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Preface
What I realize when thinking about my course of studies which started in 2007 and now
ends a little less than ten years later is that things are hard to plan in advance. I came
to St.Gallen in Switzerland to study business administration and ended up developing
keen interest in economics. A short stint in economic research at the UBS Investment
Bank motivated me to specialize in econometrics and finance. My bachelor thesis in
econometrics, however, made me realize I am more of an economist than a statistician.
This impression was reinforced by the six months I spent at the Swiss National Bank,
where I made the final decision to obtain a PhD.
In Zurich, I started out at as a PhD student at the chair of Josef Zweimüller, while
still having to take the master’s and PhD courses. Since there was plenty of coursework to
do and I was not expected to produce research output right away, this gave me valuable
time to contemplate what I wanted to specialize in. At that time, the chair oﬀered an
ideal setting to this end. Josef’s research interest comprises a wide range of fields: labor,
international trade, growth and inequality, just to name the main areas. This created an
inspiring atmosphere right from the beginning. That way, I was exposed to many diﬀerent
topics and approaches which, to my opinion, was crucial to become a good economist.
My previous work on econometrics qualified me most for the labor aspect of the chair
and hence I spent my first months delving into the endless amount of micro data Josef
has accumulated, especially the Austrian Social Security Data, which has kept me busy
ever since. This is the reason why I sometimes have the impression I know more about
Austria than about my country of origin, Germany, and my home country, Switzerland,
taken together. This endless supply of data fascinated me. After a while, however, I more
and more got the impression that approaching the data from a “theory-free” angle is also
very diﬃcult: Without the guidance of theory, I quickly got lost in the endless possible
questions I could ask. This lead me to concentrate also on theoretical models of the labor
market going forward.
To me, it only felt like being an economist once I managed to combine empirical and
theoretical work. The diﬀerent projects I was part of each required a diﬀerent combination
of approaches, tools and skills. While I am glad to see that all of the projects moved our
frontier of knowledge a little bit further, I also hope to benefit from my versatility in my
non-academic career, which is about to begin.
Along the way I briefly sketched, many people helped and supported me. First of all, I
v
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would like to thank my advisor, Josef Zweimüller, for making this whole endeavor possible.
He created an inspiring and cozy research atmosphere in our late chair, encouraged me
to work on interesting questions, and spent many hours discussing them with me. Thus,
he was pivotal in my transition from a student to a researcher. I also would like to thank
Fabrizio Zilibotti for agreeing to be my co-advisor. His ability to quickly immerse himself
into a wide range of topics and give precise feedback truly fascinates me.
Two papers in this thesis are co-authored with Josef Zweimüller, François Fontaine,
and Francis Kramarz. I am very grateful that they have agreed to collaborate with me and
for the many things I learned from them along the way, especially as to how a research
project is managed. A further project which does not show up in my dissertation is
coauthored by Andreas I. Mueller. I am very indebted to him for inviting me to visit him
at Columbia University, where I spent an unforgettable time.
I also want to thank Tobias Renkin, who started out around the same time as me and
has become a close friend since then, Sandro Favre for interesting insights into (Swiss)
history and the organization of barbecues, Philippe Ruh for introducing me to the mys-
teries of the Austrian Social Security Data, Andreas Haller for sharing the burden of
teaching macroeconomics to graduate students, Andreas Steinhauer for demonstrating
me how to connect theory and data, Christoph Winter for patiently investigating into
my numerical problems, and Claudia Bernasconi, Beatrice Brunner, Christian Kiedaisch,
Andreas Kohler, Andreas Kuhn, Harald Mayr, Aderonke Osikominu, and Stefan Staubli
for making my time both instructive and memorable.
None of this would have been possible without the love and support of my family and
friends. Many thanks go to my parents Michaela and Gerhard and my sister Laura for
always giving me great independence while trusting and supporting my plans, my “second
family” Martine, Jochen, and Theo for oﬀering me a second home for meanwhile over
twelve years, and, most importantly of all, my partner Nina. Your company, love, and
encouragement during all the years enriched my life in so many ways and gave me the
energy to make it to this point.
Zurich, February 2017
1 Introduction
“It often seems to me that’s all detective work is, wiping out your false starts
and beginning again.”
“Yes, it is very true, that. And it is just what some people will not do. They
conceive a certain theory, and everything has to fit into that theory. If one
little fact will not fit it, they throw it aside. But it is always the facts that
will not fit in that are significant.”
— Agatha Christie, Death on the Nile
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays, which, while disparate in their em-
phasis, still have various aspects in common:
First, all three of them study transitions on the labor market, either focusing on the
unemployed or the employed. It has long been understood that many aspects of labor
markets, being subject to information frictions, cannot be studied adequately through the
lens of a classical supply and demand framework. Thus, each paper relies on a search and
matching environment to get a deeper understanding of the patterns we observe. The
focus is then either put on the model’s predictions on the macro level (chapter 2), trying
to understand the evolution of labor market aggregates, or on the micro level (chapters 3
and 4), rationalizing observed behavior of individuals.
Second, at least two of the three essays (chapters 3 and 4) rely on quasi-experimental
methods in order to identify a causal eﬀect. Recent years have seen dramatic changes
in what is expected of empirical work to be deemed credible. While previously studies
posited empirical strategies that—while often being very complicated—were often ad-hoc
and not very robust, empirical designs nowadays are expected to explicitly deal with
identification, i.e. the way the data maps to the estimates through the empirical model.
While the gold-standard is an experiment, quasi-experimental designs approximate this
by looking at situations where real-world data can be treated as if generated by an
experiment.
Third, all three essays draw on administrative data, most prominently the Austrian
Social Security Database (Zweimüller et al. (2009)). While early studies mostly analyzed
aggregate data, recent advance in computational power and in the availability of admin-
istrative and survey datasets have contributed to a shift toward the analysis of micro
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data. Since economists are eventually interested in how individuals react to incentives,
individual-level data goes a long way toward understanding how economic mechanisms
actually work. Here, these incentives are embodied in institutions such as unemployment
insurance (chapters 2 and 3) and firing taxes (chapter 4) and interest lies in workers’ reac-
tion. This is even true if the nature of the analysis is more on the macro level (chapter 2),
where knowledge of individual behavior contributes to a more credible microfoundation
of aggregate relationships.
In the following, I will give a detailed overview of the individual chapters of this thesis:
Chapter 2: The Macroeconomics of Incomplete Unemployment
Insurance Take-up
While the role of unemployment insurance (UI) for its recipients has been studied exten-
sively, little research has been devoted to the question whether workers who are eligible
for UI actually claim it. The most obvious economic argument would suggest that ratio-
nal agents would always accept free money and hence that the take-up rate, the share of
eligible workers claiming UI, is 100%.
Thus, it might be surprising that numerous empirical studies, drawing on diﬀerent
datasets from diﬀerent countries, consistently measure take-up rates far below 100%.
While this stylized fact is not explicitly addressed by most of the literature, this paper is
devoted to exploring how accounting for incomplete UI take-up aﬀects various predictions
on the labor market. I do so by extending a Mortensen-Pissarides model (D. T. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (1985), Pissarides (2000)) with endogenous search eﬀort
to allow for an endogenous UI take-up decision. UI take-up is modeled as a trade-oﬀ
between a fixed cost to be paid upfront—we could think of this as administrative costs,
information costs, but also as intrinsic aversion to the welfare state and stigma—and an
uncertain length of benefit reception.
In a first step, I use a stochastic version of the model to explore the consequences for
the cyclical behavior of the labor market. On the one hand, since workers expect longer
unemployment spells in recessions, we predict a countercyclical take-up rate, which is
consistent with the evidence. On the other hand, take-up interacts with search eﬀort in
an interesting way: Having claimed UI and thus receiving benefits lowers search eﬀort.
Thus, since relatively more workers receive benefits during recessions and vice versa dur-
ing booms, variable take-up leads to additional procyclicality in aggregate search eﬀort
and hence also in the other labor market aggregates. Indeed, simulations suggest that the
volatility of search eﬀort is more than twofold compared to an economy where take-up is
held constant, while the volatility of labor market tightness, unemployment, and vacan-
cies increases by between 15 and 30%. I also find that the model produces dynamics of
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the take-up rate that closely match empirical observations. In addition to these broad
conclusions, the model also has other interesting implications: First, while the unem-
ployed who have not yet claimed UI can always revise their decision if conditions become
worse, the reverse is not true. Thus, past adverse shocks can have long-lasting eﬀects
on unemployment as they increase the share of unemployed on benefits, even if current
conditions are the same. Second, the model implies that the pool of workers on benefits
diﬀers at diﬀerent stages of the business cycle. This might have important consequences
for the optimal amount of UI benefits depending on the current state of the economy.
In a second step, I use a deterministic version of the model to investigate the con-
sequences for the optimal time structure of UI payments. The baseline finding (Shavell
and Weiss (1979), H. A. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)) implies that UI benefits should
be decreasing over time as search eﬀort is unobserved leading to moral hazard. I show
that accounting for a take-up decision leads to more backloading, possibly overturning the
other eﬀect. The intuition is the following: The government wants to minimize the cost
of providing insurance subject to the constraint of providing a minimum level of expected
utility to all unemployed. If workers diﬀer in their job search ability, workers who are
good at finding a job (high types) might already receive suﬃcient utility on their own,
while the other workers (low types) need to be insured. To save costs, the government
would want to exclude the high types, while only providing insurance to the low types.
However, as types are not observed, the insurance contract has to be designed in such
a way that only the low types select into it, while the high types do not have an incen-
tive to claim. This is done by backloading the schedule: High types know their relative
probability of being unemployed decreases over time. Thus, we can substitute payments
early in the spell by payments later in a way that leaves the expected utility of low types
unaﬀected but strictly decreases the expected utility of high types until they do not have
an incentive to claim.
Chapter 3: Quasi-experimental Evidence on Take-up and the Value
of Unemployment Insurance
This chapter is devoted to the same phenomenon as chapter 2, but looks at it from a
diﬀerent angle: While the previous chapter posited a specific behavioral model for the
take-up decision and looked at aggregate implications, we are now taking a closer look at
the actual factors underlying the take-up decision. We do so by using micro data and a
quasi-experimental setting which allows us to interpret our estimates causally.
We exploit two policy discontinuities which do not coincide perfectly: On the hand,
workers with at least three years of tenure at the time of the layoﬀ are eligible for a
severance payment of two monthly wages. On the other hand, workers who fulfill an
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experience criterion (at least three years of work experience within the preceding five
years) are eligible for up to 30 weeks of UI benefits instead of the regular 20 weeks.
Applying a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we find that the take-up rate jumps
down at the former discontinuity, while it increases at the second. This is consistent with a
benchmark job search model allowing for savings and endogenous take-up: If workers are
liquidity constrained, higher assets will facilitate consumption smoothing even without
claiming benefits. Extended benefits, in turn, increase the expected value of claiming,
thus making it more attractive to take up.
Using our model, we show how our estimates can be used to compute bounds on a
money metric of the value of unemployment insurance. First, the relative size of the
reaction of take-up and search eﬀort to eligibility for extended benefits can be used to
estimate the shape of the distribution of take-up costs and the search cost function.
Moreover, we show that there is a one-to-one mapping between the take-up probability and
the diﬀerence in intertemporal utility between claimants and non-claimants. In order to
convert this utility diﬀerence to monetary units, we normalize it by estimates of marginal
utility obtained by combining the results of the first step and our point estimates.
Our results imply that the net benefit of claiming for claimants corresponds to roughly
2.5 monthly wages for the median individual. The benefit tends to be higher for low wage
workers. For the non-claimants, our findings imply sizable costs of collecting benefits.
Chapter 4: Job Mobility and Creative Destruction: Flexicurity in
the Land of Schumpeter
In this paper we study how a major policy change in Austria—the abolition of manda-
tory severance pay and its replacement by an occupational pensions scheme—aﬀects job
mobility. The new rules are valid for all workers who started their job as of January
1, 2003. There were two major changes: First, while under the old system only laid-oﬀ
workers received a mandatory transfer, under the new system both laid-oﬀ workers and
quitters are able to transfer their pension account to the new employer. Second, a discon-
tinuous mandatory payment scheme, where the minimum severance payment amount is
determined according to a step function of previous job tenure (in particular, there is no
mandatory severance pay for tenure up to three years, while afterwards it increases to two
monthly wages) is abolished in favor of a system where firms make monthly contributions
to an account.
The policy change aﬀects the incentives of workers who anticipate a future lay-oﬀ:
Workers subject to the old system are expected to wait for a displacement in order to
collect their severance pay. Under the new system, this incentive disappears: The regula-
tion is neutral with respect to lay-oﬀs and quits, and hence we expect to see workers more
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actively searching on the job in order to find higher paying jobs and limit the amount
of time in unemployment. Importantly, note that the incentive only becomes relevant if
workers consider a future lay-oﬀ suﬃciently likely. Thus, in order to identify the reform’s
eﬀect on job mobility, we have to focus on firms experiencing adverse shocks. We approxi-
mate adverse shocks by an observed mass layoﬀ (or plant closure) and then look at worker
mobility during the period preceding the event. We employ an RDD strategy—eﬀectively
comparing workers who entered a firm shortly before and after the reform—to isolate the
reform eﬀect from potential confounding factors.
We find sizable eﬀects: Consider two workers, both having entered a firm three to four
years before a mass layoﬀ and both still employed after 12 months of tenure. Our baseline
estimates imply that a worker subject to the new system is over 12.5 percentage points
more likely to have left the employer after three years of tenure, which, from a base level
of below 25%, corresponds to a relative increase of over 50%. Moreover, we show that the
eﬀect is mostly driven by workers directly moving to a new job and not by transitions
into unemployment, which is consistent with theoretical predictions.
In order to rationalize the quantitative eﬀects we document and in order to assess the
aggregate implications, we build and estimate a job search and matching model featuring
stochastic productivity shocks on the firm level, eligible and non-eligible workers, on-the-
job search, and endogenous firm closure decisions. We find that the model can replicate
the observed patterns in workers’ behavior under reasonable parameter values, while also
being able to match aggregate data. The model predicts a positive eﬀect on productivity
as workers reallocate more quickly from less to more productive firms. Moreover, unem-
ployment is predicted to increase, as firms have a higher incentive to create jobs. While
the eﬀect on unemployment is moderate for the Austrian case, we show that the model
can generate sizable responses if the pre-reform system is calibrated in a way resembling
more a “Southern-European” case with high displacement costs.

2 The Macroeconomics of Incomplete
Unemployment Insurance Take-up
2.1 Introduction
The take-up rate of unemployment insurance (UI), i.e. the share of those eligible actually
claiming it, has only received limited attention in labor economics. Theoretical models
of the labor market generally assume it is 100% – a natural assumption as it seems.
Why should rational agents not accept free money? Given these considerations, it seems
surprising that various empirical studies reviewed in the next section consistently estimate
take-up rates far below 100%.
But why do the unemployed deliberately choose not to file for UI? Empirical evidence
detailled in the next section suggests that claiming UI entails costs, while the benefits de-
pend on the expected length of the unemployment spell. While the idea that the take-up
decision is a trade-oﬀ between claiming costs and expected benefits is not new (see Currie
(2004) for a survey of the literature and Anderson and Meyer (1997) for a simple partial
equilibrium model of the take-up decision), these insights have not been studied system-
atically on the macro level. This despite the possibility that explaining incomplete UI
take-up might not only be interesting in itself, but might also aﬀect predictions elsewhere.
Indeed, as demonstrated in this paper, endogenous take-up has important implications
for the qualitative and quantitative predictions for the cyclical properties of the labor
market and the optimal design of unemployment insurance.
In order to explore the implications of endogenous take-up on the macro level, I intro-
duce an endogenous take-up decision in a stochastic version of the Mortensen-Pissarides
(MP) search and matching model (D. T. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides
(1985), Pissarides (2000)). I assume that filing for UI entails an upfront administrative
cost, while the length of benefit reception and hence the payoﬀ is uncertain. In line with
the previous intuition, this means that the unemployed will only be willing to incur the
claiming costs if they expect a suﬃciently long duration of unemployment. Once the
take-up costs have been borne, the individual stays on unemployment benefits for the rest
of the spell. This abstracts from potentially recurring take-up costs (such as having to
go to the caseworker’s oﬃce) but corresponds to the intuition that most of the claiming
7
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costs are incurred at the beginning of the spell. An interesting implication of this setting
is that the current pool of the registered unemployed in part reflects past states of the
economy where the take-up decision was made.
In a first step, the model will be used to explore the take-up channel’s implications for
the cyclical behavior of the labor market. In equilibrium, job-finding rates are lower in
recessions, which, according to the mechanism explained above, implies that individuals
are more likely to claim. The model hence predicts a countercyclical take-up rate, which
corresponds to the empirical evidence presented in the next section. But should we also
be interested in take-up even if we did not concentrate on take-up directly? I argue
that the take-up rate aﬀects equilibrium in the labor market by interacting with search
eﬀort. I assume that, conditional on the take-up decision, unemployed individuals choose
optimal search eﬀort facing heterogeneous search costs. The consequences are twofold:
On the one hand, those with low search costs who find a job relatively quickly find it
less worthwhile to incur the cost of claiming unemployment insurance. Hence, there is
selection of diﬀerent types into registered and non-registered unemployment. On the
other hand, conditional on the take-up decision, both subgroups face diﬀerent incentives
to find a job. Since the registered are partly insured against not finding a job, their
search incentives are lower. Combining both aspects, the model predicts lower search
eﬀort and hence lower job-finding rates among the registered unemployed. However, this
mechanism also implies that not the entire gap is due to monetary incentives, but also
due to sorting of diﬀerent types into both groups, whose characteristics aﬀect search eﬀort
independently. Put diﬀerently, the interaction between search eﬀort and take-up goes in
both directions: Those who claim UI will have lower job-finding rates holding constant
search costs. But across diﬀerent types, those who find a job relatively quickly (those
with lower search costs) are less likely to claim1.
The interaction between search eﬀort and take-up implies an amplification of fluctua-
tions in aggregate search eﬀort. More workers will refrain from claiming unemployment
insurance and thus search at higher intensity if conditions are good. I calibrate the model
to match the average job-finding rates of the registered and non-registered unemployed
as well as the average take-up rate. Simulations implies that the volatility of search eﬀort
is more than twofold, while the volatility of labor market tightness, unemployment, and
vacancies increases by between 15 and 30%. Simulations of historical data reveal that the
model generates dynamics of labor market aggregates and the take-up rate that closely
1This realistic feature of the model would be preserved if we instead assumed heterogeneity in job-
finding rates conditional on search eﬀort, which would yield very similar dynamics. If we instead assumed
heterogeneity in claiming costs, however, the claiming decision would be orthogonal to the search eﬀort
decision. This would mean that we would miss the sorting of diﬀerent types into registered and non-
registered unemployment, while we would attribute the entire gap in job-finding rates monetary incentives.
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match empirical observations.
By proposing a mechanism that leads to amplification of fluctuations, the paper also
adds to the literature initiated by Shimer (2005a), who demonstrated that the stochastic
version of the standard MP model failed to account for the empirical volatility in the
aggregates of the labor market if standard parameter choices are made – a fact that had
already been noted by Andolfatto (1996). However, the model also has other important
implications along the business cycle: First, the model has interesting predictions regard-
ing path dependence. Past adverse shocks increase the share of unemployed on benefits
and hence leads to lower exit rates even if current conditions are the same. Second, I will
explore whether there are consequences for the optimal level of unemployment insurance
along the business cycle. The calibrated model implies that the elasticity of search eﬀort
to unemployment insurance among the registered unemployed is higher during booms
than during recessions, making a case for a countercyclical replacement rate. This hence
mirrors findings by Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2014), while the mechanism is diﬀer-
ent. While they emphasize general equilibrium eﬀects going through the reaction of labor
market tightness, this mechanism is absent here by construction. Instead, compositional
shifts of registered workers induce diﬀerent behavioral reactions at diﬀerent points of the
cycle.
In a second step, the steady-state version of the model is used to explore the take-up
channel’s implications for the optimal time structure of unemployment benefits. While ac-
cording to a classical result in the literature, moral hazard implies that benefits should fall
over time (Shavell and Weiss (1979), H. A. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)), I demonstrate
that endogenous take-up implies more backloading of the schedule, possibly overturning
the eﬀect of moral hazard. The intuition behind this result is the following: If work-
ers have heterogeneous job-finding prospects, those with very good opportunities might
not need to be insured in order to achieve the required level of discounted utility at the
beginning of their spell. If worker types are not observable, the benefit schedule has to
be designed in a way that gives suﬃcient utility to low types while having high types
self-select into non-take-up. This is achieved by backloading, as low types value unem-
ployment benefits in the future more than high types due to their higher probability of
remaining unemployed. Numerical exercises suggest that the eﬀect is potentially very
sizable.
I begin in the next section by summarizing empirical evidence on take-up and search
eﬀort, followed by a discussion of related literature. In Section 2.4, I describe the the-
oretical model. Section 2.5 explores the quantitative and qualitative implications of the
take-up channel along the business cycle, while Section 2.6 explains how take-up aﬀects
the optimal time-structure of unemployment benefits. Section 4.10 concludes.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence on Take-up and Search Eﬀort
Estimated
Country Source take-up Time period
Canada Storer and van Audenrode (1995) 77% 1981 – 1986
United Kingdom DWP2 (2012) 49% - 84% 1997 – 2010
United States Anderson and Meyer (1997) 24% - 50% 1979 – 1982
Blank and Card (1991) 68% - 75% 1977 – 1987
McCall (1995) 65% 1982 – 1991
Table 2.1: Overview of estimated take-up in existing studies
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Figure 2.1: Take-up rate, unemployment rate, and unemployment duration in the US over
time
Notes: The take-up rate is measured as the ratio of Initial Jobless Claims (constructed by the U.S.
Department of Labor) and job separations, calculated from CPS data using the method detailled in
Appendix A. The unemployment rate and unemployment duration are constructed by the BLS.
Various empirical studies, while diﬀering in the point estimates3, have consistently
estimated UI take-up rates far below 100% (see Table 2.1 for an overview). Moreover, UI
take-up is clearly countercyclical. This can be seen in Figure 2.1, plotting the take-up rate
(measured as initial jobless claims divided by job separations) against the unemployment
2The British Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is one of the few government agencies that
regularly publish estimates of take-up rates.
3As has been pointed out by Blasco, Fontaine, and Margolis (2010), point estimates diﬀer because of
diﬀerences in the sampling scheme. Stock sampling oversamples long unemployment spells which have
higher take-up rates, while flow sampling oversamples short spells. This distinction between stocks and
flows will be important in this paper. I will call the flow measure take-up rate, i.e. the share of those
entering unemployment claiming UI, while distinguishing this from the registration rate (stock measure),
which is the share of all unemployed who have claimed UI some time in the past. Throughout, a registered
unemployed is defined as an unemployed person who has claimed UI.
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Figure 2.2: Take-up rate and unemployment rate in Austria and UK over time
Notes: For Austria, the take-up rate is constructed from Austrian Social Security Data and defined as
the fraction of people between two jobs that ever claim UI during their nonemployment spell. The unem-
ployment rate is constructed by the Austrian National Statistical Oﬃce. For the UK, the unemployment
rate is constructed by the Oﬃce for National Statistics and reported as a yearly average. The take-up
rate is constructed by the Department for Work and Pensions.
rate and unemployment duration in the US over time4. A similar observation can also
be made for Austria (Figure 2.2a), using the data upon which the empirical section of
this paper is based, and for the UK (Figure 2.2b), one of the few countries where oﬃcial
estimates of the take-up rate are published. This suggests that this stylized fact is also
robust in an international comparison.
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Figure 2.3: Job finding rates among registered and non-registered unemployed in Austria
Notes: Constructed from Austrian Social Security Data using all unemployed between 25 and 50 with
unemployment spells below two years. I exclude employees recalled to their previous employer. The
numbers are corrected for seasonality.
As mentioned in the previous section, the take-up decision will be modelled as a trade-
oﬀ between upfront claiming costs and the expected unemployment duration. Is this a
realistic characterization of the take-up decision? In a special CPS supplement adminis-
tered in 2005, those with self-reported eligibility who did not claim UI were asked for their
4It has been noted by Hobijn and Şahin (2011) that initial jobless claims overstate layoﬀs if the
take-up rate is countercyclical.
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Number in
Reasons for not applying for UI thousands Percent
Attitude/understanding/barrier to UI benefits 778 37.00
Do not need money/do not want the hassle 220 10.40
Negative attitude about UI 78 3.74
Do not know about UI/how to file 212 10.19
Barrier to filing (e.g. language, transportation) 52 2.49
Told not eligible 175 8.32
Plan to file soon 42 2.08
Job expected/became employed 594 28.27
Not looking for a job 231 11.02
Other reasons/don’t know 496 23.70
Total 4368 100.00
Table 2.2: Reason for not applying for UI benefits in current unemployment spell, job
losers and leavers eligible for UI (self-reported) (Vroman (2009), Table 4)
Notes: The figures represent population estimates of responses to the following question from a special
CPS supplement administered in January, May, July, and November 2005: “What is the main reason
. . . has not applied for unemployment compensation since . . . last job?” The population estimates are
obtained using the CPS weights.
main reason (Table 2.2). About two thirds of all responses are accounted for by the cate-
gories “Attitude/understanding/barrier to UI benefits” (37%) and “Job expected/became
employed” (28%). The importance of the former category demonstrates that claiming
UI is costly and that these costs have to be incurred upfront. The latter category, in
turn, implies that workers take their labor market prospects into account when deciding
whether to claim unemployment insurance. The results hence suggest that a trade-oﬀ
between upfront claiming costs and expected benefit duration is a good description of the
actual mechanism at work.
Theory also predicts higher search eﬀort and hence higher job-finding rates among non-
registered unemployed. Indeed, Figure 2.3, where I plot the average weekly job-finding
rates for the registered and non-registered unemployed in Austria over time, demonstrates
that the non-registered unemployed are around four times more likely than the registered
to find a job within one week.
To get a rough idea of how the interaction of search eﬀort and take-up might be im-
portant along the business cycle, the following accounting exercise is instructive: Assume
the aggregate job-finding rate, ft, evolves over time according to
ft = stf
1
t + (1  st)f 0t ,
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where f 1t and f 0t denote the job-finding rates among the registered and non-registered
unemployed, respectively. Assume that e ⌘ f 1t /f 0t is constant over time, yielding
ft = (st + (1  st)e)f 0t .
Assuming a value for e and given data on ft and st, we can back out an implied value of
f 0t . To see how much variable take-up potentially contributes to the aggregate movement
of the job-finding rate, we can calculate the counterfactual job-finding rate if take-up is
held constant,
f˜t = (s¯+ (1  s¯)e)f 0t ,
where s¯ denotes the average take-up rate, as well as the counterfactual job-finding rate if
the conditional job-finding rates are held constant, given by
˜˜ft = (st + (1  st)e)f¯ 0,
where f¯ 0 is the average job-finding rate among the non-registered.
In Figure 2.4, we plot the results for the US, choosing e so that the average weekly
job-finding rate among the non-registered is around four times as large as among the reg-
istered. The results suggest that the take-up eﬀect is important especially at the onset of
recessions. For instance, the simple calculation implies that the fall in the job-finding rate
during the Great Recession was around twice as large as compared to a situation where
the fraction of the unemployed claiming unemployment insurance remained constant.
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Figure 2.4: Job-finding rate in the US, actual vs. counterfactuals
Notes: The black lines correspond to the monthly job-finding rate, constructed by Shimer (2005a) and
based on unemployment data constructed by the BLS based on the CPS. The gray line in panel (a)
corresponds to the counterfactual job-finding rate if the take-up rate is fixed at its average level, while
the gray line in panel (b) corresponds to the counterfactual job-finding rate if the conditional job-finding
rates are kept constant and only the take-up rate varies. Details on the construction are in the main
text. All numbers are quarterly averages of monthly series and reported in logs as deviations from an HP
trend with smoothing parameter 1,600.
While this back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that accounting for take-up might
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be quantitatively important, there are still too many simplifications to draw a definite
conclusion: On the one hand, diﬀerential selection of diﬀerent types into registered and
non-registered unemployment, as explained above, might explain part of the gap in average
job-finding rates between the registered and non-registered unemployed. This implies
that the marginal type who switches from claiming to not claiming (or vice versa) at a
given point in time might increase his search eﬀort by less since she only reacts to the
monetary incentive while heterogeneity is kept constant. On the other hand, we have
approximated the share of unemployed on benefits (a stock measure), by the take-up rate
(a flow measure), which is not entirely correct.
Hence, a model is needed which takes care of these issues. A model will also enable
us to gain further intuition of how search eﬀort and take-up interact, as well as to draw
normative conclusions.
2.3 Related Literature
Previous work on UI take-up primarily focused on empirical investigations of its deter-
minants. These are surveyed in Currie (2004) and Hernanz, Malherbet, and Pellizzari
(2004), notable examples are Blank and Card (1991), McCall (1995) and Anderson and
Meyer (1997), all concluding UI generosity is a significant determinant of take-up, as well
as Burtless (1983), among the first to document the stylized fact and exploring possible
explanations. Budd and McCall (1997) analyze the role of unions in the take-up de-
cision, finding that eligible blue-collar workers laid-oﬀ from union jobs were 23% more
likely to receive benefits. The authors interpret these findings as suggesting that unions
help workers to exercise their rights, i.e. reduced claiming costs. Petrongolo (2009) em-
pirically analyzes a mechanism similar to the one considered here, showing that a UK
JSA reform increasing job search requirements significantly increased the share of non-
claimants. Kroft (2008), on the other hand, investigates the implications of a variable
take-up rate for optimal unemployment insurance in a static environment. He finds that
the eﬀect depends on whether there are social spillovers, i.e. whether take-up costs are
lower in times of high take-up. The presence of take-up decreases its level if no social
spillovers are present, while its level is increased in the opposite case.
In a recent working paper, Hertel-Fernandez and Wenger (2013) describe an experi-
ment where randomly selected unemployed were provided accurate information about UI
eligibility requirements. Contrary to expectation, treated individuals actually had lower
participation. The authors interpret the finding as a consequence of uncertainty about
actual take-up costs. Ebenstein and Stange (2010) exploit cross-state variation in the
introduction of phone- and internet-based claiming but do not find significant eﬀects on
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take-up, suggesting physical barriers alone do not explain non-take-up. On the contrary,
though not connected to UI, Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007) show that the introduction
of electronic filing for Earned Income Tax Credit significantly increased participation. In
a field experiment, randomly sending diﬀerent reminders to non-claimants of EITC ben-
efits, Bhargava and Manoli (2015) find that claiming was very responsive to treatments
that attempted to simplify information. By contrast, treatments that attempted to re-
duce perceived costs connected to application, stigma, or audit did not have a significant
eﬀect. In sum, while the numbers in Table 2.2 point to a significant role for take-up
costs, the cited studies remain inconclusive as to their exact composition. While this is
an important question for policy makers, the exact composition of take-up costs will not
be important for the mechanism presented here.
Only recently have there been attempts to come up with structural models to ex-
plain the take-up process in more detail. One of them is Blasco and Fontaine (2012),
who incorporate a take-up decision in a detailed partial equilibrium job search model
and then use structural estimation to identify the parameters (Petrongolo (2009) also
applied a partial equilibrium search model to demonstrate the eﬀect of higher job search
requirements). Their results suggest that transaction costs in the claiming process are
substantial. Take-up of welfare programs, by contrast, was already analyzed by Moﬃtt
(1983), who emphasizes the role of stigma. However, a critical point about stigma as an
explanation for non-take-up is that take-up of means-tested programs is not lower whereas
they should be more stigmatic (see Currie (2004) for more on this).
There are only two models that introduce UI take-up in a general equilibrium setting
I am aware of. One is Auray, Fuller, and Lkhagvasuren (2013). Their setting is only
relevant for a system where firms are experience rated. This means that firms pay higher
payroll taxes if more of their previous employees collected benefits. Since firms thus prefer
workers not taking up UI, these will enjoy higher job arrival rates and workers will select
endogenously into registered and non-registered unemployment. While their model works
well to predict long-term averages in the data, their mechanism is quite diﬀerent from the
one presented here. Closest to my work is Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014).
They introduce a take-up decision into a DSGE model with matching frictions and a
representative household in order to calculate the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of
employment. However, their strategy diﬀers from mine in that they model take-up as a
static decision problem: The representative household decides how many of its members
to allocate to UI, trading oﬀ take-up costs that are increasing in the number of claimants
against take-up value, which depends on the marginal value of consumption and is hence
cyclical. By contrast, I model take-up as a forward looking decision that emphasizes
the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between an upfront claiming cost and the expected length of
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unemployment, which I consider key in understanding this phenomenon given the findings
in Table 2.2.
2.4 The Model
2.4.1 Environment
The model is in discrete time. I assume log productivity p follows a Markov process
represented by the conditional c.d.f. G(p0|p) and specified as (throughout, primes denote
next-period values)
p0 = ⇢p+ "0,
where p is standardized to have average 0 and " denotes productivity innovations.
To the extent that firms and workers incur search costs before forming a match, there
is a positive match surplus that has to be shared according to a wage setting rule. The-
oretically, any rule that guarantees that the wage stays within the bargaining range is
compatible with the model assumptions. I depart from the standard MP framework in
following Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Michaillat (2012) in assuming that wages satisfy
w(p) = w0 exp((1   )p),
which can be seen as a reduced-form way of representing sticky wages, where 0     1
denotes the extent of wage rigidity. For   = 0 we get a perfectly elastic wage, while   = 1
corresponds to the special case of constant wages analyzed by Hall (2005). As long as p is
bounden from below and from above, parameters can always be chosen such that the wage
is guaranteed to stay within the bargaining range. In Section 2.5.3, I demonstrate that the
main conclusions for the behavior along the business cycle are unchanged – if anything,
the eﬀect of take-up on cyclicality becomes larger – if we assume Nash bargaining instead.
As noted by Shimer (2005a), wage stickiness is a way of inducing suﬃcient volatility
in the stochastic DMP model. Hence, by choosing a suﬃciently high  , we could already
match the observed volatility of labor market aggregates. By contrast, I will use   to
generate suﬃcient baseline volatility, which is then amplified by the take-up channel so
as to close the gap to the data. A way of assessing amplification due to take-up would be
to compare the values of   with and without take-up needed in order to generate enough
volatility in the model. Moreover, setting   > 0 also reflects the fact that research up to
this date has suggested many sensible remedies for the Shimer puzzle which should be at
work beside the take-up channel.
The matching technology maps the aggregate unemployment rate u, aggregate vacancy
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rate v and aggregate search eﬀort e to the number of matches formed m, according to
m = m(e · u, v),
wherem(·, ·) is increasing in both arguments and features constant returns to scale. Defin-
ing the job-market tightness as
✓ ⌘ v
e · u,
the probability that a vacancy is filled can be written
m(e · u, v)
v
= m
⇣e · u
v
, 1
⌘
⌘ q (✓) ,
where q0(✓) < 0, while the probability that unemployed person i with search eﬀort ei finds
a job is given by
ei
m(e · u, v)
e · u = eim
⇣
1,
v
e · u
⌘
= ei✓q (✓) ⌘ eif (✓) ,
where f 0(✓) > 0.
Following general practice, I assume that m is Cobb-Douglas,
m = m0(e · u)↵v1 ↵,
implying q(✓) = m0✓ ↵ and f(✓) = m0✓1 ↵.
2.4.2 Firms
Firms produce with a linear production technology. Hence the firm size is indeterminate
and we can assume that one firm consists of one job, which is either occupied and produces
p, or vacant and costs c. A separation occurs with exogenous probability  . In these
respects the labor demand side of the economy is standard and follows Pissarides (2000).
The value of a job and of a vacancy then satisfy, respectively:
J(p) = exp(p)  w(p) +   [(1   )EpJ(p0) +  EpV (p0)] (2.1)
V (p) =  c+   [q (✓(p))EpJ(p0) + (1  q (✓(p)))EpV (p0)] (2.2)
If a job is filled, it produces exp(p) and costs w(p) currently. With probability   the
job is dissolved, while it persists with probability 1    . A vacancy costs c and is filled
with probability q(✓(p)) while with opposite probability it remains vacant. Using the
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free-entry condition V (p) = 0 in (2.2), we find
EpJ(p0) =
c
 q(✓(p))
, (2.3)
which can be substituted in (2.1) to yield
J(p) = exp(p)  w(p) + (1   ) c
q(✓(p))
.
Taking expectations, updating one period and replacing EpJ(p0) in (2.3), we arrive at a
rational expectations functional equation
c
 q (✓(p))
= Ep
⇢
exp(p0)  w(p0) + (1   ) c
q (✓(p0))
 
, (2.4)
requiring that firms create vacancies until expected hiring costs equal expected discounted
profits. Given the assumed functional form for w(p), this equation pins down a policy
function ✓(p) and can easily be solved numerically.
Importantly, ✓(p) ⌘ v(p, e, u)/(eu) is invariant to changes in e and u, meaning that
firms vary vacancies one-to-one with aggregate search eﬀort and unemployment. The
solution ✓(p) holds irrespective of worker behavior, while it feeds back into firm behavior
through bargaining in the standard model. In the present framework, the simple reduced-
form specification of wages leads to a block-recursive model, so that we can solve for the
firm policy function ✓(p) and then determine worker behavior taking ✓(p) as given.
2.4.3 Workers
Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral, abstracting from savings motives. In contrast
to the usual strategy, where we assume that workers receive unemployment benefits au-
tomatically once they become unemployed, I now take the aforementioned stylized facts
into account by assuming that UI has to be claimed and that claiming is costly. In
particular, the unemployed incur upfront administrative costs  in order to qualify for
unemployment insurance benefits z during every period of the remaining unemployment
spell, including the current. Note that this induces an asymmetry: If already registered,
claiming costs are sunk and there is never an incentive to leave registered unemployment
except by finding a job. On the other hand, it might well happen that claiming occurs
after a period of non-registered unemployment.
By modelling take-up costs as a one-time upfront payment, I abstract from potentially
recurring costs, such as those of having to stick to the rules or of the psychological hurdle
of having to go to the UI oﬃce. While this is clearly a simplification, it corresponds
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to the intuition that most of the hazzle connected to claiming UI benefits occurs at the
beginning of a spell: Acquiring information about the system, overcoming one’s intrinsic
aversion of receiving benefits, putting together all material needed for the claim, and so
on. Moreover, recurring take-up costs will in part be reflected in the model if we interpret
unemployment benefits as net of recurring take-up costs.
Conditional on the registration status, the unemployed choose search eﬀort optimally,
facing strictly convex search costs c(ei) = !i(1 + ) 1e1+i , where  > 0 and !i > 0
is heterogeneous and constant over time. I could also have assumed heterogeneity of
claiming costs, but this way I can account for the conjecture that registered and non-
registered unemployed are also diﬀerent in other dimensions. This means that the model
will generate diﬀerences in job-finding rates between the two groups not only because of
diﬀerent monetary incentives, but also because both groups diﬀer ex-ante in characteristics
that aﬀect search eﬀort independently of the take-up decision.
Denote by Ti(p) and Ni(p) the values of a registered and non-registered unemployed
with !i, respectively. If not yet registered, individual i files for unemployment insurance if
Ti(p)     Ni(p). Let Ui(p) ⌘ max {Ti(p)   , Ni(p)}. Conditional on not (yet) having
claimed for unemployment insurance, individual i then solves
Ni(p) = max
ei 0
⇢
`  !i
1 + 
e1+i +   [eif(✓(p))EpWi(p0) + (1  eif(✓(p))EpUi(p0)]
 
. (2.5)
If not yet registered, individual i currently only earns the value of leisure ` minus the
search cost. In the subsequent period, a job is found with probability eif(✓(p)), while the
individual remains unemployed with opposite probability. The continuation value is then
given by max {Ti(p)   , Ni(p)}, since i might change into registered unemployment for
some realizations of p0.
I conjecture that Ti(p) > Ni(p) for all p and !i, so that registered unemployed never
have an incentive to switch back into non-registered unemployment. This (rather intu-
itive) statement will be shown formally in the next section. Conditional on having already
registered, individual i then solves
Ti(p) = max
ei 0
⇢
`+ z   !i
1 + 
e1+i +   [eif(✓(p))EpWi(p0) + (1  eif(✓(p))EpTi(p0)]
 
.
(2.6)
If already registered, i receives benefits z in addition to the value of leisure. If no job is
found, i remains registered for every realization of future productivity, earning Ti(p0). If
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employed, individual i earns value
Wi(p) = w(p) +   [ EpUi(p0) + (1   )EpWi(p0)] . (2.7)
If employed, i currently earns w(p) while facing the choice of registering if the match
is dissolved.
2.4.4 Equilibrium and Aggregate Dynamics
An equilibrium in this economy describes vacancy creation decisions by firms for diﬀerent
levels of productivity, and search eﬀort and take-up decisions by the unemployed for dif-
ferent levels of productivity and search costs. The equilibrium conditions in this economy
are summarized in the following definition:
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is given by functions {✓(p), ei(p, 0), ei(p, 1), ki(p)} and
values {Ni(p), Ti(p),Wi(p)} such that
1. labor market tightness ✓(p) solves the recursive equation (2.4);
2. search eﬀort if not registered ei(p, 0) solves (2.5) given {Ni(p), Ti(p),Wi(p)} for all
p and i;
3. search eﬀort if registered ei(p, 1) solves (2.6) given {Ni(p), Ti(p),Wi(p)} for all p
and i;
4. the take-up decision is given by ki(p) = 1 [Ti(p)     Ni(p)] for all p and i and;
5. values {Ni(p), Ti(p),Wi(p)} solve recursive equations (2.5) - (2.7).
In more intuitive words, we require that (1) firms create vacancies until they make
zero profit in expectation, (2) and (3) the unemployed not registered and registered choose
search eﬀort until marginal search costs equal marginal search return, (4) non-registered
unemployed choose to register if their discounted utility when registered net of claim-
ing costs exceeds discounted utility when not registered, and (5) agents have rational
expectations, i.e. present discounted utility takes future optimal decisions into account.
To prove existence of this equilibrium, I proceed in two steps. As a first step, I prove
that the firm’s policy function ✓(p) pinned down by equation (2.4) exists and is unique.
This is established in Proposition 2.1. Given the block-recursive nature of the model, I
can then take this result as given and prove the existence and uniqueness on the worker
side.
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Proposition 2.1. Assume that p 2 [p, p]. Then, the policy function ✓(p) defined by
condition (2.4) exists and is unique. In addition, as long as instantaneous profits exp(p) 
w(p) are positive, ✓(p) is strictly increasing in p.
Proof. See appendix.
Under assumptions that guarantee that job-finding rates do not become too high, it
can be shown that the equilibrium defined in Definition 4.1 exists and is unique:
Proposition 2.2. Assume that p 2 [p, p] and that !i is bounded below by some ! > 0 so
that max {eif(✓(p))}  1   . Then, the equilibrium defined in Definition 4.1 exists and
is unique.
Proof. See appendix.
Up to now, I used the assumption that Ti(p) > Ni(p) for all p and !i to rule out any
incentive to switch back to non-registered unemployment. The following result justifies
this:
Lemma 1. If z > 0, then Ti(p) > Ni(p) for all p and !i.
Proof. Define N˜i(p, ei) and T˜i(p, ei) as the value of non-registered and registered unem-
ployment for given ei. We have Ni(p) = N˜i(p, eNi (p)) and Ti(p) = T˜i(p, eTi (p)), where
eNi = argmaxei 0 N˜i(p, ei) and eTi = argmaxei 0 T˜i(p, ei). Then
Ni(p) = N˜i(p, e
N
i (p)) < T˜i(p, e
N
i (p))  T˜i(p, eTi (p)) = Ti(p),
where the first inequality follows since i is given a positive payment z currently and
possibly in the future, while transition rates are unchanged.
Denote by si 2 {0, 1} whether individual i is registered. Moreover, define ki(p) 2 {0, 1}
as the take-up decision given p. In the next subsection, I will prove that the unemployed
will follow a cutoﬀ rule under mild conditions, i.e. for every worker there is productivity
level p¯i such that ki(p) = 1 [p  p¯i]. Note that ki(p) diﬀers from si in that si is 1 if i has
registered in the past, while ki(p) is 1 if i would want to register now. Once registered,
person i can only exit registered unemployment by finding a job. The policy function
ki(p) answers the question: If I were unemployed and not yet registered, would I want
to claim UI given my search costs and current productivity? ki(p) can be regarded as a
flow measure of take-up. Another question we could ask is: If I observe an unemployed
worker with search costs !i, how likely is he to be registered? This is described by a stock
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measure of take-up, given by the probability that the unemployed with search costs !i
are registered (registration rate), hi ⌘ Prob(si = 1), and following the recursive equation
h0i = max
n
(1  ei(p, 1)f(✓(p)))hi, ki(p0)
o
. (2.8)
Given a realization p0  p¯i, we have ki(p0) = 1, in which case every not yet registered
unemployed with !i wants to register, irrespective of how long they have been unemployed,
implying h0i = 1. On the other hand, if p0 > p¯i, nobody files for UI and only those
who were registered previously and have not found a job remain registered, yielding
h0i = (1  ei(p, 1)f(✓(p)))hi.
Average search eﬀort given search cost !i is then given by
ei = hiei(p, 1) + (1  hi)ei(p, 0),
while the unemployment rate among those with search cost !i follows recursively from
u0i = (1  eif(✓(p)))ui +  (1  ui), (2.9)
and aggregate unemployment can be found by averaging over all types
u =
Z 1
0
ui dF (!i). (2.10)
Aggregate search eﬀort is average search eﬀort conditional on being unemployed
e =
R1
0 eiui dF (!i)R1
0 ui dF (!i)
. (2.11)
2.4.5 How Do Optimal Search Eﬀort and Take-up Interact?
To characterize optimal search eﬀort, denote by si 2 {0, 1} whether i is registered. The
first-order conditions for search eﬀort ei(p, si) given productivity and registration status
are then given by
!iei(p, 0)
 =  f(✓(p)) [EpWi(p0)  EpUi(p0)]
!iei(p, 1)
 =  f(✓(p)) [EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0)] ,
setting marginal search costs equal to marginal search return. These conditions pin down
two potential search eﬀorts, while in reality we only observe one of the two levels depending
on whether i is registered. It can easily be shown that search eﬀort is higher if not
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registered and that higher search costs imply lower search, as summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. Optimal search eﬀort ei(p, si) satisfies the following:
i Search eﬀort is always higher if not registered: ei(p, 0)   ei(p, 1) 8 i, p
ii Higher search costs imply lower search: @ei(p, si)/@!i < 0 8 i, p
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, while the already registered know that they will get a payment z if no job
is found, the non-registered either will get no payment or will have to bear the claiming
cost  if they file for UI in the subsequent period. Thus, the increase in value if a job is
found is always higher for the non-registered unemployed, leading to higher search eﬀort
due to increasing marginal search costs. In addition, those with lower search costs will
always exert higher search eﬀort in equilibrium.
Moreover, under not very restrictive assumptions, individual search eﬀort given regis-
tration status will turn out to be procyclical, as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Denote by g(p0|p) the conditional density of p0 given p. Individual
search eﬀort conditional on registration status is procyclical, i.e. @ei(p, si)/@p > 0 8 i, if
(1 ↵)"✓,p+"g,p > 0, where "✓,p ⌘ (@✓(p)/@p)(1/✓(p)) denotes the elasticity of labor market
tightness with respect to productivity and "g,p ⌘ (@g(p0|p)/@p)(1/g(p0|p)) the elasticity of
the conditional density of next period’s productivity with respect to current productivity5.
Proof. See appendix.
The procyclicality of individual search eﬀort will not be crucial for the qualitative
impact of the take-up channel in equilibrium. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that
the condition for procyclicality does not turn out to be restrictive in practice. While
plausible values for "✓,p range between 1 and 20 (see D. Mortensen and Nagypál (2007)),
"g,p, assuming that innovations in the log-productivity process follow a normal distribution
with variance  2, can be shown to equal (⇢/ 2)(p0   ⇢p), which varies between  0.001
and 0.001 for the state-space and calibration used in the simulations.
Intuitively, why is this condition needed to ensure procyclicality? Strict convexity of
search costs implies that search eﬀort varies procyclically if the marginal search return
does. The latter varies along two dimensions. On the one hand, as p increases, the job-
finding rate increases, making the gain in value when finding a job more likely, implying
a procyclical movement. On the other hand, for a given job-finding rate, the relative
5In the definition of the elasticities, note that p denotes log productivity.
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expected values of working and staying unemployed change. The value of working in-
creases because wages and the continuation value increase. However, the value of being
unemployed also increases and might do so more strongly if the option value of being
unemployed increases strongly. Hence, we can have a pro- and countercyclical movement
in this second dimension. The condition in Proposition 2 is suﬃcient such that the second
dimension does not outweigh the first.
Given optimal search eﬀort, the non-registered unemployed decide every period whether
to register. In this decision, they have to trade oﬀ a fixed take-up cost against expected
future payments, discounted at the discount rate and the expected future job finding rates.
On the other hand, the non-registered have higher job finding rates and their utility gain
is higher if they find a job. Moreover, they still have the option of claiming in the future if
conditions change. This gives the non-registered a higher option value. The unemployed
will only be willing to claim UI if their probability of staying unemployed is suﬃciently
high, that is, if their job-finding rate is suﬃciently low either due to a low tightness or a
low search eﬀort. Hence, the unemployed are more likely to claim if the tightness is low
and their search costs are high, leading to a low search eﬀort.
In Proposition 2.4, I show that if search eﬀort is procyclical, the unemployed follow
a cutoﬀ rule, namely that for a given !i, there is some p¯i so that i registers if p  p¯i.
Moreover, while I have not been able to show this formally, I conjecture that p¯i is increasing
in !i, meaning that those with higher search costs are more likely to register. This
conjecture has been confirmed in all numerical exercises.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that p 2 [p, p], as well as @ei(p, 1)/@p > 0 and @ei(p, 0)/@p > 0
for all p and i. Then, the unemployed follow a cutoﬀ rule. That is, there is a productivity
level p¯i, so that ki(p) = 1 [p  p¯i].
Proof. See appendix.
2.5 How does the Take-up Channel Aﬀect the Cyclical-
ity of Unemployment and Vacancies?
The aforementioned predictions on the interaction of take-up and search eﬀort possibly
have important implications for the cyclicality of the labor market aggregates. To intu-
itively see how, consider Figure 2.5. For simplicity, assume that all i are equally likely to be
unemployed. The two solid lines correspond to
R1
0 ei(p, 0) dF (!i) and
R1
0 ei(p, 1) dF (!i),
i.e. aggregate search eﬀort if all i are not registered or registered, respectively. As argued
before, search eﬀort is always lower if registered. If we have hi 2 (0, 1), by contrast, but hi
does not depend on p, aggregate search eﬀort
R1
0 hiei(p, 1) + (1  hi)ei(p, 0) dF (!i) looks
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Figure 2.5: Search eﬀort over the business cycle
similar to the dashed black line. On the other hand, if the unemployed are less likely to be
registered for higher p, aggregate search eﬀort turns out to be steeper, as exemplified by
the gray dashed line. In a stochastic setting, this implies more volatility in search eﬀort
if its interaction with take-up is taken into account.
The rest of the present section will be devoted to getting a quantitative sense of the
notion that the take-up channel amplifies fluctuations. To this end, I will simulate a
calibrated version of the model, as explained in detail in the following.
2.5.1 Computation and Calibration
I assume that productivity innovations are normal with variance  2" and approximate the
stochastic process of p by a 51-state Markov chain using the algorithm due to Tauchen
(1986). Steady-state productivity is standardized to 1. As was shown in the proof of
Proposition 2.1, (2.4) defines a uniform contraction. Hence, I can iterate until convergence
on (2.4) to find a policy function ✓(p), which is independent of search eﬀort over the
business cycle. Given the block-recursive nature of the model, I can take ✓(p) as given
and turn to the worker-side of the economy.
A convenient consequence of the fact that ✓(p) is invariant to search eﬀort is that
diﬀerent workers do not interact, meaning that individual behavior is not aﬀected by the
distribution of !. As a consequence, I can solve the model separately for diﬀerent values
of ! and aggregate afterwards to characterize the aggregate economy. Specifically, I use
a grid of 100 values for !i and iterate on equations (2.5) - (2.7) to obtain policy functions
(ei(p, 0), ei(p, 1), ki(p)). Given initial conditions and a realization of the productivity
process {pt}, realizations of the registration rate hit and unemployment rate uit can be
deduced using recursive equations (2.8) and (2.9).
Aggregate values are obtained by integrating over all i using the appropriate condi-
tional distribution of !i, as in equations (2.10) and (2.11). For the unconditional distribu-
tion, I assume that log!i ⇠ N (µ,  2), truncated so that !i   ! > 0 to ensure job-finding
rates below 1.
The model’s periodicity is chosen to be a month divided by 28, roughly corresponding
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to one day. To calibrate the model, parameters  , ↵,  , ⇢,  2" , c,  , z, and  are chosen
according to the literature, while the remaining parameters w0, m0, µ,  2, `, and  are
chosen by requiring the certainty-equivalent version of the model to match certain long-
run outcomes. Specifically, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) calculate a steady-state labor
market tightness ✓⇤ of 0.634 for the US. Moreover, for the US between 1951 and 2003,
Shimer (2005a) estimates a monthly job-finding and job-separation rate of 0.45 and 0.026,
respectively, implying a steady-state unemployment rate of u⇤ = .026/(.026+.45) ⇡ 0.055.
At daily frequency, this translates into a steady-state job finding rate of f ⇤ = 1   (1  
0.45)1/28 ⇡ 0.022 and a job-separation rate of   = u⇤1 u⇤f ⇤ ⇡ 0.0012. I set the elasticity
of the vacancy-filling rate with respect to the labor market tightness ↵ to 0.5, which is
at the lower end of the range of plausible values (0.5 to 0.7) according to the survey by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000). I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in setting
c = 0.584 and   = .991/84, corresponding to an annual interest rate of around 4 %. Given
these parameter choices, solving the steady-state version of (2.4), I find
(c/m0)(✓
⇤)↵ (1/    1 +  ) = 1  w0,
which pins down the (approximate) average wage w0. The matching parameter m0, on
the other hand, is chosen by requiring that
f ⇤ = f(✓⇤) = m0(✓⇤)1 ↵.
Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013) estimate the elasticity with respect to wages
(= 1    ) to be 0.3 for job-stayers and 0.8 for job-movers using CPS data. Given this
background, I choose a cautious value of   = 0.25, limiting the extent of fluctuations
due to wage rigidity. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) measure productivity as seasonally
adjusted quarterly real average output per person in the non-farm business sector con-
structed by the BLS and find the quarterly autocorrelation and unconditional standard
deviation on the HP-filtered process (smoothing parameter 1600) (Prescott (1986)) to be
0.765 and 0.013, respectively. At daily frequency, this translates into ⇢ = 0.9989 and
 " = 0.0011. This completes the calibration of the labor demand side of the economy and
determines the cyclical properties of the labor market tightness.
In structurally estimated equilibrium search models, Yashiv (2000) (Israeli data) and
Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Werwatz (2005) (Danish data) each find
search cost functions that are roughly quadratic. I hence set  = 1. I fix the replacement
rate z at a very cautious value of 0.2. Thus, as explained below, I will obtain a lower
bound on the influence of the take-up channel. The remaining parameters µ,  2, `, and  
are chosen by numerically solving the certainty equivalent version of the worker problem
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and targeting the following quantities:
1. Using Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD)6 and a sample of unemployed between
25 and 50 in the years 1984 until 2008, I find an average take-up rate of s¯ = 0.5063.
2. As shown in Figure 2.3 which is constructed from ASSD, the job-finding rate of the
non-registered unemployed is about four times as large as of the registered. I target
this ratio, taking into account that diﬀerent !i’s will sort into the two subgroups.
3. Average search eﬀort among the unemployed is standardized to 1.
4. I choose ` so that the average steady-state flow utility while unemployed, i.e. the
average of `+s⇤i z !i/(1+)(e⇤i )1+, where e⇤i denotes the steady-state search eﬀort of
a worker with search costs !i taking into account i’s steady-state registration status
s⇤i , equals 0.7, following Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Table 2.3 summarizes the resulting calibration.
Parameter Definition Value
exp(µ) Median of !i 0.171
 2 Dispersion of search costs 2.521
  Wage rigidity 0.200
w0 Average wage 0.977
` Value of leisure 0.667
z Replacement rate 0.200
 Take-up cost 5.563
 Elasticity of marg. search cost 1.000
↵ Elasticity of q w.r.t. ✓ 0.500
m0 Matching parameter 0.027
c Vacancy cost 0.584
  Discount rate 1.000
  Separation rate 0.001
⇢ Persistence of the productivity process 0.999
 2" Variance of innovations in productivity process 0.001
Table 2.3: Baseline calibration
Estimated take-up costs  are substantial – around 5.6 times the average daily wage.
Accumulated UI benefits outweigh upfront take-up costs after around one month. How-
ever, this calculation does not take into account that registered unemployed have lower
search costs than the non-registered.
6ASSD covers the universe of Austrian private sector workers, providing longitudinal information
from 1972 onwards. The data has been collected in order to verify old-age pension claims and hence
covers all information relevant for this aim. The dataset is useful here because we can observe UI take-up
as well as individual search outcomes. ASSD has been used in a number of studies (e.g., Lalive, Van Ours,
and Zweimüller (2006), Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), Lalive, Schlosser, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller
(2014)). For more information about the ASSD, see Zweimüller et al. (2009).
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In order to understand the parameterization of the model, it is important to mention
that the diﬀerences in observed search eﬀorts between registered and non-registered un-
employed can be generated by a continuum of possible values of z and  2. On the one
hand, diﬀerences in search eﬀort could largely be due to diﬀerences in expected monetary
payments, while registered and non-registered unemployed do not diﬀer much in their
search costs. On the other hand, it could be that diﬀerences in payoﬀs do not play a
big role, while the two groups diﬀer a lot in their search eﬀort because eﬀort costs are
very disperse and diﬀerent people have sorted into the two groups. The first situation
corresponds to a large value of z and a low value of  2, and vice versa for the second
situation.
The take-up channel is the stronger, the closer we are to the former situation. If
all diﬀerences between the two groups are due to diﬀerences in search costs, a change
in the registration rate will only lead to a reshuﬄing of types between the two groups,
while search eﬀort conditional on !i will not change much. By contrast, if diﬀerences in
search eﬀort are largely due to diﬀerences in monetary incentives, individuals change their
search eﬀort when changing the registration status. This will amplify fluctuations in the
aggregate economy.
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Figure 2.6: Job-finding rates in the certainty-equivalent version of the model
Notes: Figure 2.6a plots the job-finding rates observed in the certainty-equivalent version of the model if
either all unemployed are registered or non-registered. Figure 2.6b plots the ratio of weekly job-finding
rates while non-registered and registered conditional on search costs. Both figures are obtained using the
calibration in Table 2.3.
Setting z = 0.2, corresponding to a replacement rate of a little more than 20%, I
use an estimate that is already very cautious for the American unemployment insurance
system, let alone the system of many European countries. In particular, Anderson and
Meyer (1997) calculate an after-tax replacement rate of 36%. This number does not
account, however, for additional costs due to administrative requirements connected to
receiving benefits and finite benefit reception length. By using a cautious value for z,
we can be assured that the influence of the take-up channel is not due to an unrealistic
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parameterization of the model.
To translate the calibration of the search cost distribution into more easily inter-
pretable terms, consider Figures 2.6a and 2.6b, summarizing properties of the certainty-
equivalent version of the model. Figure 2.6a plots the observed weekly job-finding rates
if either all unemployed are registered or non-registered. It can be seen that job-finding
rates conditional on take-up status are quite disperse, while the shift in the job-finding
rate following a change in take-up status is moderate in comparison. In Figure 2.6b, I
plot the relative change in the job-finding rate if an unemployed switches from registered
to non-registered – holding constant search costs and hence isolating the eﬀect of the
monetary incentive. This change is increasing in search costs, since diﬀerences in payoﬀ
are higher due to the longer expected length of unemployment in the case of high search
costs. As can be seen, the ratio ranges between around 1.5 and 1.8 with an average of
around 1.7, while the overall ratio, also accounting for the diﬀerent distribution of search
costs in both groups, was targeted to equal 4. Given the small value for z, only around
0.7/3 = 23.33% of the observed diﬀerences in job-finding rates are attributed to monetary
incentives, while the rest is due to selection.
2.5.2 Simulation Results
In the simulation exercise, I simulate two diﬀerent economies: One with the baseline
calibration (endogenous take-up) and one where take-up is fixed (exogenous take-up).
That is, for all !i I fix ki at its value obtained in the certainty-equivalent version of the
model and do not allow it to vary over the business cycle. I generate 100 realizations7
of {pt} of 3600 ⇥ 7 days length, eliminating the first 1200 ⇥ 7 days of every trajectory
such that the results are not influenced by initial values, and aggregate to quarterly level.
Every realization thus corresponds to 200 quarters, corresponding to 50 years of data. I
then consider second-order moments of log-deviations from a HP trend with smoothing
parameter 1600 (Prescott (1986)).
Before looking at the quantitative evaluation of the search eﬀort channel, it is in-
structive to describe the qualitative features of the baseline model. In Figure 2.7a, I plot
the take-up decision according to search costs and productivity. Combinations of search
cost and productivity where UI is not claimed are shown in white, while those where it is
claimed are shown in gray. On the one hand, as stated in Proposition 2.4, the unemployed
– if they ever change their take-up status – follow a cutoﬀ productivity rule. On the other
hand, as was conjectured, the cutoﬀ productivity is increasing in search costs such that
7For the time being, I have to make do with this low number of replications due to computational
limits. Since the results hardly change when the exercise is repeated, the results seem to be robust,
however.
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Figure 2.7: Take-up and sorting in the simulated economy
Notes: Figure 2.7a summarizes equilibrium take-up function ki(p) generated by the model with the
calibration in Table 2.3. The gray and white areas correspond to combinations of search costs and
productivity where a take-up is made and not made, respectively. Figure 2.7b plots levels of search eﬀort
and productivity observed in the simulations of the model with parameters in Table 2.3. For the black
dots, we additionally fix the take-up rate at its certainty-equivalent counterpart. Figure 2.7c plots kernel
densities of the observed conditional distributions of search costs within diﬀerent subgroups observed
when simulating the model with the calibration in Table 2.3. Figure 2.7d plots kernel densities of the
observed conditional distributions of search costs among the registered unemployed according to the
quartile of current productivity when simulating the model with the calibration in Table 2.3.
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unemployed with higher search costs are more likely to claim. In addition, there are also
types that never change their decision within the considered state space.
With time-invariant heterogeneity in search costs, there is sorting of diﬀerent types
into diﬀerent subgroups over time, as demonstrated in Figure 2.7c, plotting the search
cost distribution among diﬀerent groups if the model is simulated over time. Clearly,
among the employed those with low search costs are overrepresented as they have higher
job-finding rates. Among the unemployed, only those with low search costs sort into non-
registered unemployment, while the registered unemployed are comprised of high search
cost types. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting the average job-finding
rate shown in Figure 2.3. If we just regressed the job-finding rate on the amount of benefits
received (eﬀectively comparing groups with entirely diﬀerent search cost distributions),
we would confound this with the diﬀerences in search eﬀort due to self-selection. The
model, however, explicitly takes this into account.
Another important qualitative finding is that the composition of the registered un-
employed changes considerably over the business cycle, as can be seen from Figure 2.7d.
If conditions are favorable, only those with very high search costs sort into registered
unemployment. This is diﬀerent during downturns, when also those with low search costs
sort into registered unemployment. This might lead to diﬀerent reactions to changes in
incentives depending on the business cycle.
In Figure 2.7b, I plot the simulated counterpart of the two dashed lines in Figure 2.5. In
particular, I plot all combinations of productivity and aggregate search eﬀort obtained in a
simulation of the economy with endogenous and exogenous take-up. Clearly, the message
of Figure 2.5 is corroborated in the sense that the volatility of search eﬀort is amplified if
we account for the take-up channel. What did not become clear in Figure 2.5 is that the
dispersion of search eﬀort levels for a given productivity level is also aﬀected. There is no
deterministic relationship between productivity and aggregate search eﬀort since the latter
depends on the composition of the unemployed which is determined by history. With the
distinction between registered and non-registered unemployment there is another source
of history determined heterogeneity. In particular, if there have been many adverse shocks
in the past, many unemployed have sorted into registered unemployment and they will
only leave it by finding a job, as argued before. The high number of registered unemployed
will then cause aggregate search eﬀort to be lower, even though current productivity is at
the same level.
Finally turning to the quantitative results, I tabulate the second-order moments of
the two simulated economies in Table 2.4. For reference, I also report summary statistics
calculated from US data by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Concentrating for a moment
on the simulated correlations, we conclude that both models have qualitatively similar
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implications that are broadly in line with the previous literature and observed moments.
All the signs are correct while the absolute magnitudes are generally too high, which is a
common feature of these models. Turning now to the standard deviations, the two models
diﬀer more markedly. In particular, while ✓ does not diﬀer in both models since the firm’s
decision is invariant to take-up behavior and search eﬀort, all other volatilities turn out
to be higher in the model with endogenous take-up. In particular, the volatility of search
eﬀort is almost threefold if we account for moves in and out of registered unemployment.
This increased volatility of search eﬀort also amplifies fluctuations of unemployment,
vacancies, and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Remarkably, the wage rigidity required
to match a considerable share of the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is very
low. The elasticity of wages with respect to productivity is as high as 1    = 0.8, while
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) require a wage elasticity of 0.449.
Standard deviation Correlation with productivity
Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous
Variable Take-up Take-up Data Take-up Take-up Data
u 0.085 0.117 0.125 -0.949 -0.921 -0.302
v 0.078 0.093 0.139 0.954 0.920 0.460
e 0.029 0.067 – 0.984 0.981 –
v/u 0.156 0.194 0.259 0.996 0.994 0.393
✓ 0.127 0.127 – 0.996 0.996 –
p 0.013 0.013 0.013 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 2.4: Results from the model with endogenous take-up, exogenous take-up and
quarterly US data, 1951:I to 2004:IV
Notes: All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1.600.
Calibrated parameter values are described in Table 2.3. In the model with exogenous take-up, the take-
up probability is held fixed at its steady-state value. US data: Seasonally adjusted unemployment, u, is
constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted help-wanted
advertising index, v, is constructed by the Conference Board. Both u and v are quarterly averages of
monthly series. Average labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the
nonfarm business sector, constructed by the BLS from the National Income and Product Accounts and
the Current Employment Statistics.
The preceding exercise demonstrates that the model is generally consistent with reality
in terms of generated volatilities and correlations. As a further check of the model’s
performance, I will feed actual instead of simulated productivity data into the model and
check how the model-generated take-up rate compares to observed data.
Following Shimer (2005a), I use real real output per worker in the nonfarm business
sector, which is in quarterly periodicity and reported by the BLS, as a proxy variable
for productivity. This series is also the basis of Table 2.4. I interpolate this time series
to obtain daily data. Proceeding as in the simulations I solve for all model-generated
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Figure 2.8: Simulation of historical data
Notes: The gray line corresponds to the ratio of Initial Jobless Claims, constructed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, and separations, estimated from CPS data using the methodology detailled in Appendix
A. The variable is a quarterly average of a monthly series. The black lines correspond to model-generated
counterparts, using the calibration in Table 2.3 and taking actual productivity (seasonally adjusted real
average output per person in the nonfarm business sector, constructed by the BLS from the National
Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics) as input.
variables using the same calibration. As start values for the recursive variables I use
the steady-state counterparts instead of actual realizations, which only works against the
model’s ability to match the data. The data on unemployment and vacancies also coincide
with those used in Table 2.4. As a measure of take-up, I use Initial Jobless Claims over
separations as in Figure 2.1.
The results of this exercise are given in Figure 2.8. The model implied take-up rates
are quite close to the data. There are only two exceptions: On the one hand, during
the 80s, the model predicts considerably higher take-up rates. This gap can be explained
by a tax reform in 1982 which significantly decreased the after-tax replacement rate and
lead to a strong decline in UI take-up, as analyzed in detail by Anderson and Meyer
(1997). On the other hand, the take-up rate was higher than predicted by the model
during the Great Recession. During this time, maximum benefit durations were extended
considerably (from the usual 26 weeks to up to 99 weeks) as part of the Extended Benefits
program (EB) and Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), which eﬀectively
lead to a higher expected payoﬀ of claiming UI.
It has to be pointed out that the calibration only targeted the average take-up rate
and relative average job-finding rates when registered and non-registered. That the model
is able to replicate the observed fluctuations in take-up while also matching the other vari-
ables is due to the structure of the model. This makes me confident that the mechanism
proposed in this model is close to the trade-oﬀ that the unemployed face in reality.
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2.5.3 Introducing Nash Bargaining
How are the model’s cyclical predictions aﬀected if we instead assume Nash bargaining,
as is more common in the DMP model? I will explore this question in a slightly simplified
version of the model. Following the strategy used by Pissarides (2009), I abstract from
aggregate uncertainty (p is fixed over time) and compare diﬀerent steady-states instead.
This means that the take-up decision is fixed for every worker i and will not change during
the spell.
Diﬀering from the previous setting, firms and workers engage in Nash bargaining when
matched to each other. Bargaining is assumed to occur only at the beginning of the spell,
where take-up costs are sunk. This rules out the possibility that wages are re-bargained
once take-up costs are not sunk anymore. While bargaining is pairwise and wages are
allowed to depend on search costs !i and take-up status, I assume random search, meaning
that vacant firms cannot direct their search toward specific workers. In Appendix B, I
describe the full model.
A quantitative exercise will give us some intuition regarding the role of endogenous
take-up in this model. I solve the model for diﬀerent values of p and calculate the elas-
ticities of all endogenous variables. In doing so, I use the calibration in Table 2.3. The
condition due to Hosios (1990) provides a natural benchmark and I hence choose bar-
gaining power   equal to the elasticity of q(✓) with respect to ✓. Since before the wage
parameter w0 was pinned down by steady-state labor market tightness, I now adjust hiring
cost c so that labor market tightness equals its steady-state value for p = 0. For com-
parison, I also calculate the implied elasticities in the steady-state version of the baseline
model. Since it is a known shortcoming of the model with Nash bargaining that the wage
is too elastic, I need to reduce wage rigidity   to make the numbers comparable. I choose
  so that the elasticity of ✓ coincides for exogenous take-up, which again allows me to
quantify the net eﬀect due to the take-up channel.
The results are presented in Table 2.5. The exercise reveals that endogenous take-up
still implies more amplification in the model with Nash bargaining. Moreover, ampli-
fication seems to increase compared to the baseline model. The observed patterns are
instructive. Call "x,p the elasticity of variable x with respect to productivity. The most
important observation is that while "✓,p is invariant to take-up in the baseline model by
construction, under Nash bargaining firms vary vacancies more strongly even conditional
on search eﬀort. As "e,p is almost unaﬀected and "v/u,p = "e,p + "✓,p, the eﬀect on ✓ is
also the reason for the increased amplification in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, while
similar conclusions hold for unemployment and vacancies.
How does this eﬀect come about? While the baseline model had a block-recursive
structure in that worker behavior did not feed back into the firm’s problem, firms now
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Elasticity w.r.t. productivity
Baseline Nash Bargaining
Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous
Variable Take-up Take-up Take-up Take-up Data
u 4.430 6.712 4.337 7.791 9.615
v 1.754 1.927 1.748 3.134 10.692
e 3.090 5.544 2.991 5.506 –
v/u 6.185 8.639 6.085 10.925 19.923
✓ 3.095 3.095 3.095 5.419 –
Table 2.5: Elasticities in the baseline and Nash bargaining model with endogenous take-
up, exogenous take-up and empirical elasticities (quarterly US data, 1951:I to 2004:IV)
Notes: Calibrated parameter values are described in Table 2.3 and in the main text. The baseline model
is a steady-state version of the model described in Section 2.4. The model with Nash bargaining is
described in Appendix B. The model See the notes of Table 2.4 for details regarding the data.
react to worker behavior. In Appendix B, I show that the free-entry condition takes the
form
c
 q(✓)
= (1   )
R1
0 eiuiSi(hi) dF (!i)R1
0 eiui dF (!i)
,
where   denotes workers’ bargaining power, ui, ei, and hi denote equilibrium unemploy-
ment, search eﬀort, and take-up status of a worker with search costs !i, respectively, and
Si(h) denotes the joint surplus when a firm is matched to a worker with search costs !i,
who had take-up status hi. The zero-profit condition equates the expected hiring cost to
the expected profit, which is (1   ) times the expected surplus, where the expectation is
taken with respect to the probability of meeting a worker with !i among the unemployed.
It turns out that shifts in the probability of meeting a worker have very little quantitative
significance and hence the eﬀect is driven by the surplus function Si(hi).
Since workers’ outside value increases when registered, we have Si(0) > Si(1) 8i. If a
firm meets a worker on benefits, bargained wages are driven up ceteris paribus and hence
profits decrease. During upturns, fewer workers claim UI which drives up average surplus,
increasing incentives for vacancy creation. Thus, in the model with Nash bargaining, take-
up causes amplification in two distinct ways. On the one hand, as in the baseline model
fluctuations in search eﬀort increase as workers shift back and forth between the registered
and non-registered state. On the other hand, under Nash bargaining take-up also aﬀects
wages, inducing an endogenous wage rigidity.
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Figure 2.9: Registration rate over the business cycle and conditional on productivity;
initial values chosen for the registration rate
Notes: Figure 2.9a plots levels of the registration rate and productivity observed in the simulations of
the model with parameters in Table 2.3. Figure 2.9b plots the empirical distribution of observed values
of the registration rate given p = 0. Figure 2.9c plots the initial values for hi chosen for the impulse
response graphs.
2.5.4 Path Dependence
As is apparent from Figure 2.9a, the registration rate not only covaries systematically
with productivity, but also displays considerable dispersion for given values of produc-
tivity. This becomes clearer from Figure 2.9b, where I plot the simulated distribution
of registration rates conditional on log productivity being equal to its steady-state value.
As already explained, this variation is due to path dependence: Past adverse shocks in-
creased past claiming, which is why the registration rate is now higher even though current
productivity is the same.
Since there is no one-to-one mapping between productivity and the registration rate,
it makes sense to ask whether the current registration rate aﬀects the way the economy
reacts to shocks. To explore this question, I compare impulse response graphs for initially
high and low registration rates. In Figure 2.10, I plot the impulse response graphs,
depicting the dynamic reaction to a one-standard deviation shock to productivity. Of
course, since we are talking about the daily standard deviation, the numbers are rather
small, but the basic pattern would not change if we chose another periodicity. Initial
values of all variables are chosen to be the steady-state values, except for the registration
status given search cost, hi, which we either fix at the 25th or 75th percentile of the
observed distribution given p = 0 and !i. Figure 2.9c plots the values for hi chosen for
the two diﬀerent scenarios.
Figure 2.10 summarizes the time paths of productivity as well as for the registration
rate, the aggregate job-finding rate and the unemployment rate for the two scenarios.
In Figure 2.10b, we see that the gray line starts out at a lower level than the black
line. Even though take-up behavior is completely identical in both scenarios (as ki only
depends on current productivity), it takes around three months until the influence of initial
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Figure 2.10: Impulse response graphs: Low vs. high initial registration rate
Notes: The figures plot the dynamic reaction to a one-standard deviation shock in productivity over the
period of six months. Figures 2.10b, 2.10c, and 2.10d plot the model-generated values of the registration
rate, the job-finding rate, and the unemployment rate. For the gray lines, I assume that hi starts out at
the 25th percentile of the observed distribution given p = 0 and !i, while for the black lines I start out
at the 75th percentile.
conditions has disappeared. This diﬀerence in the registration rate directly aﬀects job-
finding rates, as is apparent in Figure 2.10c. If the economy starts out with an initially high
registration rate, the job-finding rate remains visibly lower for at least two months. This
diﬀerence leads to a much slower adjustment of the unemployment rate (Figure 2.10d).
Since the initially low job-finding rate implies a higher steady-state unemployment rate
than the start value, the unemployment rate even increases initially. In total, it takes
around six months until the unemployment rate has caught up with the scenario where
the registration rate was initially low.
The economy’s reaction to a positive productivity shock is hence very diﬀerent de-
pending on the situation we inherited from past shocks. In one case, past adverse shocks
have led to an accumulation of UI recipients. These individuals display lower search ef-
fort even though current conditions are the same. In the other case, higher productivity
is quickly transmitted to lower unemployment as the aggregate job-finding rate increases
much more quickly. This observation suggests take-up as a cause of hysteresis in the short
run. Short-lived and shallow downturns are likely to lead to less persistent periods of high
unemployment. Note that the persistence is higher if the exit rate from unemployment
is lower since the registration rate dies down less quickly. Since the model is calibrated
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to the US economy featuring relatively high degrees of reallocation, this eﬀect should be
much stronger for European economies.
2.5.5 Optimal Unemployment Insurance along the Business Cy-
cle
The model makes rich predictions on the variation of take-up and search eﬀort as well
as the composition of registered unemployed over the business cycle. Since all of the
former aﬀect the optimal design of unemployment insurance, it makes sense to explore the
model’s implications regarding the question how benefits should vary over the business
cycle. Since a full characterization of optimal unemployment insurance in the present
model is very complicated and clearly goes beyond the scope of the paper, a back-of-
the-envelope calculation can give us an idea of the qualitative eﬀect. In particular, I
will simplify the analysis by only considering permanent and unanticipated changes in
unemployment insurance. This allows me to maintain the structure of the model, as
individuals’ expectations are unaﬀected. Since the optimal permanent level of UI will
be diﬀerent depending on the current state of the economy, this still allows us to draw
qualitative conclusions about optimal UI along the business cycle.
Specifically, assume that the government has to decide on the optimal level of z, which
is financed by a lump-sum tax ⌧ on workers. Moreover, assume that individuals’ utility
from consumption is described by a function v(c), which is strictly increasing and strictly
concave. The following proposition gives an implicit condition for the optimal permanent
level of unemployment insurance in this setting:
Proposition 2.5. The optimal permanent level of unemployment insurance in period t0
is implicitly defined by
v0(cu)  v0(ce)
v0(ce)
=
P1
t=t0
 t t0u1t
⇣
@u1t
@z
z
u1t
+ @ut@z
z
ut
ut
1 ut
⌘
P1
t=t0
 t t0u1t
,
where ce denotes consumption of workers, cu denotes consumption of registered unem-
ployed, u1t denotes the number of registered unemployed in period t and ut denotes the
number of unemployed in period t.
If third-order terms of v(c) are small (v000(c) ⇡ 0),
v0(cu)  v0(ce)
v0(ce)
⇡   ce   cu
ce
,
where   is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Proof. See appendix.
Chapter 2 39
To make sense of this condition, I rewrite it in the following way:
1X
t=t0
u1t 
t t0v0(cu) =
1X
t=t0
u1t 
t t0v0(ce)| {z }
⌘M
+
1X
t=t0
u1t
✓
@u1t
@z
z
u1t
+
@ut
@z
z
ut
ut
1  ut
◆
 t t0v0(ce)| {z }
⌘B
Increasing UI by one unit for all subsequent periods increases aggregate utility by
increasing consumption of the unemployed by approximately
P1
t=t0
u1t t t0v0(cu). In the
optimum, this has to be equal to the decrease in aggregate utility due to higher taxes and
hence lower consumption of the employed. If behavior did not respond to z, this would
be given by M , which is the mechanical eﬀect. In this case, optimal UI would imply
ce = cu, i.e. full insurance. However, there is also a behavioral eﬀect, given by B: Higher
z increases unemployment and lowers the number of tax payers, which leads to a further
reduction in consumption of the employed. Expressed in per-period terms, we have
v0(cu) =
0BBB@1 +
P1
t=t0
 t t0u1t
⇣
@u1t
@z
z
u1t
+ @ut@z
z
ut
ut
1 ut
⌘
P1
t=t0
 t t0u1t| {z }
⌘C
1CCCA v0(ce)
For every additional dollar the unemployed receive, consumption of the employed has
to be decreased by 1+C dollars, where C summarizes the average behavioral response and
will henceforth loosely be called the welfare cost of increasing unemployment insurance8.
C drives a wedge between marginal utilities. Loosely speaking, the first-order condition
equates the consumption smoothing benefits of increasing UI on the left-hand side to the
welfare costs on the right-hand side. It is important to bear in mind that the condition
does not allow to calculate optimal unemployment insurance directly, since the right-hand
side of the equation is endogenous to unemployment insurance. Hence, we would have to
deduce how the right-hand side changes with z from the model. In any case, however,
we can assess the impact of a small reform around the current state: If the right-hand
side is larger, then an increase in unemployment insurance will have a negative impact on
aggregate welfare.
C can easily be simulated by solving for the policy functions given a small change in z.
I then generate 300 realizations of the productivity process using the same procedure as in
Section 2.5.2. By comparing the baseline realizations and the realizations in an economy
where z is changed after period t0, we are able to approximate the elasticities of u1t and
ut with respect to z.
8Of course, if we are considering a decrease in unemployment insurance, the cost becomes a gain, as
workers’ consumption increases by more than one-to-one due to lower unemployment.
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Figure 2.11: Simulated welfare cost of increasing z
Notes: The figures plot the welfare cost C(t0, t) for various constellations. In Figure 2.11a, we compare
economies with initial productivity below or above median for endogenous take-up, while Figure 2.11b
repeats the exercise for exogenous take-up. In Figure 2.11c, we compare the cost of an increase in z to a
decrease for endogenous take-up, while Figure 2.11d repeats the exercise for exogenous take-up.
In Figure 2.11, I plot simulated values of the welfare cost of changing z in truncated
at t,
C(t0, t) ⌘
Pt
t=t0
 s t0u1s
⇣
@u1s
@z
z
u1s
+ @us@z
z
us
us
1 us
⌘
Pt
t=t0
 s t0u1s
,
which corresponds to the welfare cost if the change in z were abandoned after period t and
the economy would jump to its baseline path afterwards. While this measure converges
to the true welfare cost of a permanent increase in z for t going to infinity, it should give
an idea about the short term eﬀects for lower t.
In Figure 2.11a, I consider the welfare cost for the baseline economy depending on
whether productivity was initially below or above median. Figure 2.11b repeats the
exercise assuming exogenous take-up. A first thing to notice is that the welfare cost
is markedly higher if take-up is endogenous. If take-up increases as z is increased, the
behavioral eﬀect is higher, a fact first noted by Kroft (2008). Moreover, the welfare cost
converges to around 3 for the baseline economy, which would require a consumption drop
(ce  cu)/ce of 100% even with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion as high as 3. This is a
sign that the level of consumption of the unemployed is too high. This is not a surprising
finding, as the literature usually finds optimal replacement rates of around 50% (e.g.,
Chetty (2006), Gruber (1997)), while the given calibration sets average flow utility at
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around 60%.
More importantly, however, endogenous take-up appears to have sizeable consequences
for welfare costs along the business cycle. While initial productivity does not seem to
matter much if take-up is exogenous, welfare costs are much higher if initial conditions are
good in the case of endogenous take-up. The behavioral eﬀect of increasing unemployment
insurance is higher if the economy is in a boom. The reasons are twofold: On the one hand,
during downturns, take-up does not increase strongly if z is increased, as most unemployed
have already claimed in the past. On the other hand, if conditions are good, the pool
of the registered unemployed tilts toward those with very high search cost, whose search
eﬀort is more elastic to UI as their expected duration of unemployment is longer as could
be seen from Figure 2.7d. This finding suggests that a countercyclical unemployment
insurance would be welfare improving. This corresponds to the result by Landais et al.
(2014), while the mechanism is diﬀerent: While they emphasize externalities of search
eﬀort going through firms’ reaction, i.e. through reactions of ✓, this mechanism is absent
by assumption in the baseline model. Here, the macro elasticity of unemployment is equal
to the micro elasticity of unemployment and take-up aﬀects both.
The model also implies an asymmetric response to increases and decreases of unem-
ployment insurance. This is because an increase in UI leads to an immediate inflow into
registered unemployment, while after a decrease the unemployed stay registered until they
find a job. While for Figures 2.11a and 2.11b, the average behavioral response was cal-
culated by averaging over the eﬀects of a decrease and increase in z, in Figures 2.11c and
2.11d I now calculate the welfare costs separately. As expected, while this dimension is
virtually irrelevant for exogenous take-up, asymmetry is apparent in the case of endoge-
nous take-up. This asymmetry disappears in the long run, as in the case of a decrease in
z workers who would not claim anymore eventually attrition out of registered unemploy-
ment. While the present qualitative analysis does not allow to quantify the eﬀect entirely,
this should serve as a caveat against varying UI over time. Given the model’s predictions,
increasing the replacement rate has a stronger short-term eﬀect on the unemployment
rate than a decrease later on. This may cause the unemployment rate to ratchet up over
time in the presence of a variable replacement rate.
Clearly, the present analysis only gives a rough sense of how take-up might aﬀect
our conclusions regarding optimal UI along the business cycle. Even so, we get the
impression that the implications are qualitatively and quantitatively relevant and that a
more thorough analysis might be worthwhile.
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2.6 How does the Take-up Channel Aﬀect the Optimal
Timing of Unemployment Insurance?
In the present framework, heterogeneity in search costs accounts for diﬀerences in job-
finding prospects that are present even conditional on monetary incentives. In reality,
these diﬀerences could be due to diﬀerences in search ability but also due to various forms
of skill mismatch. This implies that among the pool of the unemployed, the plight of
unemployment in absence of unemployment insurance, here measured by the discounted
utility if not registered, Ni(p), might display large variation. While some people manage
to find a job rather quickly and hence do not suﬀer larges losses in their utility, others
face extended spells of unemployment.
Assume the government, or henceforth the principal, oﬀers an unemployment insurance
contract with the aim of buﬀering large losses in utility by guaranteeing a minimum
promised utility level, V¯ , to every unemployed upon entry in unemployment. Among all
contracts that achieve this goal, the principal wants to find the one that minimizes the
cost of providing it. Also, assume that there are some workers who already achieve V¯ if
not registered (henceforth referred to as high types), while there are other workers who
need to be insured (henceforth low types). If search costs are observable, the principal will
not oﬀer an unemployment insurance contract to high types and oﬀer the cost-minimizing
contract only considering low types. In practice, however, search costs are unobservable
to the principal. This implies that, assuming that pooling is not optimal, the contract has
to be designed in a way that has high types self-select into non-registered unemployment.
Intuition suggests that this additional incentive constraint implies backloading of the
scheme: If the principal wants to grant a minimum utility level to low types, while not
exceeding a certain utility for high types, this is achieved by paying more transfers in the
future, as low types face a higher probability of still being unemployed. This enables the
principal to screen the unemployed, as only low types sort into registered unemployment.
Backloading comes at a gain, since high types are excluded which lowers the cost of
providing the contract. However, it also comes at a cost, since we have to deviate from
the cost-minimizing contract for the low types in order to exclude the high types. Hence,
pooling, where the principal also provides insurance to those who don’t need it, might
also be optimal.
This conclusion hence contrasts with the early finding due to Shavell and Weiss (1979)
and followed up upon by H. A. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), that benefits should be
decreasing throughout the spell to provide incentives to search (henceforth referred to
as the Shavell-Weiss contract). While this result is also sensitive to other adaptions
of the basic model – e.g. Shimer and Werning (2008) show that optimal benefits are
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nearly constant once we allow for savings – the eﬀect of endogenous take-up decisions is
a mechanism that has not been considered so far.
2.6.1 Environment
To explore what the take-up channel implies for the optimal time-structure of unemploy-
ment benefits, I focus on the steady-state version of the model laid out in section 2.4,
setting p = 0 in every period. In order to introduce a consumption-smoothing objective,
I add curvature to the model by assuming that individuals derive flow utility u(c) from
consumption c, where u00(c) < 0 < u0(c). I assume that workers cannot save. On the one
hand, this simplifies the analysis and will yield the result due to Shavell and Weiss (1979)
as a natural benchmark. On the other hand, this will make it more diﬃcult to generate
backloading in the benefit schedule, since, as mentioned above, allowing for savings works
against a downward sloping benefit schedule.
To simplify notation, I fix f(✓) = 1 and rescale search eﬀort accordingly. In t = 0, all
workers start out as unemployed. The stationary setting implies that workers either claim
in t = 0 or never. If they find a job, they stay employed forever (I set   = 0), earning
value
W =
u(w(0))
1    .
Denote by N(!) the value if not registered of type !, while T (t;!) denotes the value
of type ! if unemployed and having been in insured unemployment for t periods. In
order to simplify the analysis, I assume that there are only two types, a low type and
a high type with search cost parameters !l and !h, where !l > !h, respectively. The
respective population shares are given by q(!l) and q(!h). The remainder of the model
stays unchanged.
At t = 0 a risk-neutral principal oﬀers unemployment insurance as a take-it-or-leave-it
contract to each unemployed individual. The contract specifies net transfers as a function
of unemployment duration, z(t), and a recommended action (search eﬀort if registered)
e(!, t) as a function of realized history. The principal neither observes the search cost !
nor e(!). For technical reasons, I need to assume that benefits are paid up to period T ,
which is without loss of generality as T can be chosen to be arbitrarily large. The principal
chooses the optimal contract so as to minimize the cost of providing the contract,
C =
X
!2{!l,!h}
s(!)q(!)
"
z(0) +
TX
t=1
 t
t 1Y
⌧=0
(1  e(!, ⌧))z(t)
#
,
subject to
s(!)(T (0;!)   ) + (1  s(!))N(!)   V¯ 8!,
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where s(!) 2 {0, 1} denotes the take-up status of type ! and V¯ denotes minimum
promised utility. That is, the principal wants every unemployed to attain a utility level
of at least V¯ , either if insured or not. To rule out the trivial solution where UI is either
oﬀered to nobody or both types, we assume N(!l) < V¯  N(!h), i.e. the low type needs
a transfer in order to achieve the required level of utility, while the high type already
enjoys suﬃcient utility in autarky.
The setting is similar to Hagedorn, Kaul, and Mennel (2010), who characterize the
optimal time structure of benefits if the principal can condition the time structure of
benefits on unobserved heterogeneity. The diﬀerence in the setting adopted here is that
the principal only oﬀers one time structure to every type and agents can opt out by not
claiming benefits. In particular, their setting implies that the highest types are oﬀered
the first-best contract (no distortion at the top), while here the contract is only oﬀered to
the low types (or everyone). More importantly, however, the present setting is a natural
extension of the realistic take-up setting analyzed in this paper.
2.6.2 Benchmark Cases
In the case of full information, where the principal observes workers’ types as well as
their search eﬀort decisions, it is straightforward to verify that the principal will oﬀer a
constant benefit schedule to low types while excluding the high types. The risk neutral
principal insures the risk averse agent fully against income fluctuations, while prescribing
a constant eﬀort level.
If the principal observes types, but not search eﬀort, he will still exclude high types
from the contract. The problem then reduces to the classic setting with moral hazard and
the principal will oﬀer the Shavell-Weiss contract to the low types.
This is not generally possible, however, if types are not observed. Unless !h is very
low compared to !l, the high types will always have an incentive to sort into the Shavell-
Weiss contract oﬀered to the low types. But the Shavell-Weiss contract is only the cost
minimizing contract if high types can be excluded. This means that the cost minimizing
contract will look diﬀerent, either because both types are oﬀered a contract (pooling) or
because types have to be separated.
2.6.3 Simplified Model
The basic mechanism is best demonstrated in a stylized version of the model: Assume
we only have two periods. In the first period, workers start out as unemployed, choose
whether to claim UI and search optimally for a job. If a job is found, they are employed in
the second period, while in the opposite case they stay unemployed. In order to simplify
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the exposition, I assume u(c) = log(c) and standardize w(0) = 1, so that u(w(0)) = 0. I
also set  = 1 and   = 1.
If not registered, the unemployed earn value
N(!) = max
e
n
log `+ e · 0 + (1  e) log `  !
2
e2
o
= 2 log `+
1
2!
(log `)2 ,
where the second equality follows by substituting the first-order condition for optimal
search eﬀort into the value function.
If registered, a worker’s value in period 0 with benefit schedule (z(0), z(1)) is given by
T (z(0), z(1),!) = max
e
n
log(`+ z(0)) + e · 0 + (1  e) log(`+ z(1))  !
2
e2
o
= log(`+ z(0)) + log(`+ z(1)) +
1
2!
(log(`+ z(1)))2 ,
where the second equality again follows using the first-order condition for optimal search
eﬀort. As before, a worker claims UI if T (z(0), z(1),!)    N(!). Note that @(T (z(0), z(1),!) 
N(!))/@! > 0, i.e. workers with higher search costs are more likely to claim.
If types were observable, the principal would calculate the optimal time structure of
benefits given ! = !l and oﬀer it only to the low types, ignoring the high types. Given
unobservable search costs, however, there are two possible contracts the principal could
oﬀer: On the one hand, she could oﬀer a pooling contract, which is accepted by both
types, even though only one type needs insurance. On the other hand, she could oﬀer a
separating contract, which is designed in such a way that only the low types want to claim
it. Importantly, there are always (!l,!h) so that the optimal contract under observable
types cannot be implemented as a separating equilibrium under unobservable types, as
demonstrated in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. If N(!)   V¯ is not too large, the optimal contract under observable types
cannot be implemented as a separating equilibrium under unobservable types.
Proof. Denote by z⇤(0), z⇤(1) the optimal net transfers under observable types. Under
optimality the promised utility constraint must be binding, since otherwise the transfers
could be lowered, yielding lower costs, while still satisfying the constraint. This implies:
T (z⇤(0), z⇤(1),!l) = V¯ +  
The high type prefers this contract to autarky if
T (z⇤(0), z⇤(1),!h)   N(!h) +  .
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Combining both conditions, we find that this is the case if
T (z⇤(0), z⇤(1),!h) T (z⇤(0), z⇤(1),!l) = 1
2
✓
1
!h
  1
!l
◆
(log(`+ z⇤(1)))2   N(!h)  V¯ .
Since N(!) can be arbitrarily close to V¯ while !l could be arbitrarily large, we can always
find (!l,!h) such that the condition is fulfilled. But this means that the high types will also
opt into the contract, meaning it is not implementable as a separating equilibrium.
Separating contract. This means that the presence of optimal take-up aﬀects the de-
sign of the separating contract. The principal faces the additional constraint of having the
high types self-select into non-registered unemployment. The principal hence minimizes
the expected cost of providing insurance, subject to the constraints that the low types
achieve the minimum promised utility, the high types prefer not to claim, and that the
low types choose search eﬀort optimally:
min
z(0),z(1),el
z(0) + (1  el)z(1)
s. t. (i) log(`+ z(0)) + (1  el) log(`+ z(1))  !l
2
e2l   V¯ +  
(ii) log(`+ z(0)) + (1  eh) log(`+ z(1))  !h
2
e2h  N(!h) +  
(iii) !lel =   log(`+ z(1)),
where el and eh denote search eﬀort if registered of the low and high type, respec-
tively. Denote by  0, 1 and µ the multipliers on the first, second, and third constraint,
respectively. Moreover, note that the first-order conditions imply eh = (!l/!h)el > el.
The first-order conditions of the principal’s problem are then
`+ z(0) =  0    1 (2.12)
`+ z(1) =  0    11  (!l/!h)el
1  el   µ
1
1  el (2.13)
µ = z(1)/!l (2.14)
 0   0, 1   0, (2.15)
along with the usual complementary slackness conditions. Combining (2.12) and (2.13),
we obtain
z(1) = z(0)  µ 1
1  el| {z }
Moral-hazard eﬀect
+  1
eh   el
1  el| {z }
Take-up eﬀect
. (2.16)
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As a benchmark, consider the case of perfect information. This means that the prin-
cipal can ignore the second constraint (as search costs are observable) and the third
constraint (as search eﬀort is observable), meaning  1 = µ = 0. We then directly find
z(0) = z(1), i.e. the low types are perfectly insured against income fluctuations. In next
step, assume now that search eﬀort is not observable, while search costs are observable, in
which case only  1 = 0. From (2.14) it follows that µ > 0 whenever z(1) > 0, and hence
from (2.16) z(0) > z(1). This corresponds to the classical Shavell-Weiss result. Note that
this result also applies if search costs are not observable but N(!h) is large, meaning that
the second constraint does not bind.
If the autarky value of the high type is suﬃciently small, however, the second constraint
is binding and  1 > 0. We see from (2.16) that z(1) tends to increase relative to z(0),
possibly overturning the usual eﬀect due to moral hazard. The intuition is that the
principal has to grant the promised utility to the low type, while not giving too much
utility from claiming to the high type. This is done by backloading the schedule, since
the low type values benefits in the second period more than the high type as he is more
likely to remain unemployed.
Pooling equilibrium. Whenever the second constraint is binding, the separating equi-
librium works by backloading the benefit scheme and thus making UI less attractive for
the high type. However, making benefits less smooth over time also entails a utility cost
for the low types. As their utility has to achieve the initially promised level, the principal
has to compensate them by increasing the benefit level. But this means that providing
insurance becomes more expensive compared to the case where the types are known, as
implementing the separation is costly.
Hence, pooling, i.e. providing insurance to both types, could be a less costly alterna-
tive. While this means that insurance has to be paid to more people, the principal no
longer has to separate types which entails costs. This alternative could be preferable in
particular if the fraction of low types is very high. Since it is not as interesting as the
separating case, I characterize the optimal pooling contract in Appendix C. It turns out
that there are again two opposing forces. While on the one hand, moral hazard tends to
lead to a downward-sloping schedule, the fact that typically only the low type’s constraint
is binding tends to push benefits upward over time. Importantly, as the share of low types
approaches 1, the pooling contract approaches the Shavell-Weiss contract.
Numerical example. A small numerical example should be helpful in gaining an in-
tuition for the previous results. Assume (!h,!l) = (1, 2), ` = 0.72,  = 0.1, and
q ⌘ q(!l) = 0.8. This implies N(!l) =  0.63 and N(!h) =  0.6031. To make the
problem interesting, I assume V¯ =  0.62, so that the low type has to be insured.
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Figure 2.12: Cost of pooling contract minus cost of separating contract according to the
share of low types
Under observable types, we can calculate the optimal benefit schedule by setting  1 =
0 in (2.12) to (2.14). This yields (` + z⇤(0), ` + z⇤(1)) = (0.9651, 0.5689). However,
T (z⇤(0), z⇤(1),!h) =  0.4405 > N(!h) +  and hence the high types would take-up UI
as well. The optimal separating contract reads (` + z˜(0), ` + z˜(1)) = (0.7584, 0.7708).
Strikingly, while the contract under observable types was strongly downward sloping,
the separating contract is now weakly upward sloping. The pooling contract, on the
other hand, can be calculated as (`+ ˜˜z(0), `+ ˜˜z(1)) = (0.9660, 0.5682) and hence almost
coincides with the solution under observable types. However, C(˜˜z(0), ˜˜z(1)) = 1.3607 while
C(z˜(0), z˜(1)) = 1.1430. Thus, the principal will implement the separating contract.
More generally, the principal will opt for the separating contract as long as the share
of high types is not very low. In Figure 2.12, I plot C(˜˜z(0), ˜˜z(1)) C(z˜(0), z˜(1)), i.e. the
cost of providing a pooling contract minus the cost of providing a separating contract
depending on the share of low types, q. It turns out that for q   0.9590, pooling becomes
optimal.
2.6.4 General Case
While the previous setting is instructive to understand the general mechanism, we need
to make the setting more general to get a realistic idea of the quantitative impact of the
take-up channel. This is achieved by solving the model with many periods using calibrated
parameter values.
Recursive formulation. In the following, I will assume that the population share of
high types is suﬃciently large so that pooling is not optimal. I will hence only characterize
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the separating contract. In the general case with many periods, the optimal separating
contract solves the following program:
C0(V¯ +  , N(!h) +  ) = min
{z(t)}Tt=0
z(0) +
TX
t=1
 t
t 1Y
⌧=0
(1  e(!l, ⌧))z(t)
s. t. (i) T (0;!l)   V¯ +  
(ii) T (0;!h)  N(!h) +  
(iii) Low types choose optimal e(!l, t) for all t given {z(t)}Tt=0.
Constraint (i) denotes the promised utility constraint, positing that the utility from
claiming UI net of take-up costs to the low type be at least V¯ . Constraint (ii), on the
other hand, is an incentive constraint, requiring that the high type’s utility from claiming
net of take-up costs do not exceed his utility in the non-registered state. Eventually,
constraint (iii) is the usual incentive compatibility constraint acknowledging that workers
choose optimal search eﬀort. C0(V¯ +  , N(!h) +  ) is the minimized cost of providing
insurance to the low types, given that low types receive at least V¯ +  and the high
types’ value from claiming does not exceed N(!h)+ . Note that, given the assumptions,
constraint (i) will always be binding. Constraint (ii), on the other hand, can be slack: If
the high type’s outside value is very high, he does not have an incentive to claim even if
the principal oﬀers the Shavell-Weiss contract to the low types. Since the Shavell-Weiss
contract cannot be improved upon, relaxing constraint (ii) will then not have any eﬀect
on C0(V¯ +  , N(!h) +  ).
This problem is numerically very hard to solve, as it involves searching over T + 1
values, taking into account how optimal search eﬀort reacts, and satisfying two nonlinear
constraints. Fortunately, the problem can be simplified considerably by rewriting it recur-
sively. For this purpose, define Ct(V lt , V ht ) to be the minimized cost of providing insurance
starting in period t, given that low types receive at least value V lt and the high types’ value
does not exceed value V ht from period t onward. Clearly, we obtain the full problem as a
special case of this definition by setting t = 0 and (V lt , V ht ) = (V¯ +  , N(!h) +  ).
For all even nonterminal9 periods, Ct(V lt , V ht ) satisfies the recursive relationship
Ct(V
l
t , V
h
t ) = min
z(t),z(t+1),V lt+2,V
h
t+2
 
z(t) +  (1  el(t))
 
z(t+ 1) +  (1  el(t+ 1))Ct+2(V lt+2, V ht+2)
  
9For the terminal period T   1, continuation values , V lt+2, V ht+2 are fixed at N(!l) and N(!h) and we
only minimize over z(T   1) and z(T ).
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s. t. (i) u(`+ z(t))  !l
1 + 
el(t)
1+ +  (1  el(t))
⇢
u(`+ z(t+ 1))  !l
1 + 
el(t+ 1)
1+ +  (1  el(t+ 1))V lt+2
 
  V lt
(ii) u(`+ z(t))  !h
1 + 
eh(t)
1+ +  (1  eh(t))
⇢
u(`+ z(t+ 1))  !l
1 + 
eh(t+ 1)
1+ +  (1  eh(t+ 1))V ht+2
 
 V ht
(iii) !lel(t) =   
⇢
u(`+ z(t+ 1))  !l
1 + 
el(t+ 1)
1+ +  (1  el(t+ 1))V lt+2
 
(iv) !heh(t) =   
⇢
u(`+ z(t+ 1))  !h
1 + 
eh(t+ 1)
1+ +  (1  eh(t+ 1))V ht+2
 
(v) !lel(t+ 1) =   V lt+2
(vi) !heh(t+ 1) =   V ht+2.
That is, if we know the minimized cost of providing insurance from period t+2 onwards,
granting at least value V lt+2 to the low type and at most V ht+2 to the high type, we can
solve for the minimized cost of providing insurance from period t onwards, granting at
least value V lt to the low type and at most V ht to the high type, by choosing the optimal
combination of benefits in period t and t+1 as well as continuation values V lt+2 and V ht+2,
given the constraints that (i) the low types receive at least value V lt , (ii) the high types’
value does not exceed V ht , and each type in each period chooses search eﬀort optimally
((iii) - (vi)). Importantly, while in each period t we assume that agents cannot enter
into the contract later on, providing insurance from period t onwards is equivalent to a
sequence of recursive problems in all even periods after t, where the initial values (V lt , V ht )
are determined endogenously. The reason that we solve for the benefit levels in t and
t + 1 at once is that by only choosing z(t), we cannot choose continuation value V lt+1
independently from V ht+1. Lastly, in order to solve for the optimal separating contract, we
add the initial conditions V l0 = V¯ +  and V h0 = N(!h) +  .
Model solution. The usual strategy of solving this type of model involves forming a
grid over the state variables and a starting guess for the cost function at each grid point.
One then eliminates z(t), z(t + 1), el(t), and el(t + 1) from the objective function using
the constraints. Using a numerical optimizer, one then minimizes the objective function
at every grid point with respect to the continuation values (V l(t + 2), V h(t + 2)). This
also requires interpolation of the cost function, typically by Chebychev polynomials. One
then iterates on this procedure until convergence.
For several reasons, this standard procedure is hard to implement here. On the one
hand, the implementation of Chebychev polynomials requires a rectangular state space,
i.e. (V lt , V ht ) 2 [V l, V l] ⇥ [V h, V h]. However, it turns out that the set of promised values
(V lt , V
h
t ) than can be generated by future transfers is not rectangular, but lens-shaped
(see Figure 2.13). Interpolation techniques that allow interpolating over these domains,
such as Delaunay triangulation, will generate a non-smooth surface which makes it very
hard for numerical optimizers to converge. Also, the bounds of the state space is curved,
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Figure 2.13: Example: feasible state space
which makes it hard to interpolate points at the bound even by triangulation.
To sidestep these issues, I apply the method of endogenous gridpoints first proposed
by Carroll (2006). The solution algorithm works as follows:
Algorithm 2.1.
1. Form an initial guess for the terminal states (V lT , V hT ). As both types are in non-
registered unemployment from t = T + 2, we can solve for z(T ) and z(T + 1) from
a simple system of equations. Calculate the envelope conditions
⇣
@CT (·)
@V lT
, @CT (·)
@V hT
⌘
.
2. Given that we arrive in (V lT , V hT ), where did we have to originate in T  2 in order to
optimally arrive there? Given (V lT , V hT ) and the envelope conditions
⇣
@CT (·)
@V lT
, @CT (·)
@V hT
⌘
,
there are analytical expressions for the associated controls z(T   2) and z(T  
1). Using the constraints, calculate states (V lT 2, V hT 2), as well as the envelope
conditions.
3. Repeat the previous step until arriving in t = 0. Compare (V l0 , V h0 ) to the initial
conditions.
4. Repeat all previous steps, searching over terminal states (V lT , V hT ), until the diﬀerence
between (V l0 , V h0 ) and the initial conditions meets an exit criterion.
There are several advantages to this solution method compared to the traditional
strategy: First, there is no need for numerical optimization, which can be very time-
consuming (note that one needs to optimize separately for every point in the grid), and
can have problems converging. Also, there is no need for interpolation, which naturally
implies an approximation error. The choice of the interpolating function is somewhat
arbitrary and can aﬀect the results. Eventually, the strategy proposed here converges to
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the solution much more quickly. The disadvantage is that we need to assume that benefits
are only paid up to period T + 1, which, as pointed out above, is of little importance as
T can be arbitrarily large10.
In the following proposition, I derive the expressions for the optimal controls given
the subsequent states and the envelope conditions.
Proposition 2.6. Given envelope conditions
⇣
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
, @Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
⌘
, whenever all constraints
bind, optimal transfers (z(t), z(t+ 1)) satisfy
1
u0(`+ z(t))
=
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
+
(1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1))
(1  eh(t))(1  eh(t+ 1))
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
+
 
!l
Ct+2(·) el(t+ 1)
1 
1  el(t+ 1)
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t) (2.17)
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
=
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
+
1  el(t+ 1)
1  eh(t+ 1)
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
+
 
!l
Ct+2(·) el(t+ 1)
1 
1  el(t+ 1) . (2.18)
The envelope conditions are calculated as
@Ct(·)
@V lt
=
1  el(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
✓
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)
◆
  1  eh(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
1
u0(`+ z(t))
(2.19)
@Ct(·)
@V ht
=  1  el(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
✓
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)  
1
u0(`+ z(t))
◆
.
(2.20)
Proof. See appendix.
To make sense of these results, it is useful to derive the same equations for the model
where types are observable or where the incentive constraint does not bind, i.e. for the
Shavell-Weiss contract.
Lemma 4. If types are observable or if the incentive constraint of high types does not
bind, optimal benefits over time satisfy
1
u0(`+ z(t))
=
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t) . (2.21)
Proof. See appendix.
10Note that the method of endogenous gridpoints in principle allows for infinite horizon problems.
However, this would require Delaunay interpolation, which, as explained above, is very diﬃcult – if
feasible at all – given the irregular state space.
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Comparison of this result with the envelope condition (2.20) directly implies that,
using u00(c) < 0, @Ct(·)
@V ht
< 0 as long as z(t + 1) relative to z(t) is higher than implied
by the Shavell-Weiss contract: If we have not yet reached the cost-minimizing contract
under observable types, cost would decrease as the constraint becomes less strict. As
soon as @Ct(·)
@V ht
becomes zero, no further cost savings are possible by changing z(t) relative
to z(t+ 1), as the principal already oﬀers the cost-minimizing contract under observable
types. @Ct(·)
@V lt
, on the other hand, approaches 1/u0(`+ z(t)) from above, which corresponds
to the envelope condition under observable types. It can then be verified that equations
(2.17) and (2.18) reduce to equation (2.21), meaning that the problem reduces to the
standard problem.
Moreover, combining equations (2.17) and (2.18) implies
1
u0(`+ z(t))
=
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)| {z }
Moral-hazard eﬀect>0
+
1  el(t+ 1)
1  eh(t+ 1)
eh(t)  el(t)
1  eh(t)
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2| {z }
Take-up eﬀect0
,
which diﬀers from equation (2.21) by the take-up eﬀect. We can directly conclude that,
if the incentive constraint for the high types binds in t+ 2 (@Ct2+(·)
@V ht+2
< 0), it will continue
to do so in t, as the principal will choose z(t) lower relative to z(t + 1) compared to the
Shavell-Weiss contract. The conclusion is that the incentive constraint either binds for
all periods or never. In particular, if the principal has to deviate from the Shavell-Weiss
contract, the resulting contract will be more positively or less negatively sloped than the
Shavell-Weiss contract everywhere.
Calibration. One period is chosen to be one week. I assume that utility is CRRA, i.e.
u(c) = c1  /(1   ) and assume   = 1. Moreover, I assume that consumption in autarky
` is two thirds of the average wage. This is a fairly innocuous assumption as it will only
scale the optimal benefit schedule up or down and just needs to be fixed in order to obtain
the values in autarky. The elasticity of marginal search costs, , and the discount rate,
 , are set to the same value as in Table 2.3.
The parameters (!l,!h) have to be chosen in a way that approximates a continuous
distribution. Since with continuous types the promised utility constraint will always bind
for the lowest type, !l should be chosen to approximate the lowest type actively searching
for a job. The incentive constraint, on the other hand, will always bind for the marginal
type excluded from UI. Hence, !h should be set to the value of the lowest type not claiming
UI. Based on these considerations, I calibrate (!l,!h) to obtain an average duration of
nonemployment in the non-registered state of 30 and 3 weeks, respectively. T should be
chosen to be very high compared to the average nonemployment spell. In practice T = 156
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weeks turns out to be suﬃcient. The resulting calibration is summarized in Table 2.6.
Parameter Definition Value
!l Search cost param. low type 548.076
!h Search cost param. high type 12.480
` Consumption in autarky 0.667
 Elasticity of marg. search cost 1.000
  Discount rate 0.999
  Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 1.000
T Time Horizon 156
Table 2.6: Baseline calibration
Optimal benefit schedules. To explore the eﬀects for optimal benefits over time, I
set V¯ equal to the value a low type would obtain if receiving a flat benefit at 20% of the
average wage. This is a reasonable assumption, as this is the average level of benefits paid
for 156 weeks, while benefits are typically only granted for about six to twelve months.
I then calculate the optimal separating contract for diﬀerent levels of the take-up cost
 . For better interpretability, I convert  to the equivalent relative income loss   in
monetary units, which solves
u(`)   = u((1  )`).
For a very high take-up cost, high types won’t have an incentive to claim UI even if
the Shavell-Weiss, i.e. unconstrained, contract is oﬀered to low types. It turns out that
the principal will oﬀer this contract for   above 95%. For all   below this value, the
principal will have to backload the schedule relative to the Shavell-Weiss contract to keep
high types from selecting into the contract.
In Figure 2.14, I plot the Shavell-Weiss contract, corresponding to the optimal contract
for   equal to 95%, in red. In black, on the other hand, I plot the optimal contract if
take-up costs are lowered to 60% of weekly consumption. While these take-up costs are
arguably still very high, the contract is distorted considerably. The diﬀerence is especially
marked during the initial weeks, where benefit is considerably lower. This is compensated
by higher benefits later on11. Moreover, while initially the take-up eﬀect dominates and
the schedule becomes upward sloping, later on the moral-hazard eﬀect dominates leading
to a downward sloping schedule. However, one has to keep in mind that the results are
11The comparison in levels is partly misleading as higher take-up costs have to be compensated by
a higher level of benefits later on. Hence, the red line is shifted upward to fulfill the initial promise
constraint.
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always relative to the benchmark with no savings. As mentioned before, allowing for
savings will lead to more backloading even in the case with observable types.
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Figure 2.14: Optimal benefit schedules
The Shavell-Weiss result has often been quoted as a reference to justify the usual prac-
tice of a constant benefit to be paid for a finite duration. The real-world implication of the
result allowing for take-up, on the other hand, would make a case for increasing benefits,
at least at the beginning of the spell, and a longer maximum benefit duration. One way of
implementing this would by way of a mandatory waiting period before receiving benefits.
2.7 Conclusion
I proceeded from a puzzling but still quite robust and widely documented empirical fact:
Even though entitled to do so, many unemployed deliberately choose not to claim UI
benefits. This finding stands in stark contrast to the assumptions commonly made in
macro models, where the take-up rate is assumed to be 100%. This assumption might
be innocuous if take-up can be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, not interacting with
the labor market aggregates. The goal of this paper was to demonstrate the opposite –
that take-up behavior can aﬀect the equilibrium in a labor market in a qualitatively and
quantitatively important way by interacting with search eﬀort.
On the one hand, this interaction manifests itself along the business cycle: Conditional
on the past take-up decision, search incentives for the registered are lower than for the
non-registered. Since more workers claim unemployment insurance during downturns, this
leads to amplification in fluctuations in search eﬀort, and thus also in unemployment and
vacancies. Indeed, a simulation of the model calibrated to match long-term averages in
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take-up and job-finding rates demonstrates that the eﬀect of the channel is quantitatively
important, more than doubling the volatility of search eﬀort while increasing the volatility
of the labor market aggregates by 15 to 30%. In addition, the model also matches empirical
patterns fairly well, as was demonstrated by a simulation of historical data.
The model’s predictions along the business cycle might also be important for policy-
makers. First, the current share of the unemployed on benefits might be an important
indicator of how extended a period of high unemployment is. Also, since workers en-
dogenously sort into registered unemployment, the composition of the registered unem-
ployed might be very diﬀerent at diﬀerent points of the cycle. This can have important
consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance, since the registered un-
employed respond diﬀerently to incentives at diﬀerent points in time. Interestingly, the
finding that UI can amplify fluctuations if there is variable take-up contrasts with its
traditional role as an automatic stabilizer12.
On the other hand, endogenous UI take-up also has important implications in the
steady state: The specific design of the UI contract will aﬀect workers’ decision to claim.
Governments can save money by designing the contract in a way that keeps workers that
do not need to be insured from claiming. This is generally achieved by backloading the
schedule, working against the classical result that UI benefits should be decreasing over
time.
Even though many aspects of UI take-up have been covered in this paper, there are
many important questions that remain unanswered: As a first example, I completely
abstracted from savings motives in this paper, while an interesting question is also how
take-up interacts with workers’ assets. Also, take-up costs were always taken as given.
However, as they could be partly controlled by the government, one should also explore
whether there is an optimal level of the take-up cost and whether they are generally too
low or too high. These are only two examples of a long list of topics in a field that has
received little attention so far.
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2.8 Appendix
A Estimating Job Separations from CPS Data
This section details the methodology proposed by Shimer (2005b) to estimate job-finding
rates ft and separations rates  t during period t. I then use  t to get estimate the flow of
separation between t and t+ 1, St,t+1.
The two critical assumptions are that movements in and out of the labor force can be
ignored and that all unemployed workers find jobs at rate ft while all workers lose their
jobs at rate  t. The model presumes a continuous time environment in which data are
measured at discrete dates t 2 {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Given some t, let ⌧ 2 [0, 1] denote the time
elapsed since the previous measurement date. Further, denote by et+⌧ employment at
time t+⌧ , by ut+⌧ the number of unemployed workers at t+⌧ , and by ust+⌧ as “short-term
unemployment”, workers who are unemployed at t+ ⌧ but where employed at least once
since t.
For lack of within period data, assume that ft and st are constant within periods.
Then, unemployment and short-term unemployment satisfy the diﬀerential equations
u˙t+⌧ = et+⌧ t   ut+⌧ft (2.22)
and
u˙st+⌧ = et+⌧ t   ust+⌧ft. (2.23)
Subtracting (2.23) from (2.22) and rearranging, we find
˙(ut+⌧   ust+⌧ )
(ut+⌧   ust+⌧ )
=  ft.
Using ust = 0, this can be solved for ut+1 and ust+1 given ut:
ut+1 = e
 ftut + ust+1. (2.24)
Given data on unemployment and short-term unemployment, this equation can be used
to determine the job-finding probability.
Moreover, using the assumption that the labor force lt = et + ut is constant during
period t, we can rewrite (2.22) to obtain
u˙t+⌧ = lt t   (ft +  t)ut+⌧ .
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Given initial condition ut, this diﬀerential equation has the solution
ut+1 =
 
1  e ft  t  t
ft +  t
lt + e
 ft  tut,
which, given ft determined in (2.24), pins down  t and can easily be solved numerically.
Given an estimate  t of the separation rate between t and t + 1, the flow of job
separations during period [t, t+ 1) is given by
St =
Z 1
0
 tet+⌧ d⌧ ⇡  t et + et+1
2
,
where the approximation uses a linear interpolation of et+⌧ for ⌧ 2 (0, 1).
The method is implemented using monthly data on employment and unemployment
based on the CPS and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for et and ut, respec-
tively. Moreover, the BLS also publishes the number of unemployed with unemployment
duration below five weeks, which is used for ust .
B A Steady-State Model with Nash Bargaining
When a firm is matched to an unemployed worker, the wage is fixed by generalized Nash
bargaining, solving
Ji = (1   )(Ji +Wi   hiTi   (1  hi)Ni),
where   is workers’ bargaining power and where we have already used vacancies yield zero
value in equilibrium. Once the wage wi is fixed, I assume that it is not bargained anew.
I thus rule out the (unrealistic) possibility that the wage is bargained anew once take-up
costs are not sunk anymore. Call Si(h) ⌘ Ji +Wi   hTi   (1  h)Ni the surplus if a firm
is matched to a worker who had registration status h before.
A firm matched to a worker with search costs !i earns value
(1   )Ji = exp(p)  wi     Ji. (2.25)
Turning to the labor supply side, equations (2.5) to (2.7) simplify to
(1   )Ni = max
ei 0
n
`  !i
1 + 
e1+i +  eif(✓)(Wi  Ni)
o
, (2.26)
(1   )Ti = max
ei 0
n
`+ z   !i
1 + 
e1+i +  eif(✓)(Wi   Ti)
o
, (2.27)
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and
(1   )Wi = wi +   (Ui  Wi), (2.28)
where Ui = max {Ti    , Ni}. The unemployed always make the same take-up decision
upon becoming unemployed and the registration status is hence given by
hi = ki(p) = 1 [Ti      Ni] = 1 [ (Si(0)  Si(1))     0] .
Steady-state optimal search eﬀort for registered and non-registered unemployed, ei(1) and
ei(0), are determined by the first-order conditions
!i(ei(1))
 =  f(✓)(Wi   Ti) =  f(✓) Si(1)
!i(ei(0))
 =  f(✓)(Wi  Ni) =  f(✓) Si(0).
Call ei = ei(hi). Equilibrium unemployment follows as
ui =
 
 + eif(✓)
.
Combining equations (2.25) to (2.28) with the FOCs for search eﬀort and the Nash
bargaining assumption, one can show that the surplus functions solve
(1   (1   ))Si(h) + 
1 + 
! 1/i ( f(✓) Si(h))
1+
 = p  `  h(z +    ).
I assume random search, meaning that firms cannot direct their search to specific
types of workers. The value of a vacancy is hence independent of i and given by
V =  c+  q(✓)
R1
0 eiui(1   )Si(hi) dF (!i)R1
0 eiui dF (!i)
.
Equilibrium labor market tightness solves the free-entry condition V = 0.
C Optimal Pooling Contract
The principal solves the following program:
min
z(0),z(1),e
z(0) + q(1  el)z(1) + (1  q)(1  eh)z(1)
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subject to
log(`+ z(0)) + (1  el) log(`+ z(1))  !l
2
e2l   V¯ +  
log(`+ z(0)) + (1  eh) log(`+ z(1))  !h
2
e2h   N(!h) +  
!heh =   log(`+ z(1))
!lel =   log(`+ z(1)),
where eh and el denote the search eﬀort levels of the high and low types, respectively.
Denote by  0, 1, µl, and µh the multipliers on the first, second, third, and fourth
constraint, respectively. The first-order conditions of the principal’s problem are then
`+ z(0) =  0 +  1
`+ z(1) =
 0(1  el) +  1(1  eh)
q(1  el) + (1  q)(1  eh)   (µl + µh)
1
q(1  el) + (1  q)(1  eh)
µl = qz(1)/!l
µh = (1  q)z(1)/!h
 0   0, 1   0,
along with the usual complementary slackness conditions. By the same argument as
before, if V¯ is close enough to N(!h), the second constraint is slack. Hence, in solving
the model we can guess  1 = 0 and verify that the solution satisfies the constraint.
Under this assumption, the FOC’s imply
z(1) = z(0)
1
q + (1  q)1 eh1 el
  z(1) q/!l + (1  q)/!h
q(1  el) + (1  q)(1  eh) .
The second term pushes b1 downward due to the usual moral hazard eﬀect. The total
eﬀect is ambiguous, however, as the first term tends to push b1 upward. The reason is
that both types aﬀect costs, while only the low type’s constraint is binding. Importantly,
the pooling contract converges to the Shavell-Weiss contract if q ! 1.
D Omitted Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1:
By assumption, p 2 [p, p]. Let (B(S), d1) denote the space of all bounded, bounded away
from zero, and continuous functions defined on state space S = [p, p] equipped with the
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metric d1(f, g) = ||f   g||1 for some f, g 2 B(S). The policy function ✓(p) is the fixed
point of the operator T : B(S)! B(S) defined by
c
 q(T ✓(p))
= Ep
⇢
exp(p0)  w(p0) + (1   ) c
q(✓(p))
 
.
By Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem (see, e.g., Stachurski (2009)), since (B(S), d1) is a
complete metric space, T has a unique fixed point ✓(p) if T is a uniform contraction on
S.
To see that T is uniformly contracting, note that, for any v, w 2 B(S), we have      c q(Tv(p))   c q(Tw(p))
      =
     (1   )Ep
⇢
c
q(v(p))
  c
q(w(p))
       
 (1   )Ep
(      cq(v(p))   cq(w(p))
     
)
,
      1q(Tv(p))   1q(Tw(p))
        (1   )Ep
(      1q(v(p))   1q(w(p))
     
)
  (1   )Ep
(
sup
p
      1q(v(p))   1q(w(p))
     
)
=  (1   )| {z }
<1
sup
p
      1q(v(p))   1q(w(p))
     .
Since 1/q(·) is strictly increasing, we conclude
|Tv(p)  Tw(p)| < sup
p
|v(p)  w(p)| 8p.
Taking the supremum over p on the left-hand side, we conclude
d1(Tv, Tw) < d1(v, w)
and hence T is uniformly contracting on S. Thus, ✓(p) exists and is unique.
Define instantaneous profits ⇡(p) ⌘ exp(p)  w(p). Observe that
⇡0(p) = exp(p)  (1   )w0 exp((1   )p) = exp(p)  (1   )w(p) = ⇡(p) +  w(p) > 0,
as long as ⇡(p) > 0. To prove monotonicity, since T is uniformly contracting, it suﬃces to
show that T maps an arbitrary strictly increasing function v(p) into a strictly increasing
function Tv(p). Since 1/q(·) is monotonically increasing and exp(p)  w(p) is increasing,
this is the case.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2:
In Proposition 2.1, it was shown that the policy function ✓(p) exists and is unique under
the given assumptions. Hence, I will continue to prove existence and uniqueness for the
worker side.
Note that we can rewrite the worker problem (equations (2.5) to (2.7)) in one recursive
equation. Define Ui(p, s) as the value of the unemployed with search cost parameter !i
and last period registration status s given productivity p. It is given by
Ui(p, s) = max
ei 0,s02{0,1}
n
`+ s0z   (1  s)s0   !i
1 + 
e1+i
+   [eif(✓(p))EpWi(p0) + (1  eif(✓(p))EpUi(p0, s0)]
o
,
where the current registration status is now denoted by s0. In particular, take-up costs  
only have to be borne if not yet registered (s = 0). As can easily be checked, this dynamic
equation is equivalent to (Ui(p), Ni(p), Ti(p)). The value of a worker only has to rewritten
slightly, accounting for the fact that a newly laid-oﬀ worker always has s = 0:
Wi(p) = w(p) +   [ EpUi(p0, 0) + (1   )EpWi(p0)]
Since Wi(p) does not involve any worker choices, we might as well maximize Gi(p, s) ⌘
Ui(p, s) Wi(p), given by
Gi(p, s) = max
ei 0,s02{0,1}
n
`+ s0z   (1  s)s0   !i
1 + 
e1+i   w(p)
+   Ep (Ui(p0, s0)  Ui(p0, 0)) +  (1     eif(✓(p))EpGi(p0, s0)
o
= max
ei 0,s02{0,1}
n
ui(s, s
0, e, p) +   Ep (Gi(p0, s0) Gi(p0, 0))
+  (1     eif(✓(p))EpGi(p0, s0)
o
,
where ui(s, s0, e, p) ⌘ `+ s0z   (1  s)s0   !i1+e1+i   w(p).
By assumption, !i   !, where ! is such that ei  e, where max {ef(✓(p))}  1    
and p 2 [p, p]. Let (B(S), d1) denote the space of all bounded and continuous functions
defined on state space S = [p, p]⇥ {0, 1} equipped with the metric d1(f, g) = ||f   g||1
for some f, g 2 B(S). Let E ⌘ [0, e]⇥{0, 1}. The value function Gi(p, s) is the fixed point
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of the Bellman operator T : B(S)! B(S) is defined by
Twi(p, s) = max
(ei,s0)2E
n
ui(s, s
0, e, p) +   Ep (wi(p0, s0)  wi(p0, 0))
+  (1     eif(✓(p))Epwi(p0, s0)
o
8(p, s) 2 S.
By the Weierstrass Theorem, as E is compact and the objective function is bounded and
continuous, a solution to the optimization problem always exists.
In order to prove existence and uniqueness, the following lemma will be important:
Lemma 5. The Bellman operator T is uniformly contracting at rate  (1  ), that is, for
v, w 2 B(S),
d1(Tv, Tw)   (1   )d1(v, w).
Proof. For any v, w 2 B(S) and any (p, s) 2 S, we have
|Twi(p, s)  Tvi(p, s)| =    sup
(ei,s0)2E
n
ui(s, s
0, e, p) +   Ep (wi(p0, s0)  wi(p0, 0)) +  (1     eif(✓(p))Epwi(p0, s0)
o
  sup
(ei,s0)2E
n
ui(s, s
0, e, p) +   Ep (vi(p0, s0)  vi(p0, 0)) +  (1     eif(✓(p))Epvi(p0, s0)
o   ,
and hence, using | supw   sup v|  sup |w   v|, defining  s0 ⌘ Ep (wi(p0, s0)  vi(p0, s0)),
and suppressing the argument of f(·) for simplicity,
|Twi(p, s)  Tvi(p, s)|    sup
(ei,s0)2E
   (1     eif) s0 +   ( s0   0)    
=   sup
(ei,s0)2E
   (1  eif) s0     0   
=  max
n
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 0   ,
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1  eif) 1     0   o.
Focusing on the second part of the max-operator, observe that, as by assumption
eif < 1   ,
 1    0 ) (1     eif) 0  (1  eif) 1     0  (1     eif) 1,
while
 0 >  1 ) (1     eif) 1 < (1  eif) 1     0 < (1     eif) 0.
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Thus,
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1  eif) 1     0     max( sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 1   , sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 0   )
and
|Twi(p, s)  Tvi(p, s)|   max
(
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 0   ,
max
(
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 1   , sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 0   ))
=  max
(
sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 0   , sup
ei2[0,e]
   (1     eif) 1   )
=   sup
(ei,s0i)2E
   (1     eif) (s0)   
  (1   ) sup
s0i2{0,1}
   Ep (wi(p0, s0i)  vi(p0, s0i))    
  (1   ) sup
s0i2{0,1}
Ep
⇣   wi(p0, s0i)  vi(p0, s0i)   ⌘
  (1   ) sup
s0i2{0,1}
Ep
⇣      wi(p0, s0i)  vi(p0, s0i)      1⌘
=  (1   )||wi   vi||1.
Taking the supremum over |Twi(p, s)  Tvi(p, s)| gives the desired inequality.
By Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem (see, e.g., Stachurski (2009)), since (B(S), d1) is a
complete metric space and T is a uniform contraction on S, T has a unique fixed point
Gi(p, s). Hence, an equilibrium exists and is unique.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
We have Ui(p) = max {Ti(p)   , Ni(p)} < Ti(p) using Lemma 1. Claim (i) follows then
directly from the two first-order conditions.
From the two first-order conditions, it is apparent that to show claim (ii), it suﬃces
to show that (Wi(p)   Ui(p))/!i and (Wi(p)   Ti(p))/!i are decreasing in !i, or equiv-
alently, that (Ui(p)  Wi(p))/!i and (Ti(p)  Wi(p))/!i are increasing in !i. Note that
we showed in Theorem 2.2 that the recursive system is uniformly contracting given the
stated assumptions. Hence, it suﬃces to show that the Bellman operator T , defined in the
proof of Theorem 2.2, maps arbitrary increasing functions (N˜i(p)   W˜i(p))/!i, (T˜i(p)  
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W˜i(p))/!i, and (U˜i(p)  W˜i(p))/!i into increasing ( ˜˜Ni(p)  ˜˜Wi(p))/!i, ( ˜˜Ti(p)  ˜˜Wi(p))/!i,
and ( ˜˜Ui(p)  ˜˜Wi(p))/!i. To see this, note that since !i > 0, the recursive system can be
rewritten and the Bellman operator implies
˜˜Ni(p)  ˜˜Wi(p)
!i
= max
ei 0
(
`  w(p)
!i
  1
1 + 
e1+i +  (1     eif(✓(p)))Ep
 
U˜i(p)  W˜i(p)
!i
!)
and
˜˜Ti(p)  ˜˜Wi(p)
!i
= max
ei 0
(
`+ z   w(p)
!i
  1
1 + 
e1+i +  (1     eif(✓(p)))Ep
 
T˜i(p)  W˜i(p)
!i
!)
.
Consider a change of !i to !j > !i but keep search eﬀort fixed at e⇤i , where e⇤i denotes the
maximizer given !i in the respective equation. By assumption, the terms in expectations
will increase for every p, leading to an increase in the expectations. Also, since ` + z  
w(p) < 0 and `   w(p) < 0, ` w(p)!i and
`+z w(p)
!i
increase as well. When we change
e⇤i to e⇤j , the value can be no smaller, since e⇤j is the maximizer. This establishes that
˜˜Ni(p)  ˜˜Wi(p))/!i and ˜˜Ti(p)  ˜˜Wi(p))/!i are increasing in !i as well, which then follows
for ˜˜Ui(p)   ˜˜Wi(p))/!i directly. Hence, the same has to hold for (Ui(p)  Wi(p))/!i and
(Ti(p) Wi(p))/!i, the fixed point of T , which establishes the claim.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3:
Diﬀerentiate the FOC for ei(p, 1) to get
!iei(p, 1)
 1| {z }
>0
@ei(p, 1)
@p
=  
@
@p
[f(✓(p)) [EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0)]] .
We need to find suﬃcient conditions so that the right-hand side of this equation is positive.
We find, noting that p denotes log productivity,
@
@p
[f(✓(p)) [EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0)]] = @f
@✓
@✓
@p
[EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0)] + f(✓)
✓
@EpWi(p0)
@p
  @EpTi(p
0)
@p
◆
=
Z
(Wi(p
0)  Ti(p0))

@f
@✓
@✓
@p
g(p0|p) + f(✓)@g(p
0|p)
@p
 
dp0
=
Z
(Wi(p
0)  Ti(p0))| {z }
>0
f(✓)
"
@f
@✓
✓
f(✓)| {z }
(1 ↵)
@✓
@p
1
✓|{z}
"✓,p
+
@g(p0|p)
@p
1
g(p0|p)| {z }
"g,p
#
g(p0|p) dp0.
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Hence, (1   ↵)"✓,p + "g,p > 0 guarantees that the entire integral is positive, implying
@ei(p, 1)/@p > 0. The argument for ei(p, 0) is analogous.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4:
First, observe that if ki(p) = 1 or ki(p) = 0 for all p 2 [p, p], then person i follows a
cutoﬀ rule trivially since we can set the cutoﬀ to p + ✏ or p   ✏ where ✏ > 0 and ✏ ! 0,
respectively.
For all cases where i changes the take-up decision in the interior of [p, p], if person i
follows a cutoﬀ rule in take-up, then Ni(p0) > Ti(p0)   implies Ni(p1) > Ti(p1)   for
p1 > p0. A suﬃcient condition for this is that @Ni(p)@p >
@Ti(p)
@p for all p.
Diﬀerentiating (2.5) and (2.6) with respect to p, we find (using f(p) = f(✓(p)) as a
shorthand):
@Ni(p)
@p
=  
@EpUi(p0)
@p
+  ei(p, 0)
@
@p
[f(p) (EpWi(p0)  EpUi(p0))]
@Ti(p)
@p
=  
@EpTi(p0)
@p
+  ei(p, 1)
@
@p
[f(p) (EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0))] .
By diﬀerentiating the two FOCs for search eﬀort and imposing @ei(p, 0)/@p > 0 and
@ei(p, 1)/@p > 0 we find
@
@p
[f(p) (EpWi(p0)  EpUi(p0))] > 0
and
@
@p
[f(p) (EpWi(p0)  EpTi(p0))] > 0.
Hence, denoting by g(p0|p) and G(p0|p) the conditional pdf and cdf of p0 given p,
respectively, and using ei(p, 0) > ei(p, 1) by Proposition 2,
@Ni(p)
@p
  @Ti(p)
@p
>  
✓
@EpUi(p0)
@p
  @EpTi(p
0)
@p
◆
+  ei(p, 1)
@
@p
[f(p) (EpTi(p0)  EpUi(p0))]
=  
✓
@EpUi(p0)
@p
  @EpTi(p
0)
@p
◆
+  ei(p, 1)
"
@f(p)
@p
(EpTi(p0)  EpUi(p0))| {z }
>0 by Lemma 1
+ f(p)
✓
@EpTi(p0)
@p
  @EpUi(p
0)
@p
◆#
>  (1  ei(p, 1)f(p))
✓
@EpUi(p0)
@p
  @EpTi(p
0)
@p
◆
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=  (1  ei(p, 1)f(p))
Z
(Ui(p
0)  Ti(p0))| {z }
=max{  ,Ni(p0) Ti(p0)}
@g(p0|p)
@p
dp0
=  (1  ei(p, 1)f(p))
Z
@max {  , Ni(p0)  Ti(p0)}
@p0
✓
 @G(p
0|p)
@p
◆
dp0,
where the last step follows from integration by parts. Noting that
G(p0|p) = P ("0  p0   ⇢p|p)
and hence
@G(p0|p)
@p
=  ⇢g(p0|p),
we find, for all p,
@Ni(p)
@p
  @Ti(p)
@p
>  (1  ei(p, 1)f(p))⇢
Z
@max {  , Ni(p0)  Ti(p0)}
@p0| {z }
2
n
0,
@Ni(p
0)
@p0  
@Ti(p
0)
@p0
o
g(p0|p) dp0
>  (1  ei(p, 1)f(p))⇢| {z }
2(0,1)
Z
min
⇢
0,
@Ni(p0)
@p0
  @Ti(p
0)
@p0
 
g(p0|p) dp0| {z }
0
>
Z
min
⇢
0,
@Ni(p0)
@p0
  @Ti(p
0)
@p0
 
g(p0|p) dp0.
Define  (p) ⌘ @Ni(p)@p   @Ti(p)@p . We want to prove that  (p) > 0 for all p. To the contrary,
assume that 9p :  (p)  0. Define   ⌘ minp  (p). We have    0 by assumption. The
previous inequality holds for all p, among them p so that  (p) =  . Picking p = p, we
find
  >
Z
min {0, (p0)} g(p0|p) dp0  
Z
min
 
0, 
 
g(p0|p) dp0 = min 0,  =  ,
which is a contradiction. Hence @Ni(p)@p >
@Ti(p)
@p for all p, which establishes the result.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.5:
If the government runs a balanced budget every period, we have
(1  ut)⌧t = u1tz 8t,
where ⌧t denotes the lump-sum tax on workers. Diﬀerentiating with respect to z and
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rewriting, we find
1  ut
u1t
@⌧t
@z
= 1 +
@u1t
@z
z
u1t
+
@ut
@z
z
ut
ut
1  ut .
Moreover, given a small increase in z in period t0, we only need to look at first-order
eﬀects on aggregate welfare due to the envelope theorem. In particular, we only need to
consider the impact on consumption when employed and unemployed, but we can ignore
the impact on the probability of being registered, u1t, and of being employed, 1 ut, since
individuals choose search eﬀort optimally. At the optimum we hence have
1X
t=t0
u1t 
t t0v0(cu)  (1  ut) t t0v0(ce)@⌧t
@z
= 0
,
1X
t=t0
 t t0u1tv0(ce)
✓
v0(cu)
v0(ce)
  1  ut
u1t
@⌧t
@z
◆
= 0.
Plugging in from above, we find
1X
t=t0
 t t0u1t
✓
v0(cu)  v0(ce)
v0(ce)
  @u1t
@z
z
u1t
  @ut
@z
z
ut
ut
1  ut
◆
= 0,
which directly implies the result.
Moreover, if third-order terms of v(c) are small, a Taylor approximation implies
v0(cu) ⇡ v0(ce)  v00(ce)(ce   cu)
, v
0(cu)  v0(ce)
v0(ce)
⇡  v
00(ce)
v0(ce)
ce| {z }
⌘ 
ce   cu
ce
.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.6:
At the optimum, the derivatives of Ct(V lt , V ht ) with respect to z(t) and z(t + 1) are
zero:
  1   2(1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1))
"
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
@V lt+2
@z(t)
+
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
@V ht+2
@z(t)
#
+  Ct+1(·)@el(t)
@z(t)
+  2(1  el(t))Ct+2(·)@el(t+ 1)
@z(t)
= 0
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   (1  el(t))   2(1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1))
"
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
@V lt+2
@z(t+ 1)
+
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
@V ht+2
@z(t+ 1)
#
+  Ct+1(·) @el(t)
@z(t+ 1)
+  2(1  el(t))Ct+2(·)@el(t+ 1)
@z(t+ 1)
= 0
Using implicit diﬀerentiation in the constraints, we find:
@V lt+2
@z(t)
=   u
0(`+ z(t))
 2(1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1))
@V ht+2
@z(t)
=   u
0(`+ z(t))
 2(1  eh(t))(1  eh(t+ 1))
@V lt+2
@z(t+ 1)
=   u
0(`+ z(t))
 (1  el(t+ 1))
@V ht+2
@z(t+ 1)
=   u
0(`+ z(t))
 (1  eh(t+ 1))
@el(t)
@z(t)
=    
!l
el(t)
1  (1  el(t+ 1))
@V lt+2
@z(t)
=
el(t)1 
1  el(t)
u0(`+ z(t))
!l
@el(t+ 1)
@z(t)
=    
!l
el(t+ 1)
1  @V
l
t+2
@z(t)
=
el(t)1 
 (1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1)
u0(`+ z(t))
!l
@el(t)
@z(t+ 1)
=    
!l
"
u0(`+ z(t+ 1)) +  (1  el(t+ 1))
@V lt+2
@z(t+ 1)
#
= 0
@el(t+ 1)
@z(t+ 1)
=    
!l
el(t+ 1)
1  @V
l
t+2
@z(t+ 1)
=
el(t+ 1)1 
(1  el(t+ 1)
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
!l
Plugging in above and simplifying, we find
1
u0(`+ z(t))
=
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
+
(1  el(t))(1  el(t+ 1))
(1  eh(t))(1  eh(t+ 1))
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
+
 
!l
Ct+2(·) el(t+ 1)
1 
1  el(t+ 1)
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
=
@Ct+2(·)
@V lt+2
+
1  el(t+ 1)
1  eh(t+ 1)
@Ct+2(·)
@V ht+2
+
 
!l
Ct+2(·) el(t+ 1)
1 
1  el(t+ 1)
.
To find the envelope conditions, we need to ask how the current cost Ct(V lt , V ht ) is
aﬀected by changes in V lt and V ht starting from the optimum. The principal can change
V lt and V ht by changing z(t) and z(t+1). Using the envelope theorem, a marginal change
in z(t) satisfies
1 =
@Ct(·)
@V lt
u0(`+ z(t)) +
@Ct(·)
@V ht
u0(`+ z(t)).
For a marginal change in z(t+1), we have to take into account that el(t) reacts as we
keep V lt+2 constant:
 (1  el(t)) +  Ct+1(·)  
!l
el(t)
1 u0(`+ z(t+ 1)) =  (1  el(t))@Ct(·)
@V lt
u0(`+ z(t+ 1)) +  (1  eh(t))@Ct(·)
@V ht
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
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Solving this system of equations for @Ct(·)
@V lt
and @Ct(·)
@V ht
, we find
@Ct(·)
@V lt
=
1  el(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
✓
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)
◆
  1  eh(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
1
u0(`+ z(t))
@Ct(·)
@V ht
=  1  el(t)
eh(t)  el(t)
✓
1
u0(`+ z(t+ 1))
+
 
!l
Ct+1(·) el(t)
1 
1  el(t)
  1
u0(`+ z(t))
◆
.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
Given that the high types can be excluded, there is only one state variable and it
suﬃces to solve for the optimal benefits one period at a time. The recursive problem now
reads
Ct(V
l
t ) = min
z(t),V lt+1
 
z(t) +  (1  el(t))Ct+1(V lt+1)
 
subject to
u(`+ z(t))  !l
1 + 
el(t)
1+ +  (1  el(t))V lt+1 = V lt
!lel(t)
 =   V lt+1.
At the optimum, the derivative with respect to z(t) has to be zero, hence
 1   (1  el(t))@Ct+1(·)
@V lt+1
@V lt+1
@z(t)
+  Ct+1(·)@el(t)
@z(t)
= 0.
Implicit diﬀerentiation in the constraints implies
@V lt+1
@z(t)
=  u
0(`+ z(t))
 (1  el(t))
@el(t)
@z(t)
=
u0(`+ z(t))
!l
el(t)1 
1  el(t) .
Moreover, the envelope theorem implies
@Ct(·)
@V lt
=
1
u0(`+ z(t))
.
Plugging in above and simplifying yields the desired result.
3 Quasi-experimental Evidence on Take-up
and the Value of Unemployment
Insurance
Joint with François Fontaine
A version of this paper has been submitted to the American Economic Review.
3.1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance (hereafter UI) helps individuals to smooth consumption when
they are unemployed. From this perspective, unemployment insurance take-up is an
intriguing phenomenon. In most of the existing studies, it lies between 25% and 75%
(see Table 3.1), suggesting that claiming costs are high in comparison with the value
of unemployment insurance. In this paper, we try to quantify the net value of UI by
finding a monetary equivalent of the intertemporal utility of claiming and receiving UI
relative to not doing so. For this purpose, we study a large Austrian administrative
database where discontinuities in eligibility for severance payments (SP) and extended
unemployment benefits (EB) create variation in take-up rates and in the exit rate from
unemployment. We first provide a simple search model where workers face a cost of
claiming for unemployment benefits and can partially smooth consumption using savings.
In the spirit of Card et al. (2007), we show that reduced-form estimates of the impact of
SP and EB on take-up rates and exit rates can be used to compute bounds on a money
metric for the net value of UI.
Following seminal work by Moﬃtt (1983) on welfare benefits, previous studies on UI
take-up primarily focused on empirical investigations of its determinants. These are sur-
1The British Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is one of the few government agencies that
regularly publish estimates of take-up rates.
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Estimated
Country Source take-up Time period
Canada Storer and van Audenrode (1995) 77% 1981 – 1986
France Blasco and Fontaine (2012) 27% - 45% 2001 – 2002
United Kingdom DWP1 (2012) 49% - 84% 1997 – 2010
United States Anderson and Meyer (1997) 24% - 50% 1979 – 1982
Blank and Card (1991) 68% - 75% 1977 – 1987
McCall (1995) 65% 1982 – 1991
Table 3.1: Overview of estimated take-up in existing studies
veyed in Currie (2004) and Hernanz et al. (2004). Notable examples are Blank and Card
(1991), McCall (1995) and Anderson and Meyer (1997), all finding that generosity of UI is
a significant determinant of take-up2 which is consistent with agents comparing costs and
benefits of UI take-up. Claiming costs per se have been the focus of a number of studies
(e.g. Bhargava and Manoli (2015), Budd and McCall (1997), Ebenstein and Stange (2010),
Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007)). While existing evidence is inconclusive as to their ex-
act composition (physical costs, psychological costs or administrative barriers to filing;
see descriptive evidence in Vroman (2009)), they point to a significant role for take-up
costs. Finally, low take-up rates could be understood as the result of errors in individu-
als’ assessment of their eligibility. Following this idea, a recent paper Hertel-Fernandez
and Wenger (2013) describes an experiment where randomly selected unemployed were
provided accurate information about UI eligibility requirements. Contrary to expecta-
tion, treated individuals actually displayed lower participation. The authors interpret the
finding as a consequence of uncertainty about actual take-up costs. In comparison with
existing studies, we try to quantify directly the two sides of the take-up choice, namely
the claiming costs and the welfare gains from UI.
Only recently have there been attempts to come up with structural models to explain
the take-up process in more detail. One of them is Blasco and Fontaine (2012), who
incorporate a take-up decision in a detailed partial equilibrium job search model and
estimate it on administrative data. They show that the take-up decision, job search
behavior and expectations are deeply interrelated and that the elasticity of the exit rate
to unemployment benefits depends on the elasticity of the take-up rate. In this paper, we
allow the take-up rate to depend on job search eﬃciency and the search behavior to be
aﬀected by claiming, while focusing on the quantification of the value of UI.
Recent studies by Auray et al. (2013), Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014)
2Burtless (1983) is probably among the first to document the stylized fact and to explore possible
explanations.
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and Kettemann (2016) incorporate UI take-up in an equilibrium model. The first is only
relevant for a system where firms are experience rated and pay higher payroll taxes if more
of their previous employees collected benefits. In this case, since firms prefer workers not
taking up UI, these will enjoy higher job arrival rates and workers will select endogenously
into registered and non-registered unemployment. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis
(2014) introduce a take-up decision into a DSGE model with matching frictions and a
representative household in order to calculate the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of
employment. Kettemann (2016) introduces a take-up decision in a search and matching
model with linear preferences, hence abstracting from savings, and endogenous search
eﬀort. He shows that take-up and search eﬀort interact to amplify fluctuations of labor
market aggregates along the business cycle. Moreover, he demonstrates that endogenous
take-up can have important consequences for the optimal time structure of unemployment
benefits, potentially making the schedule upward sloping. In all cases, the strategy and
purpose is diﬀerent from ours. Our main objective is to identify the distribution of the net
value of UI using data on take-up behavior and exit rates from unemployment. Moreover,
by relying on estimates from a regression discontinuity design, we are, to our knowledge,
the first to come up with quasi-experimental evidence on UI take-up.
The data, together with some information on the institutional background, are pre-
sented in section 3.2. We then develop a simple search model with UI take up in section
4.6, from which we build our empirical strategy in section 3.4. Section 4.8 is devoted to
the empirical findings, while section 4.10 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
In this section we briefly describe the institutional background motivating our empirical
strategy. We are going to use two discontinuities in the data: the first is related to
eligibility for severance payments, the second to eligibility for extended UI benefits.
On the one hand, firms are required to make a lump-sum transfer at the time of the
layoﬀ, whose size depends on a step function of the worker’s tenure in the firm3. In
particular, jobs below three years of tenure at the time of the separation are not eligible
for mandatory severance pay. After three years, firms have to make a transfer of at least
two months of salary.
In addition, workers having lost their job can collect benefits if they have acquired a
suﬃcient work history (those who quit face a waiting period of 28 days). Workers who
have worked at least twelve months out of the two years preceding job loss are able to
3For all jobs starting as of January 1, 2003, mandatory severance pay was abolished and succeeded
by a system of occupational pensions.
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claim. The maximum benefit duration, in turn, depends on the months worked in the five
years preceding job loss. If a worker was employed for below 36 months, she is eligible
for up to twenty weeks of benefits, while those having worked for more than 36 months
are eligible for 30 weeks. Benefits replace approximately 55% of previous earnings up
to a minimum and a maximum, though the maximum is attained by very few people.
Importantly, unemployment insurance has to be claimed personally at the local oﬃce of
the public employment service Austria (AMS).
As discussed by Card et al. (2007), this setting implies a “double-disconinuity” problem.
For around 50% of all jobs in our baseline sample4, the threshold of receiving severance pay
coincides with the threshold of receiving extended benefits. Card et al. (2007) show that
the eﬀects of eligibility for severance pay and extended benefits can still be separated since
labor market experience and job tenure are not perfectly correlated for all individuals.
We use data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). ASSD covers the
universe of Austrian private sector workers (about 80% of the entire workforce), providing
longitudinal information from 1972 onwards. The data have been collected in order to
verify old-age pension claims and hence covers all information relevant for this aim. In
particular, it reports individuals’ complete earnings and employment history, as well as
other labor market states, such as registered unemployment, sickness or maternal leave.
For our analysis, we focus on terminations from jobs that started between January 1,
1981 and December 31, 2002. For all jobs starting after January 1, 2003, the severance
payment scheme was abolished in favor of an occupational pension scheme. In order to
limit the interaction with special programs for older workers, we drop workers above 50
years of age at the time of their job loss and/or retiring within the same calendar year. We
also exclude workers below 25 (as their jobs are often fixed-term apprenticeships), termi-
nations from jobs in the construction industry (as they are subject to a diﬀerent severance
regulation). Following Card et al. (2007), we exclude terminations from hospitals, schools,
and other public sector service industries, as some of these jobs are fixed-term. Lastly, we
exclude workers recalled to their previous employer, as they might not be searching for a
job, and those that never return to a job.
Unfortunately, the ASSD does not record non-registered unemployment (non take-up)
explicitly, but we have to infer this from a gap in the working history. We code such a
nonemployment spell as registered if it overlaps with an unemployment insurance spell
in the data, while we code it as non-registered if no such spell is observed. While the
requirement that the workers in our sample return to the labor market at a later stage
ensures some labor force attachment, we are not entirely able to distinguish between non-
4The number is 20% in Card et al. (2007), as they use a larger bandwidth and also include very young
(< 25 years) workers.
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registered unemployment and non-participation. Due to unobserved non-participation,
there is a long tail of extremely long nonemployment durations in the data. To limit their
influence on the results, we follow Card et al. (2007) and censor spells at 2 years.
Moreover, while many spells apart from employment and registered unemployment are
observed in the data (such as sickness, retirement, maternal leave, etc.), there are certain
labor market states that are not recorded in the data, such as self-employment or a stay
abroad. This might lead to some of these states being erroneously coded as non-registered
unemployment. As will become apparent later on, however, this limitation will not have
a crucial eﬀect on our results if we can assume that all relevant unobserved states trend
smoothly around the two discontinuities.
In Table 3.2, we list some summary statistics for all job terminations and the estimation
sample, using a bandwidth of 12 months around the cutoﬀs for severance pay and extended
benefits. The sample selection criteria we have to apply result in some obvious diﬀerences
between the entire population and the estimation sample. By construction, we focus on
workers with relatively high tenure at their previous employer, while on average jobs have
a quite low duration. Workers in the sample are also more likely to be female, slightly
older, more experienced, and facing a slightly longer unemployment spell. The take-up
rate is also considerably higher, which is also due to the fact that many workers in the
entire population are not eligible for unemployment insurance. Then again, it is reassuring
that the sample at hand does not seem to diﬀer much from the overall population in terms
of the pre-displacement wage.
All Job Terminations Estimation Sample
Female (%) 48.65 66.18
Age 31.29 34.43
Experience (years) 5.98 6.71
Austrian citizen (%) 83.00 78.19
Tenure at previous job (years) 1.89 2.78
Nonemployment duration 253.54 321.08
Take-up rate (%) 36.80 66.05
Blue-collar worker (%) 58.85 64.79
Monthly wage (year 2000 Euros) 1458.06 1457.68
Observations 7753856 83451
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for all job losers and the estimation sample
3.3 Theoretical Framework
We provide a model where workers are, among other things, heterogeneous in terms of
wealth when entering unemployment. When becoming unemployed, they face a cost of
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claiming for unemployment benefits and evaluate the gain from unemployment insurance
by taking into account their ability to smooth consumption using savings. For some of
them, claiming is too costly and they will thus only rely on their accumulated wealth in
doing so, which will, in turn, aﬀect their search behavior. Besides, since eligibility for
severance payments is similar to a wealth shock, it will likely aﬀect both search behavior
and willingness to claim. The same applies for eligibility for extended benefits which
renders unemployment insurance more attractive. In the following model, we will give a
formal derivation of (i) how exit rates react to eligibility for extended benefits, and (ii)
how the take-up rate responds to eligibility for severance pay and extended benefits.
3.3.1 The Model
Time is discrete and the first period is 0. When a worker becomes unemployed, she
decides whether to claim unemployment benefits, which is costly. The claiming cost is
denoted by   and it is assumed to be distributed in the population of unemployed workers
according to a distribution with cdf F and pdf f . If unemployment benefits have been
claimed when entering unemployment, income during unemployment is bIt , if not, it is bI¯t .
We also assume that for each state, there might be other costs/benefits, denoted by  jt ,
j 2  I, I¯ , that represent social or administrative constraints, stigma or psychological
costs and benefits. This means that, while there is a fixed cost of claiming, individuals
may also have to bear costs for every period they collect benefits. In the same way, there
can be benefits beyond benefit collection. We introduce these costs and benefits in terms
of a monetary equivalent. Adding a second argument to the utility function, in addition
to consumption, wouldn’t aﬀect our results5.
For a worker with A0 asset holdings, U I0 (A0) denotes the intertemporal value of the
claimants and U I¯0 (A0) the intertemporal value of non-claimants, both in period 0. The
worker collects unemployment benefits if
U I0 (A0)  U I¯0 (A0)    .
Then, in each period, the timing is the following. First, workers make their consump-
tion choices. Workers can save or dissave but, due to borrowing constraints, there is
a lower limit on A (this is not explicit below to simplify the presentation). Then they
choose their search intensity sjt (j = I if collecting benefits, j = I¯ if not), equal to the
probability of obtaining an oﬀer, at a cost  (sIt ). If they get an oﬀer, they become imme-
5The main reason is that we don’t have to go beyond deriving the behavioral response to a change
in wealth and to longer benefit duration.
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diately employed with an intertemporal value V jt+1(At+1), if not they stay unemployed.
The intertemporal values at time t in both states satisfy, with   the discount rate and r
the interest rate,
U jt (At) = u
⇣
At   (1 + r) 1At+1 + bjt    jt
⌘
   (sjt)
+  
⇣
sjtV
j
t+1(At+1) + (1  sjt)U jt+1(At+1)
⌘
,
where j 2 {0, 1}. The value of employment in t is denoted by V jt (At) and depends on the
level of assets and possibly on the state of origin (claimants or non-claimants).
3.3.2 Job Search and Take-up Choices
In the following, we characterize optimal behavior, focusing on the eﬀects we will use
later on, namely the eﬀect of assets and extended benefits on take-up and the eﬀect of
extended benefits on the exit rate. The first-order condition for search intensity reads
 0(sjt) =  
 
V jt+1(At+1)  U jt+1(At+1)
 
, (3.1)
with j 2 {I, I¯}. The eﬀect of a future benefit increase in period t + s on exits in period
t, using (3.1) and the envelope condition, follows as
dsIt
dbt+s
=   1
 00(sIt)
 spt+s|t+1u0(cIt+s), (3.2)
where pt+s|t+1 ⌘
Qt+s 1
i=t+1 (1   sIi) for s > 1, and 1 otherwise, denotes the probability of
being unemployed in period t + s if unemployed after t + 1 periods. Because they raise
the value of unemployment, future benefits decrease current search eﬀort. The particular
ordering of the eﬀects on the exit rates from sI0 to sIT 1 depends on the changes in  00(sIt)
and cIt+s6 and is theoretically ambiguous.
Another way of expressing it, which will be more convenient especially when dealing
with extensions of unemployment insurance over many periods, is to express it in terms of
the marginal eﬀect on intertemporal utility in period T , where T denotes the first period
where the extension takes place. Denote by be the benefit level during the extension period
and E the number of periods of this extension. The total eﬀect on exits in period t is
then given by
dsIt
dbe
=   1
 00(sIt)
 T tpT |t+1
@U IT
@be
. (3.3)
6If net benefits, bIt    It , are decreasing over time, consumption is decreasing as well.
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Considering, as we will later on, the eﬀect of becoming eligible for extended benefits on
search eﬀort in the last period prior to the extension, T   1, one gets
dsIT 1
dbe
=
dsIT 1
dbT
+ ...+
dsIT 1
dbT+E
(3.4)
where bT = ... = bT+E = be.
We now look at the incentive to claim for unemployment benefits. Savings help workers
to smooth consumption in unemployment and decrease the incentive to exit unemploy-
ment quickly. Notice that while the agent knows the claiming cost, we don’t observe this
cost in the data. From the econometrician’s point of view, take-up can thus be considered
probabilistic. The worker collects unemployment benefits if
U I0 (A0)  U I¯0 (A0)    ,
which happens with probability F
 
U I0 (A0)  U I¯0 (A0)
 
. The eﬀects of assets and extended
benefits on this take-up probability, denoted by `, are:
d`
dA0
= f
⇣
U I0   U I¯0
⌘
(u0(cI0)  u0(cI¯0)) (3.5)
d`
dbe
= f
⇣
U I0   U I¯0
⌘
 T 1pT |1
@U IT
@be
(3.6)
Eligibility for extended benefits increases unambiguously the probability to claim by rais-
ing the value of unemployment insurance. In the same way, as long as cI0 > cI¯0, a
one-dollar increase in wealth will aﬀect utility of the non-claimants by more than the
utility of the benefit recipient due to decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Thus,
the utility diﬀerence and the incentive to claim decrease. Both reactions are scaled by the
density of marginal workers.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy borrows from Card et al. (2007) and Chetty (2008). The idea is to
identify the value of UI using reduced-form estimates of the impacts of extended benefits
(EB) and severance payments (SP) on the exit rates and on the take-up rate. For the
sake of presentation, we explain our strategy in reverse order. We start by defining our
money metric, assuming that we have estimates for the individual take-up probabilities,
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the eﬀects of EB and SP, and estimates of the claiming cost distribution and the search
cost function. Second, we show how reduced-form estimates can be used to get parameters
for the two latter objects. Finally, we present the RDD which captures the behavioral
response to EB and SP.
The general idea of our empirical strategy is the following. We don’t observe individual
claiming costs,  . However, the estimated take-up probabilities are informative about the
intertemporal utility diﬀerence, U I0   U I¯0 . The higher the probability, the bigger this
diﬀerence. Moreover, the fact that workers react diﬀerently to eligibility for extended
benefits or severance pay is indicative about how a money transfer impacts their welfare.
Under parametric assumptions for F and  , this enables us to create a money metric for
the value of UI.
3.4.1 The Value of Unemployment Insurance
We are looking for the asset transfer  A such that a non-claimant is indiﬀerent between
claiming and not claiming:
U I0 (A0)    = U I¯0 (A0 + A)
By definition, we have  A > 0 for claimants, as they would have to be compensated
for not claiming. This transfer compensates for the benefits they forgo but is reduced by
the fact that they don’t have to face the claiming costs. On the contrary,  A < 0 for
non-claimants. These individuals face high claiming costs relative to their value of unem-
ployment benefits: They have enough assets or expect a quick exit from unemployment.
They are thus willing to give up assets for not claiming.
A first-order Taylor approximation implies
 A ⇡
⇣
U I0 (A0)  U I¯0 (A0)   
⌘ dU I¯0 (A0)
dA0
! 1
=
U I0 (A0)  U I¯0 (A0)   
u0(cI¯0)
, (3.7)
where the second step follows from the envelope theorem. Eﬀectively, our approximation
yields the diﬀerence in intertemporal utility, normalized by the utility value of one addi-
tional euro of consumption for the non-claimants. Note that, due to the concavity of the
value function, a first-order compared to a second-order approximation will likely result
in a downward biased  A (in absolute terms). If anything our measure underestimates
the value of unemployment insurance among the claimants.
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In the following, we will connect (3.7) to objects for which we have estimates: the
take-up probability, the eﬀect of assets and extended benefits on take-up, and the eﬀect
of extended benefits on the exit rate from unemployment. We need to determine the value
of three elements: the intertemporal utility diﬀerence U Ii0   U I¯i0, the take-up cost   and
the marginal utility u0(cI¯0). Denote by pi the take-up probability of individual i. First,
observe that U Ii0 U I¯i0 = F 1(pi). Workers that have a high probability to claim are those
for which the intertemporal utility diﬀerence is the biggest. Under parametric assumption
for F and if we manage to get estimates of F ’s parameters, we can pin down this utility
diﬀerence.
The fixed cost,  i, on the other hand, cannot be exactly identified. However, if we
have an estimate of the probability of claiming, and since we observe the take-up decision,
we can compute the expected value of  i among claimants and non-claimants,
 ¯i1 =
Z F 1(pi)
0
x
pi
dF (x), and (3.8)
 ¯i0 =
Z  sup
F 1(pi)
x
1  pi dF (x), (3.9)
respectively. Note that this directly implies U I0 (A0)   U I¯0 (A0)    ¯0 < 0  U I0 (A0)  
U I¯0 (A0)    ¯1. Intuitively, a worker who claims despite having a low predicted take-up
propensity is expected to have a low claiming cost (and vice versa).
u0(cI¯0), in turn, is impossible to pin down given our estimates. However, we can bound
it. One insight we can use here is that a higher marginal value of consumption in the
case where the individual does not collect benefits will translate into a stronger reaction
of the take-up probability to a wealth shock. Remember that, in the data, eligibility for
severance pay is equivalent to a wealth shock when entering unemployment. For a lower
bound, observe that
u0(cI¯0) > u
0(cI¯0)  u0(cI0),
which can be connected to the marginal eﬀect of assets on the claiming probability. Indeed,
(3.5) directly implies
u0(cI¯0)  u0(cI0) =   d`dA0
1
f (F 1(pi))
and thus u0(cI¯0)   u0(cI0) is identified by the eﬀect of assets on take-up. If one worker
is more reactive than another to a wealth shock, it means that the utility value of one
euro is higher for her than for the other. For the same intertemporal utility diﬀerence
U I0 (A0)   U I¯0 (A0)     this implies a lower monetary equivalent for the more responsive
worker because her marginal value of consumption is higher.
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For an upper bound, we use that
u0(cI¯0) = u
0(cI¯0)  u0(cI0) + u0(cI0)  u0(cI¯0)  u0(cI0) + u0(cIT ),
where the second equality holds as long as cIT  cI07 by the concavity of the utility
function. We have already shown that u0(cI¯0)   u0(cI0) is identified if we know the take-
up response to a change in wealth. u0(cIT ), in turn, can be bounded using the eﬀect of
extended benefits on exits the period before the extension takes place, dsiIT 1/dbe. Again,
more responsive workers are those for whom one euro has a higher value in terms of utility.
Assume that the UI extension takes place in period T and lasts until period T +E. The
total marginal eﬀect of increasing the benefit level in all E periods is given by
dsIT 1
dbe
=
dsIT 1
dbT
+ . . .+
dsIT 1
dbT+E
Using (3.2), and again using that consumption is non-increasing over time, we find
(note that dsIT 1/dbT < 0)
dsIT 1
dbe
=
dsIT 1
dbT

1 +  pT+1|T
u0(cIT+1)
u0(cIT )
+ . . .+  EpT+E|T
u0(cIT+E)
u0(cIT )
 
 dsIT 1
dbT
⇥
1 +  pT+1|T + . . .+  EpT+E|T
⇤| {z }
⌘B
.
Substituting for dsIT 1/dbT using (3.2), we conclude
u0(cIT )   dsIT 1
dbe
 00(sIT 1)
 B
,
where B corrects for the fact that the extension aﬀects multiple time periods.
Combining all previous steps, we conclude that the equivalent wealth transfer to the
claimants satisfies
F 1(pi)   ¯1
  d`dA0 1f(F 1(pi))  
dsIT 1
dbe
 00(sIT 1)
 B
  A  F
 1(pi)   ¯1
  d`dA0 1f(F 1(pi))
, (3.10)
while for the non-claimants
F 1(pi)   ¯0
  d`dA0 1f(F 1(pi))
  A  F
 1(pi)   ¯0
  d`dA0 1f(F 1(pi))  
dsIT 1
dbe
 00(sIT 1)
 B
. (3.11)
7This is the case if bIt    It is non-increasing over time.
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3.4.2 Estimation of the Structural Parameters
In order to implement (3.10) and (3.11), we need estimates for the parameters of the
claiming cost distribution and the search cost function. Start with pi, the estimated prob-
ability of a given individual to be observed as receiving unemployment benefits. Assume
we have such a value for each individual. Under parametric assumptions for F ( ), we can
link this probability to the value of unemployment insurance:
U Ii0   U I¯i0 = F 1(pi)
Together with (3.3) and (3.6) this directly implies
d`i/dbe
dsiIT 1/dbe
⌘Mi =  f
⇣
U Ii0   U I¯i0
⌘
 T 2pT |1 00i (siIT 1)
=  f  F 1(pi)   T 2pT |1 00i (siIT 1). (3.12)
Equation (3.12) links the estimated probability of claiming and the behavioral response
to eligibility for extended benefits to the parameters of the claiming cost distribution and
the search cost function. We will specify these functions in subsection 3.5.3. However, we
can already point out that these sets of parameters, denoted by ✓ and a, can be estimated
by least squares, solving
{✓, a} = argmin
X
i
 
ln( Mi)  ln
 
f
 
F 1(pi)
 
 T 2pT |1 00i (siIT 1)
  2
.
Intuitively, ✓ and a are identified by the variation of the relative response in take-up
and search to extended benefits. The first depends on the take-up probability (driven
by the F distribution, parameterized by ✓) and the second hinges on the job-finding rate
which is linked to the search cost function (parameterized by a). A high value of  Mi,
indicating that the reaction of the take-up probability relative to the reaction of the job-
finding rate to extended benefits is large, can be for two reasons: (i) A strong reaction
in take-up if the density of the claiming cost distribution is high at the point determined
by pi (f(F 1(pi))). (ii) A small reaction in unemployment exits if the curvature in the
marginal costs  00i (siIT 1) is high at siIT 1. Finally, notice that since the marginal utility
of consumption enters in the same way in d`i/dbe as in dsiIT 1/dbe, the moment Mi does
not depend on the shape of the utility function, meaning that we can avoid having to
make any parametric assumptions here.
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3.4.3 Estimating the Eﬀect of Extended Benefits and Severance
Payments
Identification. The identification strategy is similar to Card et al. (2007). We use the
quasi-experiment created by the sharp discontinuity in eligibility for severance pay and
extended unemployment benefits in Austria. Eligibility for the former depends on job
tenure, while eligibility for extended benefits depends on the number of months worked
in the five preceding years. The eﬀects of severance pay and extended benefits can thus
be separated as job tenure in months, denoted by JT , and the number of months worked
in the past, denoted by MW , are not perfectly correlated. On the one hand, there are
workers who have lost a job having job tenure below three years, while having acquired
around three years of work experience in the preceding five years. On the other hand,
there are also workers who have around three years tenure while having surpassed three
years work experience in the preceding five years. As in these cases only one of the two
assignment variables jumps, the eﬀects are identified.
Take-up probability. We use a probit model for take-up. We allow for cubic polyno-
mials in the running variables and control for observed characteristics. We denote by Si
the eligibility dummy for severance pay and by Ei the eligibility for extended benefits. Xi
is a vector of observable characteristics8. MW and JT are centered around the cutoﬀs,
meaning that MW equals zero at 36 months worked and JT at 36 months of job tenure.
The probability of collecting benefits, pi, is assumed to satisfy
pi =  (yi), (3.13)
where
yi = SSi +  EEi +  1JTi +  2MWi +  3JTiSi +  4MWiEi
+  5JT
2
i +  6MW
2
i +  7JT
2
i Si +  8MW
2
i Ei
+  9JT
3
i +  10MW
3
i +  11JT
3
i Si +  12MW
3
i Ei +  
0Xi,
and   denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The parameters of interest
are in the first line:  S and  E, which identify the eﬀects of severance pay and extended
benefits.
8We control for age, age squared, experience, experience squared, gender, Austrian nationality, and
four industry categories, log previous wage, and log previous wage squared.
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Exit rates from non-employment. We model exits from unemployment as a discrete
duration model where the probability of exiting in a given period is modeled as a probit.
Again, we allow for third order polynomials in the running variables. We denote by hij(t)
the hazard of exiting non-employment in period t for the UI recipients (j = I) and non-
recipients (j = I¯). We consider discrete time intervals of variable length. That is, for
unemployment durations up to 30 weeks we use intervals of 2 weeks, while above we fix
intervals at 10 weeks. This accounts for two things. On the one hand, we have more
observations for shorter durations which allows us to estimate the eﬀects more precisely.
On the other hand, it will be more crucial to have precisely estimated eﬀects at shorter
horizons for our structural analysis.
Our specification for the hazard of exiting unemployment reads
hij(t) =  ( ij(t)), (3.14)
where
 ij(t) = jSSi + ↵
S
jtSi +  jEEi + ↵
E
jtEi
+  j1JTi +  j2MWi +  j3JTi ⇥ Si +  j4MWi ⇥ Ei
+  j5JT
2
i +  j6MW
2
i +  j7JT
2
i ⇥ Si +  j8MW 2i ⇥ Ei
+  j9JT
3
i +  j10MW
3
i +  j11JT
3
i Si +  j12MW
3
i Ei
+ ↵jt +  
0
jXi.
The parameters of interest are again in the first line:  S identifies the eﬀect of severance
pay on the exit rate in period 0, while ↵Sjt denotes the diﬀerential eﬀect of severance pay
on exit rates in period t (that is, the total eﬀect of Si on the exit rate in period t is
 S+↵Sjt). The same holds for the eﬀect of extended benefits. Thus, the eﬀect of severance
pay and extended benefits on exits from unemployment is allowed to change over the
non-employment spell, which is consistent with theory. By including ↵jt, we control for
a piecewise constant baseline hazard of arbitrary form and thus account for duration
dependence. Xi is a vector of observable characteristics9. In Appendix A, we give more
details on the estimation procedure.
Selection around the discontinuity. Our main identification assumption is that all
observable and unobservable worker characteristics evolve smoothly around the discon-
tinuities defining eligibility for severance pay and extended benefits. While this cannot
be tested directly, we can gain intuition on the validity of the assumption by checking
9We again control for age, age squared, experience, experience squared, gender, Austrian nationality,
and four industry categories, log previous wage, and log previous wage squared.
Chapter 3 85
whether the number of observations and observed characteristics display any salient fea-
tures, in particular bunching or jumps, at the threshold. Much of the following has already
been demonstrated by Card et al. (2007) and we will replicate much of their analysis to
demonstrate that similar conclusions hold in our sample.
One threat to our identification would be that firms attempt to avoid mandatory sev-
erance payments by firing workers just before the three-year threshold. This behavior
should show up as an excess mass just before and missing mass just after the eligibility
threshold. As we can see from Figure 3.9(a) in Appendix B, however, we cannot discern
any sign of strategic firing in the data. As argued by Card et al. (2007), this finding is not
surprising as any such behavior is illegal and leads to bad reputation eﬀects. For com-
pleteness, we also demonstrate that similar conclusions hold for the experience criterion
as well (Figure 3.9(b)).
To investigate potential diﬀerences of observables around the discontinuity, we plot the
average pre-displacement wage observed in our baseline sample by previous job tenure and
the months worked in the preceding five years in Figure 3.10 in Appendix B. We conclude
that there is no visible jump in either panel (a) or panel (b), suggesting that there is no
diﬀerential selection around either discontinuity. This contrasts with the finding by Card
et al. (2007), who find a small discontinuity in previous wages at the tenure threshold, but
then argue that this discontinuity is negligible in terms of behavior. Our findings diﬀer
because we use a diﬀerent baseline sample. In particular, we exclude workers below 25,
whose jobs are often fixed-term (apprenticeships). In any case, mirroring the conclusion by
Card et al. (2007), we conclude that there is no sign of quantitatively important selection
around the discontinuities.
3.5 Empirical Findings
3.5.1 Descriptive Results
Take-up probability. To get an impression how the take-up rate and eligibility for
severance pay and extended benefits correlate, we show descriptive discontinuity plots,
based on local linear regressions of the form
p = ⇡0 + ⇡1S + ⇡2JT + ⇡3JT ⇥ S + ",
for the eﬀect of severance pay and analogously for the eﬀect of extended benefits. For
both regressions, we only include workers for whom the discontinuities do not coincide
(eﬀectively, this means MW > JT ). We put more weight on observations close to the
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cutoﬀ by using a triangular kernel following the suggestions by Porter (2003) and Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001). The reported t-statistics are based on a bootstrap
with 1000 replications.
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(b) Eﬀect of EB
Figure 3.1: Eﬀect on take-up of eligibility for severance pay and for extended benefits
Note: These figures plot average take-up rates per monthly tenure/experience bin. The lines correspond to local linear
regressions estimates (individual level) on both sides separately and bootstrapped (1000 replications) confidence intervals,
clustered by individual to account for correlation between spells.
As predicted by theory, workers respond to a severance payment by claiming unem-
ployment insurance less often—the take-up rate decreases by around 5.1% (Figure 3.1).
The eﬀect also goes into the right direction where extended benefits are concerned, as
take-up increases by 5.7% at the discontinuity. These descriptive figures are only in-
structive, however, and a joint estimation of both discontinuities is needed, which we will
conduct in the next section.
Exit rates from non-employment. One way of getting a graphical intuition for the
eﬀects of extended benefits on exits is by estimating regressions of the form
d(t) = ⇠t0 + ⇠
t
1E + ⇠
t
2MW + ⇠
t
3MW ⇥ E + ",
where d(t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker exits from non-employment in period
t and we include all individuals having non-employment duration of at least t periods.
Since we could produce a discontinuity plot for every period and running variable, we will
concentrate on the most important moment for our identification, the eﬀect of extended
benefits on exits just before regular benefits run out, dhiIT 1/dEi.
Eligibility for extended benefits is likely to have stronger eﬀects around the moment
where regular benefits end. Figure 3.2 focuses on benefit recipients and looks at the eﬀect
of the extension two weeks before and after it takes place. There is a clearly discernible
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(a) Claimants: Exit in weeks 19-20
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(b) Claimants: Exit in weeks 21-22
Figure 3.2: Eligibility for extended benefits and probability of exiting before and after
benefit extension
Note: These figures plot the probability of finding a job 19-20 weeks and 21-22 weeks after becoming unemployed, conditional
on being unemployed for at least 18 weeks, for the claimants. The lines correspond to local linear regressions estimates
(individual level) on both sides separately and bootstrapped (1000 replications) confidence intervals, clustered by individual
to account for correlation between spells.
downward jump for the registered unemployed—the exit rate falls by over three percentage
points from baseline level of around 7% and 8%.
3.5.2 Estimates
We estimate the model explained in Section 3.4.3, jointly considering both discontinuities,
by maximum likelihood. We focus on individuals that are at most 12 months away from
either cutoﬀ. The standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for
unobserved correlation across various spells.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline w/o Controls LPM   4 Layoﬀs by Firm
Severance Pay -0.0747⇤⇤⇤ -0.0875⇤⇤⇤ -0.0699⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0304)
Extended Benefits 0.0429⇤⇤ 0.0368⇤⇤ 0.0408⇤⇤ 0.0766⇤⇤
(0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0301)
Observations 83451 83451 83451 30791
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
z-statistics (based on delta-method) in parentheses
Table 3.3: Eﬀect of severance pay and extended benefits on take-up
Note: The numbers correspond to the predicted change in the take-up probability if either eligibility for severance pay or
extended benefits are switched on. All running variables are set to 0, while covariates are set to their mean values. Standard
errors are calculated using the delta method. Column 1 is calculated using the estimates from our baseline model. Column
2 replicates column 1 leaving out control variables Xi. In column 3, we replace the probit by a linear probability model we
estimate by OLS. Column 4 restricts our sample to job separations resulting from mass layoﬀs, which we define as at least
four layoﬀs within one month from the same firm.
The point estimates are shown in Table 3.7 in Appendix C. The marginal eﬀects of
becoming eligible for severance pay and extended benefits on the take-up probability are
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displayed in column 1 of Table 3.3. While we now control for both running variables
simultaneously as well as for nonlinear terms and observed heterogeneity, the main con-
clusions of the descriptive analysis are unaﬀected. Eligibility for severance pay reduces
the take-up probability by around 7 percent, while the eﬀect of eligibility for extended
benefits is positive, increasing the probability of collecting benefits by around 4 percent.
We also probe the robustness of our results to the model assumptions in various ways: If
we leave out control variables (column 2), the eﬀects stay comparable. A classical RDD
uses a linear specification—if we do so by estimating a linear probability model (column
3), the results do not change much, either. One concern might be that workers are fired
selectively around the discontinuity. Even though we already concluded in Section 3.4.3
that there is no sign of selective firing, we can also address this question by focusing on
mass layoﬀs: Arguably, layoﬀs involving multiple workers should correspond to an exoge-
nous rather than to a selective displacement. If we conduct the same analysis focusing on
workers having lost their job along with at least three other workers in the same month,
we find even more pronounced eﬀects (column 4).
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Figure 3.3: Marginal eﬀects over time
Note: The plots show the eﬀect of becoming eligible for severance pay or extended benefits, respectively, on the probability
of exiting unemployment over time. Covariates are fixed at their average value while the respective running variables are
take at the threshold value. The confidence bands are based on standard errors clustered at the individual level.
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We give a graphical representation of the eﬀect on exit rates over time in Figure
3.3. Extended benefits aﬀect exits negatively just before and after benefits run out for
claimants, while non-claimants are unaﬀected. This is consistent with our model. The
eﬀect is stronger close to the benefit extension because workers account for the probability
of exiting unemployment before the extension and because they discount the future. When
entering unemployment, the value of the benefit extension is thus very small. It might be
more surprising that we appear to find almost no eﬀects of severance pay, while Card et
al. (2007) document negative eﬀects. While we use a diﬀerent sample, the main reason
is that we allow the eﬀect of severance pay to change over the course of the spell, while
they estimate the overall eﬀect on the job finding hazard during the first 20 weeks of
unemployment. In Appendix D, we demonstrate that we get comparable results if we
use Card et al. (2007)’s strategy and look for an overall eﬀect on exits during the first 20
weeks of unemployment.
We explore the robustness of our estimates in a similar way as for take-up by focusing
on the eﬀect of extended benefits on exits of claimants one period before the extension
takes place, dhiIT 1/dEi, which is the moment featuring most prominently in our further
analysis. Column 1 of Table 3.4 displays the marginal eﬀect implied by our baseline
estimates for period T   1 only. The probability of exiting during the last period before a
benefit extension is predicted to decrease by around 3.2 percentage points, which, given
a baseline probability of around 7% for the non-eligible, corresponds to a large eﬀect.
This estimate is not sensitive to either leaving out control variables or estimating a linear
specification10 (columns 2 and 3). If we restrict the sample to mass layoﬀs, the size of the
eﬀect decreases, but remains highly significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline w/o Controls LPM   4 Layoﬀs by Firm
Extended Benefits -0.0321⇤⇤⇤ -0.0322⇤⇤⇤ -0.0325⇤⇤⇤ -0.0201⇤⇤⇤
(0.00415) (0.00407) (0.00417) (0.00615)
Observations 83451 83451 83451 30791
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
z-statistics (based on delta-method) in parentheses
Table 3.4: Eﬀect of severance pay and extended benefits on exits from unemployment one
period before regular benefits run out (T   1)
Note: The numbers correspond to the predicted change in the probability of exiting unemployment (claimants) in the
period before regular benefits run out if eligibility for extended benefits is switched on. All running variables are set to 0,
while covariates are set to their mean values. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. Column 1 is calculated
using the estimates from our baseline model. Column 2 replicates column 1 leaving out control variables Xi. In column 3,
we replace the probit by a linear probability model we estimate by OLS. See Appendix A for details. Column 4 restricts
our sample to job separations resulting from mass layoﬀs, which we define as at least four layoﬀs within one month from
the same firm.
One additional concern might be that there is heterogeneity driving both take-up and
10In Appendix A, we explain in detail how the linear approximation to our baseline model works.
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job search, leading to correlation across the two margins. In Appendix E, we describe an
estimator which allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity between both decisions.
As can be seen from Table 3.9 in Appendix E, we estimate a correlation across both
decisions which is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, and the parameter estimates are
thus only marginally aﬀected. Arguably, the observed covariates already do a suﬃcient
job in controlling for correlation. If we estimate the same model without covariates, on
the other hand, we estimate a strongly negative correlation between both decisions which
is consistent with our model11.
3.5.3 Implications
Estimation of the structural parameters. The econometric model, along with the
estimated parameters, gives us predictions for the eﬀect of extended benefits on take-up
and on exits from unemployment based on individual characteristics. Call vE the cash
value of extended benefits and denote by Ei whether individual i is eligible for extended
benefits. The estimated marginal eﬀects can be connected to the theoretical eﬀects by
realizing that
dhiIT 1
dEi
⇡ dsiIT 1
dbe
vE
dpi
dEi
⇡ d`i
dbe
vE.
Combining these results, we obtain
Mi =
d`i/dbe
dsiIT 1/dbe
⇡ dpi/dEi
dhiIT 1/dEi
.
The ultimate goal is to solve for the parameters in equation (3.12), by solving
{✓, a} = argmin
X
i
 
ln( Mi)  ln
 
f
 
F 1(pi)
 
 T 2
 
T 1Y
⌧=1
(1  sI⌧ )
!
 00i (siIT 1)
!!2
.
To make progress, we assume that take-up costs   are Weibull distributed. Other
distributions are possible but the Weibull distribution is flexible and it has delivered the
11The results are available on request.
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best fit to the empirical moments12. Letting  i ⌘ U Ii0   U I¯i0, this assumption implies
`i = F ( i) = 1  exp
  ( i/✓i0)✓1  ,
where {✓0, ✓1} are the parameters of the cost distribution to be estimated. We also
assume that the search cost function is isoelastic, satisfying  (s) = a0isa1 . We account
for observed heterogeneity by assuming a0i = a0 exp(X 0i⇠) and ✓0i = ✓0 exp(X 0i⇡), where
Xi is a vector of covariates.
In Appendix F, we show that, given our assumptions, we obtain the following estimable
equation
yi = K +
✓1   1
✓1
ln(  ln(1  pi)) + (a1   2) lnhiIT 1 +X 0i , (3.15)
where   ⌘ ⇠   ⇡, yi ⌘ ln dpidEi   ln
⇣
 dhiIT 1dEi
⌘
  ln(1   pi)   ln
⇣QT 1
⌧=1 (1  hiI⌧ )
⌘
and
K ⌘ ln ✓1✓0 + ln  T 2 + ln(a0a1(a1   1)).
By estimating (3.15) by OLS, we get estimates of the shape parameter of the take-
up cost distribution, ✓1, as well as of the curvature of the search cost function, a1. By
controlling for Xi, we eﬀectively control for how observables drive the relative importance
of the take-up and the search margin. ⇠ and ⇡ are not separately identified but separate
identification is not necessary to compute our metric.   is not identified separately, either,
and we will have to calibrate it later on.
Estimate 95% CI (Delta Method)
✓1 1.886 [1.411,2.360]
a1 1.872 [1.862,1.882]
Table 3.5: Implied structural parameters
The regression results are shown in Table 3.8 in Appendix C, while Table 3.5 lists the
implied structural parameters. Search costs are almost quadratic, which is consistent with
previous work (see, e.g., Yashiv (2000) (Israeli data) and Christensen et al. (2005) (Danish
data)). The Weibull distribution reduces to the exponential distribution for ✓1 = 1, which
can be rejected. The R2 is above 95%, which suggests that the parametric assumptions
do a good job in describing the data. Figure 3.4 gives an additional sense of how well our
specification fits the data: We rewrite (3.15) so as to isolate either pi or hiIT 1 on the
right-hand side and then plot the right-hand side against the left-hand side.
In Figure 3.4(a), we can see that the Weibull distribution succeeds in describing the
hump-shaped relationship between the take-up rate and the empirical moment. It makes
12We have also come up with a strategy which does not rely on any distributional assumption. The
results are almost unaﬀected, which is due to the fact that the Weibull already fits the empirical moments
very well. We thus decided to stick with the more parsimonious parametric approach.
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(b) Isoelastic fit
Figure 3.4: Fit of the Weibull and isoelastic specification to the empirical moments
Note: In the left figure we asses the fit of of he Weibull distribution to the empirical moments by plotting exp(yi + ln(1 
pi)  Kˆ  (aˆ1  2) lnhiIT 1 X0i ˆ) (gray dots) against exp(((✓ˆ1  1)/✓ˆ1) ln(  ln(1  pi))+ ln(1  pi)) (red line), where hats
denote estimated coeﬃcients, based on equation (3.15). In the right figure we asses the fit of the isoelastic search cost by
plotting exp(yi  Kˆ   ((✓ˆ1  1)/✓ˆ1) ln(  ln(1  pi) X0i ˆ) (gray dots) against exp((aˆ1  2) lnhiIT 1) (red line), where hats
denote estimated coeﬃcients, based on equation (3.15). In the left figure, the dots correspond to averages within take-up
rate bins of width 0.001. The dots in the right figure correspond to means within 300 quantiles of the exit rate (to take
care of outliers).
sense that the reaction of take-up is strongest for a take-up probability around 50%, while
most observations are in the downward sloping part. The downward sloping line in Figure
3.4(b) is due to an estimated elasticity of search costs of less than two (quadratic search
costs would imply a flat relationship). This implies a slightly stronger reaction of search
eﬀort if the exit rate is already high.
The value of unemployment insurance. We are now able to calculate bounds on
the value of unemployment insurance, using our estimates for the marginal eﬀects, the
estimates of the structural parameters and equations (3.10) and (3.11) for the bounds. In
order to connect empirical estimates to theoretical marginal eﬀects, we use the approxi-
mation
dpi
dSi
⇡ d`i
dA0
vS
dhiIT 1
dEi
⇡ dsiIT 1
dbe
vE,
where Si and Ei indicate eligibility for severance pay and extended benefits, respectively,
and vS and vE denote the cash value of severance pay and extended benefits. In Appendix
F, we show the exact expressions for the bounds we implement.
Following Card et al. (2007), we assume that vE ⇡ 0.85w and vS ⇡ 2.69w, where w is
the after-tax individual monthly wage13. In order to implement our formula, we need to
13The value of extended benefits is an approximation because one needs to account for unemployment
assistance to compute this value and the benefits of UA depends on the household earnings that we do
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translate vE to one period in our empirical model. Since the extension aﬀects five two-
weekly periods, we use vE = (0.85/5)w = 0.17w. For the baseline results, we assume an
annual discount rate of 5%. While this has no eﬀect by construction on the upper bound
for claimants and the lower bound for non-claimants, we show in Table 3.6 in Appendix
B that alternative assumptions have a negligible eﬀect on the other bounds.
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(b) Upper bound
Figure 3.5: Bounds on wealth transfer to claimants
Note: The plots show c.d.f.’s of the lower and upper bound on  A based on equations (3.10) and (3.11), for claimants of
UI.  A is the asset transfer to a non-claimant required to make her indiﬀerent between claiming and not claiming. It is a
monetary equivalent to the diﬀerence in intertemporal utilities between claimants and non-claimants net of claiming costs
and thus is, by construction, positive for claimants and negative for non-claimants. We only display observations between
the 1st and the 99th percentile.
In Figure 3.5, we plot the distribution of the resulting lower and upper bounds for
claimants, who have a positive  A. We find that for the median individual the relative
value of collecting benefits net of claiming costs is equivalent to at least 2.5 monthly
wages. This is the minimum amount, implied by her behavioral responses to severance
pay and extended benefits, which one needs to transfer when she enters unemployment
so as to make her indiﬀerent between collecting benefits or not. The lower bound appears
reasonable given a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation: The median number of weeks
unemployed among the claimants with unemployment duration in our baseline sample is
23. With a replacement rate of 0.55, the expected total sum of UI payments (ignoring
discounting) is (23/52) · 12 · 0.55 = 2.92 monthly wages for those eligible for extended
benefits and (20/52) · 12 · 0.55 = 2.54 for the non-eligible. Our metric also accounts
for take-up cost, discounting and non-monetary benefits of collecting benefits but this
shows that our lower bound is a credible estimate of the value of the insurance and its
distribution. The upper bound, around 11 monthly wages for the median, appears on the
contrary less informative.
not observe. As in Card et al. (2007), we assume that the individual has a partner with a net wage of
1200 euros per month and two children.
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(b) Upper bound
Figure 3.6: Bounds on wealth transfer to non-claimants
Note: The plots show c.d.f.’s of the lower and upper bound on  A based on equations (3.10) and (3.11), for non-claimants
of UI. See notes of Figure 3.5 for further details. We only display observations between the 1st and the 99th percentile.
The results for non-claimants are shown in Figure 3.6. Their relative value of UI
net of claiming costs is negative, meaning they would be willing to give up part of their
wealth to avoid having to claim for UI. We find that the median individual would have
to lose the equivalent of at least 2 monthly wages to become claimant. Again the other
bound, above nine months for the median, appears less informative. In any case, even
just focusing on the first bound, these numbers suggest that the perceived take-up costs
are sizable for many workers who don’t collect, caused by, for instance, a combination
of intrinsic aversion to the welfare state (induced by stigma for example), administrative
costs of filling a claim and the set of constraints imposed on those who collect benefits.
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(a) Lower bound
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(b) Upper bound
Figure 3.7: Bounds on wealth transfer to claimants by previous wage
Note: The plots show c.d.f.’s of the lower and upper bound on  A based on equations (3.10) and (3.11), for claimants of
UI, according to whether the previous wage was above or below the median. See notes of Figure 3.5 for further details. We
only display observations between the 1st and the 99th percentile.
It is interesting to see if the value of unemployment insurance varies with worker
characteristics, especially for the claimants. Figure 3.7 displays the distribution of the
lower and upper bound of claimants, distinguishing between high- (above median) and
low-wage (below median) workers. Except for very high values, the distribution of val-
ues for workers below median stochastically dominates the distribution of values for the
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workers above. This means that the value of the insurance is higher for low-wage workers.
Closer inspection of this finding in the data reveals that this is mostly driven by a higher
estimated take-up probability among low-wage workers. A high take-up probability is in-
dicative of a high diﬀerence in intertemporal utilities between claiming and not claiming.
Finally, the same exercise can be done for those who don’t collect benefits (Figure 3.8),
but there are no clear results here. While the low-wage workers seem to be willing to give
up less in order to avoid claiming where the lower bound is concerned, this relationship
switches or disappears for the upper bound.
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(a) Lower bound
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(b) Upper bound
Figure 3.8: Bounds on wealth transfer to non-claimants by previous wage
Note: The plots show c.d.f.’s of the lower and upper bound on  A based on equations (3.10) and (3.11), for non-claimants
of UI, according to whether the previous wage was above or below the median. See notes of Figure 3.5 for further details.
We only display observations between the 1st and the 99th percentile.
3.6 Conclusion
Using variation in take-up and job search behavior, this paper infers bounds on the value of
unemployment insurance. Using Austrian administrative data and a double discontinuity,
one in the eligibility for severance pay, one in the eligibility for extended unemployment
benefits, we first document the fact that the probability of claiming is lower if work-
ers are eligible for severance pay, which is equivalent to a wealth shock when entering
unemployment. On the contrary, eligibility for extended benefits increases the take-up
probability and lowers the exits from unemployment around the time where the extension
occurs. Then, using a simple job search model where workers face a cost of claiming for
unemployment benefits, we show that these results can be used to derive bounds on the
insurance value. For the workers who collect benefits, we show that the median value
of the insurance is at least equal to a transfer of 2.5 monthly wages at the beginning of
the unemployment spell. Interestingly, the value of the insurance is higher for low wage
workers. For the workers who don’t claim, the value is by definition negative with an
upper bound of around two monthly wages for the median individual. This suggests that,
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for a significant share of the individuals, take-up costs, stigma and/or constraints imposed
on those who collect are sizable.
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3.7 Appendix
A Details on the Discrete Duration Model
As noticed early, discrete time duration model can conveniently be estimated as binary
models (see Allison (1982) or Jenkins (1995)). Let t denote unemployment duration.
Individual i’s likelihood contribution is then given by
`i = [Pr (Ti = ti)]
di [Pr (Ti > ti)]
1 di ,
where di takes the value 1 if i’s observation is non-censored. As described in the main
text, we denote by hij(t) the hazard of individual i with take-up status j 2
 
I, I¯
 
of
exiting unemployment in period t. We obtain
`i =
"
hij(t)
ti 1Y
s=1
(1  hij(s))
#di " tiY
s=1
(1  hij(s))
#1 di
=

hij(ti)
1  hij(ti)
 di tiY
s=1
(1  hij(s))
and hence
log `i = di log
✓
hij(t)
1  hij(t)
◆
+
tiX
s=1
log(1  hij(s))
=
tiX
s=1
yit log
✓
hij(s)
1  hij(s)
◆
+
tiX
s=1
log(1  hij(s)),
where yit is a dummy which takes the value 1 if individual i exits in period t. The
log-likelihood is then
L =
NX
i=1
tiX
s=1
yit log(hij(s)) +
NX
i=1
tiX
s=1
(1  yit) log(1  hij(s)).
Looking closely at the resulting expression, we realize that it is equivalent to a set
of binary regressions for 1, . . . , ti. Estimation of the duration model amounts to treating
periods 1, . . . , ti for each individual as separate observations and setting the dependent
variable yit equal to 1 if individual i exits in t and 0 otherwise. Choosing a functional
form for hij(t), we estimate the resulting model by maximum likelihood.
In our baseline specification, we assume hij(t) to be of probit form. This naturally
restricts the probability to be between zero and one and it enables to introduce correlated
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unobserved heterogeneity as robustness exercise. In our result tables, we also present
the results in the case where we assume hij(t) to be linear, estimating the resulting
specification by OLS. This is what we call “LPM” in Table 3.4.
B Additional Figures and Tables
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(b) By Months Worked
Figure 3.9: Frequency of Separations by Job Tenure
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Figure 3.10: Previous Wage according to Previous Job Tenure and Months Worked in
Preceding 5 Years
Annual Discount Rate 1 % 5 % 10 % 20 %
Upper Bound (Non-Claimants) -2.321 -2.293 -2.259 -2.198
Lower Bound (Claimants) 2.580 2.549 2.512 2.445
Table 3.6: Diﬀerent assumptions on the annual discount rate and implied median values
for the bounds
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C Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3)
Exit uninsured Exit insured Take-up
Severance Pay -0.0319 0.00467 -0.194⇤⇤⇤
(0.0446) (0.0394) (0.0473)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 1 -0.0197 -0.0258
(0.0368) (0.0413)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 2 -0.0122 0.0418
(0.0393) (0.0384)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 3 -0.00394 -0.0299
(0.0503) (0.0412)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 4 0.00420 -0.0676⇤
(0.0504) (0.0396)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 5 -0.0243 -0.0690
(0.0600) (0.0430)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 6 0.0389 -0.00625
(0.0545) (0.0410)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 7 -0.0859 -0.0553
(0.0653) (0.0439)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 8 0.0176 0.0172
(0.0614) (0.0423)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 9 0.00977 -0.110⇤⇤
(0.0746) (0.0448)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 10 -0.0195 -0.0269
(0.0666) (0.0430)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 11 -0.00186 -0.0997⇤⇤
(0.0772) (0.0456)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 12 -0.0000625 -0.0420
(0.0610) (0.0445)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 13 0.0793 -0.0590
(0.0617) (0.0450)
Extended Benefits -0.0707 -0.00377 0.118⇤⇤
(0.0471) (0.0400) (0.0509)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 1 0.0266 -0.0182
(0.0361) (0.0395)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 2 0.0144 -0.0454
(0.0385) (0.0370)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 3 -0.0190 0.00376
(0.0489) (0.0395)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 4 -0.102⇤⇤ 0.0272
(0.0483) (0.0379)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 5 0.00626 -0.00221
(0.0592) (0.0410)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 6 0.0534 -0.0426
(0.0543) (0.0393)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 7 0.0786 -0.0293
(0.0641) (0.0417)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 8 -0.0193 -0.0750⇤
(0.0604) (0.0405)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 9 -0.00838 -0.290⇤⇤⇤
(0.0731) (0.0409)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 10 -0.0598 -0.292⇤⇤⇤
(0.0632) (0.0402)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 11 -0.0790 -0.214⇤⇤⇤
(0.0745) (0.0423)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 12 -0.0143 -0.122⇤⇤⇤
(0.0596) (0.0425)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 13 -0.109⇤ -0.0474
(0.0606) (0.0434)
Log-Likelihood -66356.567 -159209.240 -51777.868
Observations 83451 83451 83451
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Eﬀect of severance pay and extended benefits on exits from unemployment and
take-up
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Estimate 95% CI
ln(  ln(1  pi)) 0.470 [0.336,0.603]
lnhiIT 1 -0.128 [-0.138,-0.118]
Observations 83451
R2 0.953
95% confidence intervals (robust to heteroskedasticity)
in brackets.
Table 3.8: Regression results (equation (3.15))
D The Eﬀect of Severance Pay and Extended Benefits on Exits
during the First 20 Weeks
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(a) Eﬀect of SP
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(b) Eﬀect of EB
Figure 3.11: Eﬀect of severance pay and benefit extension on exits from unemployment
during the first two weeks among claimants
In this section, we show that we obtain similar conclusions if we apply Card et al. (2007)’s
strategy to our dataset. In particular, in order to estimate the eﬀect of eligibility for SP
on overall exits from unemployment during the first 20 weeks, we censor all observations
with unemployment duration above 20 weeks. We then estimate
h(t) = exp( t),
where
 t = ↵t + ✓11 [JT =  12] + . . .+ ✓111 [JT =  2]
+ ✓131 [JT = 0] + . . .+ ✓241 [JT = 12]
+  1E +  2MW +  3MW ⇥ E +  4MW 2 +  5MW 2 ⇥ E
+  6MW
3 +  7MW
3 ⇥ E,
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and t is in discrete time with two-weekly intervals and ↵t controls for the baseline hazard.
Note that JT =  1 is the omitted category. The ✓s hence give us the diﬀerence in
the two-weekly job-finding probability relative to an individual just below the eligibility
threshold for SP. We can do the analogous analysis for the eﬀect of EB.
We plot the estimated ✓s in Figure 3.11. The discontinuities are roughly comparable
in size to Card et al. (2007), who report an eﬀect between -0.094 and  0.125 for SP and
 0.064 and  0.093 for EB.
E Allowing for Correlated Unobserved Heterogeneity in Take-up
and Search Eﬀort Choices
Assume the probability of claiming UI can be represented by the following equation
`i = Prob
 
✓`i + "
`
i > 0
 
where
✓`i = SSi +  EEi +  1JTi +  2MWi +  3JTiSi +  4MWiEi
+  5JT
2
i +  6MW
2
i +  7JT
2
i Si +  8MW
2
i Ei +  
0Xi.
Moreover, the probability that a job is found in period t, given that i is unemployed
up to period t, for take-up status j 2 {0, 1}, is given by
 ij(t) = Prob
 
✓ ij(t) + "
 
i > 0
 
, (3.16)
where
✓ ij(t) = SSi +
TX
⌧=1
↵S⌧ 1[t = ⌧ ]⇥ Si +  EEi +
TX
⌧=1
↵E⌧ 1[t = ⌧ ]⇥ Ei
+  1JTi +  2MWi +  3JTi ⇥ Si +  4MWi ⇥ Ei
+  5JT
2
i +  6MW
2
i +  7JT
2
i ⇥ Si +  8MW 2i ⇥ Ei+
+  9JT
3
i +  10MW
3
i +  11JT
3
i ⇥ Si +  12MW 3i ⇥ Ei +  0Xi,
where we suppressed the dependence of all parameters on j to simplify notation.
To capture unobserved heterogeneity correlated across decisions, we assume that"
"`i
" i
#
|(✓`i , ✓ ij) ⇠ N
 "
0
0
#
,
"
1 ⇢
⇢ 1
#!
.
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For identifiability, we need to assume that " i ’s conditional distribution does not depend
on the takeup-status.
Consider worker i and assume i claims UI and exits after ti periods. His contribution
to the log-likelihood is given by
ln Prob
 
✓`i + "
`
i > 0
 
+
ti 1X
⌧=1
ln
 
1  Prob ✓ ij(⌧) + " i > 0|✓`i + "`i > 0  
+ lnProb
 
✓ ij(t) + "
 
i > 0|✓`i + "`i > 0
 
.
Using the properties of the bivariate normal distribution, this is equivalent to
ln (✓`i ) +
ti 1X
⌧=1
ln
 
 2( ✓ ij(⌧), ✓`i , ⇢)
 (✓`i )
!
+ ln
 
 2(✓ ij(t), ✓
`
i , ⇢)
 (✓`i )
!
,
where  2 denotes the c.d.f. of the bivariate normal distribution.
Define fit which takes the value 1 if i exits in period t and 0 otherwise. Then, the
likelihood contribution can be written as
Pti
1 li⌧ , where
li⌧ = 1 {⌧ = 1} · ln (✓`i ) + (1  fit) ln
 
 2( ✓ ij(⌧), ✓`i , ⇢)
 (✓`i )
!
+ fit ln
 
 2(✓ ij(⌧), ✓
`
i , ⇢)
 (✓`i )
!
.
More generally, let q`i = 2 ·`i 1 and qfji = 2 ·f jit 1 for j 2 {0, 1}. Then the likelihood
contribution of period ⌧ of worker i is given by
li⌧ = 1 {⌧ = 1} · ln (q`i✓`i ) + ln
 
 2(q
fj
i ✓
 
ij(⌧), q
`
i✓
`
i , q
`
iq
fj
i ⇢)
 (q`i✓
`
i )
!
.
If we impose ⇢ = 0, we obtain our baseline model as a special case.
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Exit uninsured Exit insured Take-up
Severance Pay -0.0511 -0.00908 -0.196⇤⇤⇤
(0.0785) (0.0575) (0.0478)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 1 -0.0196 -0.0258
(0.0365) (0.0411)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 2 -0.0122 0.0414
(0.0390) (0.0383)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 3 -0.00406 -0.0298
(0.0499) (0.0410)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 4 0.00395 -0.0674⇤
(0.0500) (0.0394)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 5 -0.0243 -0.0688
(0.0596) (0.0429)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 6 0.0384 -0.00629
(0.0542) (0.0409)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 7 -0.0855 -0.0551
(0.0649) (0.0437)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 8 0.0173 0.0170
(0.0609) (0.0422)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 9 0.00953 -0.110⇤⇤
(0.0741) (0.0446)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 10 -0.0196 -0.0269
(0.0661) (0.0428)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 11 -0.00159 -0.0994⇤⇤
(0.0766) (0.0454)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 12 -0.000233 -0.0418
(0.0605) (0.0443)
Severance Pay ⇥ Period 13 0.0785 -0.0587
(0.0614) (0.0448)
Extended Benefits -0.0585 0.00431 0.117⇤⇤
(0.0635) (0.0468) (0.0510)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 1 0.0264 -0.0181
(0.0359) (0.0393)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 2 0.0144 -0.0451
(0.0382) (0.0369)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 3 -0.0188 0.00377
(0.0486) (0.0393)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 4 -0.101⇤⇤ 0.0272
(0.0483) (0.0378)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 5 0.00634 -0.00211
(0.0588) (0.0408)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 6 0.0532 -0.0423
(0.0540) (0.0391)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 7 0.0782 -0.0291
(0.0637) (0.0416)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 8 -0.0191 -0.0746⇤
(0.0600) (0.0404)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 9 -0.00825 -0.288⇤⇤⇤
(0.0726) (0.0417)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 10 -0.0592 -0.291⇤⇤⇤
(0.0629) (0.0410)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 11 -0.0783 -0.213⇤⇤⇤
(0.0741) (0.0427)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 12 -0.0141 -0.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.0592) (0.0425)
Extended Benefits ⇥ Period 13 -0.108⇤ -0.0471
(0.0605) (0.0433)
Estimated Correlation .1401(.466)
Log-Likelihood -277343.452
Observations 83451
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.9: Eﬀect of severance pay and extended benefits on exits from unemployment and
take-up, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
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F Omitted Results
Derivation of the estimable equation
Letting  i ⌘ U Ii0   U I¯i0 and assuming   is Weibull distributed, the take-up probability
satisfies
`i = F ( i) = 1  exp
  ( i/✓0i)✓1  ,
where {✓0i, ✓1} are the parameters of the cost distribution to be estimated. Inverting this
relationship, we find
 i = F
 1(`i) = ✓0i [  ln(1  `i)]1/✓1 .
Since the p.d.f. satisfies
f( i) =
✓1
✓0i
✓
 i
✓0i
◆✓1 1
exp
  ( i/✓0i)✓1  ,
we conclude
f
 
F 1(`i)
 
=
✓1
✓0i
[  ln(1  `i)]
✓1 1
✓1 (1  `i).
Moreover, assuming that the search cost function is isoelastic, satisfying  (s) = a0isa1 ,
we obtain
 00(s) = a0ia1(a1   1)sa1 2.
Plugging into the regression equation and replacing theoretical by estimated values,
we find
ln
dpi
dEi
  ln
✓
 dhiIT 1
dEi
◆
=
ln
✓1
✓0i
+
✓1   1
✓1
ln(  ln(1  pi)) + ln(1  pi) + ln  T 2 + ln
 
T 1Y
⌧=1
(1  hiI⌧ )
!
+ ln(a0ia1(a1   1)) + (a1   2) lnhiIT 1.
We account for observed heterogeneity by assuming a0i = a0 exp(X 0i⇠) and ✓0i =
✓0 exp(X 0i⇡), where Xi is a vector of covariates. Define   ⌘ ⇠    . Simplifying and
collecting terms, we get the estimable equation
yi = K +
✓1   1
✓1
ln(  ln(1  pi)) + (a1   2) lnhiIT 1 +X 0i , (3.17)
where yi ⌘ ln dpidEi   ln
⇣
 dhiIT 1dEi
⌘
  ln(1   pi)   ln
⇣QT 1
⌧=1 (1  hiI⌧ )
⌘
and K ⌘ ln ✓1✓0 +
ln  T 2 + ln(a0a1(a1   1)).
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Implementation of Bounds on Money Metric
Following the results derived by McEwen and Parresol (1991) for the truncated Weibull
distribution, the expected take-up cost can be written as
 ¯ =
8<:✓0
 (1/✓1+1,  ln(1 pi))
pi
if registered,
✓0
 (1/✓1+1)  (1/✓1+1,  ln(1 pi))
1 pi if not registered,
where  (z) ⌘ R10 xz 1 exp( x) dx denotes the Gamma function and  (z, u) ⌘ R u0 xz 1 exp( x) dx
denotes the incomplete Gamma function.
For claimants, it follows by plugging into (3.10) and replacing theoretical by estimated
values that
[  ln(1  pi)]1/✓1    (1/✓1 + 1,  ln(1  `i))/pih
  dpidSi 1vS
i
1
✓1
[  ln(1  pi)](1 ✓1)/✓1 11 pi +
h
 dhIT 1dEi 1BvE
i
  1 a0i✓0i a1(a1   1)ha1 2IT 1
  A  [  ln(1  pi)]
1/✓1    (1/✓1 + 1,  ln(1  `i))/pih
  dpidSi 1vS
i
1
✓1
[  ln(1  pi)](1 ✓1)/✓1 11 pi
,
while for the non-claimants, using 3.11), it follows that
[  ln(1  pi)]1/✓1   [ (1/✓1 + 1)   (1/✓1 + 1,  ln(1  `i))] /(1  pi)h
  dpidSi 1vS
i
1
✓1
[  ln(1  pi)](1 ✓1)/✓1 11 pi
  A 
[  ln(1  pi)]1/✓1   [ (1/✓1 + 1)   (1/✓1 + 1,  ln(1  `i))] /(1  pi)h
  dpidSi 1vS
i
1
✓1
[  ln(1  pi)](1 ✓1)/✓1 11 pi +
h
 dhIT 1dEi 1BvE
i
  1 a0i✓0i a1(a1   1)ha1 2IT 1
.

4 Job Mobility and Creative Destruction:
Flexicurity in the Land of Schumpeter
Joint with Francis Kramarz and Josef Zweimüller
A version of this paper has been submitted to Econometrica.
4.1 Introduction
Lack of labor market flexibility resulting from, among other things, high firing costs is
considered to be one of the most important factors driving the high unemployment rates
and low productivity in some Southern European countries. Such costs tend to discourage
workers from searching for better job matches; and it forces firms to continue ineﬃcient
employment relationships, resulting in sub-optimally low productivity and low output.
Moreover, as workers are reluctant to move firms have fewer incentives to create new
jobs, either because they anticipate low arrival rates by currently employed workers or
high adjustment costs if employment has to be reduced. Nevertheless, while this narrative
belongs to the standard repertoire when describing especially (Southern) European labor
markets, there is little empirical evidence trying to establish a causal link between firing
costs and worker mobility.
To shed light on this issue, this paper looks at a major change in Austrian labor
market regulations: the introduction of an occupational pension scheme for private sector
workers and the simultaneous abolition of a previous system of severance pay. The new
system was implemented for all employment relationships starting after January 1, 2003,
whereas jobs that started before this date continued to be subject to the old system. Thus,
a comparison of jobs starting before the date of the policy change with jobs starting after
this date is informative on how workers and firms react to the introduction of occupational
pensions and the simultaneous abolition of severance pay.
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The switch from the old Austrian severance pay system to the new occupational pen-
sion system brought about two major changes. The first change concerns eligibility rules
with respect to quits and layoﬀs. Under the old severance pay system, only layoﬀs were
subject to severance pay, whereas (voluntary) quits were not eligible. Under the new
occupational pension system, both (voluntary) quits and (involuntarily) laid-oﬀ workers
keep their accumulated separation payments on the pension account (and transfer it to
a new employer once they have a new job). The second major change involved a switch
from from a discontinuous schedule to a continuous scheme. Under the old severance pay
system, job losers with less than 3 years of tenure were not eligible for severance pay; and
severance pay amounted to 2 (3, 4, 6, 9, 12) monthly wages when the worker had at least
3 (5, 10, 15, 20, 25) years of tenure. The introduction of occupational pension accounts
made this schedule for separation payments continuous (with monthly employer contri-
butions of 1.53 % of the worker’s salary) with workers keeping them upon job separation
(the account being transferred to a new employer when a new job is started).
This paper studies how this policy change from severance pay to occupational pensions
aﬀects job mobility. Notice that the policy change aﬀects the incentives of workers who
anticipate a major shock to their firm and a high likelihood of being laid oﬀ. Under the
old severance pay system, workers have an incentive to “wait for a layoﬀ” (as a layoﬀ is
associated with a severance payment) but a low incentive to quit (as quitting is associated
with the loss of the severance payment). Hence job mobility under the new system of
occupational pensions should be higher than under the old severance pay system.
To identify the impact of the policy change on job mobility, we look at job separa-
tions before a mass layoﬀ. An important literature (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993);Fallick (1996);Stevens (1997)) has documented that a job loss has long-lasting
eﬀects on a worker’s future career. This literature also emphasizes the importance to ac-
count for worker mobility immediately before a mass layoﬀ (Pfann and Hamermesh (2001)
among others). Our empirical approach builds on this literature and identifies the impact
of the switch from severance pay to occupational pensions focusing on worker mobility
preceding a mass layoﬀ.
We are able to isolate the reform’s eﬀect on worker mobility from confounding factors
such as the firms’ reaction to the workforce composition as well as the business cycle using
a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. In particular, we compare workers starting a job
shortly after the reform to those starting shortly before. Since the economic environment
as well as the workforce composition of the typical firm employing them has not changed,
we know that any observable change has to be due to workers’ reaction to the reform.
We find that the policy change had a significant impact on job mobility. Consider
two workers, both employed in a firm that experiences a mass layoﬀ two years from now.
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According to our baseline estimates, the probability that a worker subject to the new
system is still employed at the firm at the date of the mass layoﬀ is 12.5 percentage points
(or around 40 percent relative to the pre-reform mean) lower than the corresponding
probability of a worker subject to the old system. Looking more closely into the eﬀect,
we find that most of the reaction is driven by the workers’ higher propensity to move
directly to other jobs as opposed to transitions into unemployment. This is consistent
with the reform incentives as the workers subject to the new system have higher incentives
to search on the job in order to decrease the risk of becoming unemployed and to move
to better paying jobs.
We also demonstrate that the finding is robust to various variations of the baseline
setting. On the one hand, we probe the exact definition of an adverse shock to the firm
in various ways and find no eﬀect. On the other hand, we define a sample of “matched
control” workers that are comparable in observable characteristics to the baseline sample
at the time of the job start, but do notÊhappen to enter a firm about to experience a
mass layoﬀ. We show that this sample evolves smoothly around the reform cutoﬀ, which
makes it appear unlikely that other unobserved factors drive our findings. Moreover, while
there is no direct test of selection around the discontinuity, we demonstrate that workers
appear to be “as good as randomly assigned” around the cutoﬀ by finding no significant
discontinuity in observable characteristics and no bunching in the number of job starts.
In order to put our quantitative results into perspective and to draw broader conclu-
sions by exploring the reform’s aggregate implications, we propose an equilibrium search
model featuring endogenous layoﬀs and job-to-job mobility. In a new match, workers
start out as non-eligible for severance pay and then turn eligible with some probability.
Firms face productivity (or demand) shocks, changing the likelihood that a worker in a
distressed firm will experience a layoﬀ. When the layoﬀ probability is high, a worker who
might lose a severance payment will wait for being laid oﬀ under the old system (rather
than searching hard for a new job and accepting reasonable job oﬀers), while a worker
who will keep the payment (because the separation payment can be transferred to a new
employer) will be more likely to move and accept a new and more eﬃcient employment
relationship. We estimate the model by Simulated Method of Moments to find the param-
eter values that are most in line with the data. It turns out that, under realistic parameter
values, the estimated model generates diﬀerences in mobility behavior of a similar order
of magnitude as those found in the empirical analysis.
The model also predicts (comparing steady states) a moderate decrease in the equi-
librium unemployment rate by around 0.6 percentage points, which is mainly driven by
higher job creation. Along with this goes a mild productivity increase (output per worker
increases by around 0.33 percentage points) which is driven by reallocation: Workers move
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more quickly to more productive jobs, which shifts the stationary productivity distribution
to the right.
In a last step, we use the parameterized model to conduct policy simulations in order
to explore potential eﬀects of a comparable reform in other economies. In particular, we
first argue that the Austrian pre-reform system was mild in comparison to the system
currently in place in many Southern European countries, where workers become eligible
for severance pay much more quickly and the expected size of the payment is much higher
(with the additional risk of potential litigation). If we calibrate the model to match these
facts, we predict considerable reform eﬀects, with unemployment dropping by almost 5
percentage points and productivity increasing by around 0.66 percentage points (leading
to an increase in output by over 6 percentage points). Moreover, in order to account for
an important stylized fact in these economies, we propose a variant of the baseline model
where we allow for temporary jobs. We estimate the model on Austrian data and again
conduct policy simulations. We now find that the reform impacts both margins alike,
with the share of temporary employment and unemployment each dropping by over 3
percentage points.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Sec-
tion 4.3 gives an overview of the institutional setting before and after the reform. Section
4.4 describes our data and the empirical strategy. In Section 4.5, we present empirical ev-
idence on worker mobility in declining firms. Section 4.6 describes the specification of our
model. The estimation strategy and identification is explained in Section 4.7, while Sec-
tion 4.8 discusses the results and model fit. In Section 4.9, we conduct policy simulations
and Section 4.10 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on severance pay was sparked by Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
and Bertola (1990). As demonstrated by Lazear (1990), in a frictionless environment any
severance payment scheme can be oﬀset by an eﬃcient labor contract and thus should not
have real eﬀects. As a response, subsequent theoretical work analyzing the eﬀects of lay-
oﬀ costs introduced frictions of diﬀerent forms, such as indivisible labor (H. Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993)), or search frictions (e.g. Burda (1992); Saint-Paul (1995); Alvarez
and Veracierto (1998); Garibaldi (1998); Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999); D. T. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999)). As discussed in Ljungqvist (2002), these models produced mixed
results on the eﬀect of lay-oﬀ costs on overall employment level.
In addition to this literature, normative theories have emerged (see Parsons (2013) for
a recent overview), arguing that severance packages arise as optimal contracts in certain
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market environments. A recent example is Boeri, Garibaldi, and Moen (2013), who show
that tenure-related severance pay is optimal if there are wage deferrals and moral hazard
on the side of employers and workers.
A more recent strand of literature stresses the importance of on-the-job search and
voluntary payments (see, e.g., Fella (2007) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2014)). In par-
ticular, employers hit by an adverse shock may find it worthwhile to make a transfer in
order to induce a worker to accept an outside oﬀer.
On the empirical side, there is a number of studies using cross-country variations
that find that higher employment protection reduces job or labor turnover (e.g. Gomez-
Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004); Micco and Pagés (2006); Messina and Vallanti
(2007); Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2008)), while Gielen and Tatsiramos
(2012) show that quits respond less to reported job satisfaction in countries with higher
job protection. Other studies use within-country variation (e.g. Boeri and Jimeno (2005);
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006); Kugler and Pica (2008); Fraisse, Kramarz, and
Prost (2014)) and generally find a negative eﬀect on job or labor turnover, while yielding
ambiguous results in terms of employment. Our empirical strategy relies on the behavior
of workers in distressed firms (firms with mass layoﬀs or plant closures). On this last side,
a large literature has used plant closures or mass layoﬀs to study how job losses aﬀect
the long-run career prospects of such workers and has typically found large and long-
lasting eﬀects. For recent studies, see e.g. Huttunen, Moen, and Salvanes (2011), Song
and von Wachter (2014), Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2010), Ichino, Schwerdt,
Winter-Ebmer, and Zweimüller (2014), among many others.
4.3 Institutional Background
Before the 2003 reform introduced the occupational pension system, a system of manda-
tory severance pay was in place. All jobs that started before January 1, 2003 were subject
to the old severance-pay system, while all jobs that started on January 1, 2003 or later
became subject to the new occupational-pension system1.
1This implies that jobs that started before 2003 and are still ongoing after January 1, 2003 continue to
be covered by the old severance-pay system. However, the 2003 reform also allowed for the possibility to
convert these old-system contracts into new-system contracts, provided that both employee and employer
agreed to the switch. There were two possibilities to switch. (i) The partial switch “freezes” the severance
pay at the level for which the employee is currently eligible and starts the occupational pension account
at that date. When the employee quits, she can only transfer the pension to the new employer but loses
the “frozen” severance pay. (ii) The full switch pays the severance pay to which the employee is currently
eligible into a new pensions account. Notice that only for full switchers the incentive to wait completely
disappears, while it does not (fully) disappear for partial switchers.
When interpreting our empirical results below, we consider a worker to be eligible for the old-severance
pay rules if her job started before January 1, 2003. Similarly, we consider a worker as eligible for the new
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The old severance-pay system. The pre-reform system requires firms to make a
lump-sum transfer to each laid-oﬀ worker. The size of this transfer depends on the worker’s
tenure and is increasing in steps: After 3 years of tenure, workers become eligible for
severance pay of at least 2 monthly salaries, while there is no mandatory payment below
this tenure level. After 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years of tenure, the severance pay increases to
at least 3, 4, 6, 9, 12 monthly salaries, respectively. Importantly, the worker is eligible
only after an involuntary layoﬀ, while quits and dismissals for cause are exempt from the
severance-pay rule. This means firms have to make a transfer in case of a layoﬀ, a job
termination upon mutual agreement (of firm and worker), or after the end of a temporary
contract. However, in case of a worker-induced job termination (quit or dismissal for
cause), the worker is not eligible. The only exception are quits for retirement. In that
case, the firm has to provide a severance payment given the worker has at least 10 years
of tenure2.
The new occupational-pension system. All jobs starting as of January 1, 2003,
(new-system) are subject to the new system of occupational pensions. Starting from the
second month of the employment relationship, the employer has to transfer 1.53 percent
of the worker’s current salary to a pension account, on which the employee earns interest.
When the job is terminated—be it through a layoﬀ or a quit—the worker continues to be
the owner of the pension account. While the claims are never lost, accessing the pension
account is regulated. Withdrawing funds is only possible after three years of tenure; after
a layoﬀ; when firm and worker mutually agree to terminate the employment contract;
and after the end of a temporary contract. When the worker quits (or is dismissed for
misconduct), no right to withdraw from the pension account exists.
Changes in incentives as a result of the reform. The 2003 reform relates to
severance-pay eligibility after a voluntary quit. Under the old system, severance-pay
claims are lost. Under the new system, the worker continues to own the accumulated
occupational-pension rules if her job started on January 1, 2003 or later. In the data, we can only observe
the start date of a new job but not the type of contract (and whether an old contract was converted
to a new one). This implies we may erroneously classify workers who started their jobs before 2003 as
subject to the old system if in fact their contracts were converted to the new system. No such ambiguity
exists for workers who started their jobs in 2003 or later (it was no option to convert a new contract
to pre-reform rules). Notice that the resulting measurement error in the treatment status will bias the
estimated reform eﬀect towards zero, which means we will estimate a lower bound of the true reform
eﬀect. In practice, only a negligible number of contracts under the old system were converted to the new
system (see, e.g., Percher (2003)). For this reason, any bias of the estimated reform eﬀect will be small.
2See Manoli and Weber (2016) who study how severance pay rules aﬀect retirement behavior of
Austrian workers. They find that transitions to retirement are significantly lower (higher), immediately
before (after) a tenure threshold, suggesting that workers align the timing of retirement to the severance
pay rules.
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funds on the pension account. As a result, the incentive to wait for a layoﬀ (and the
associated severance payment) is strong under the old system and disappears under the
new system. By contrast, we should expect new-system workers employed by firms expe-
riencing adverse shocks to search more actively on the job to limit the risk of becoming
unemployed and to benefit from wage increases. In the empirical part below, we show
that the abolition of severance-pay indeed lead to higher job separations among workers
with high layoﬀ probabilities. We also show that the higher probability of a job separation
is largely driven by an increase in job-to-job mobility. This supports the claim that under
the system workers are more willing to accept outside oﬀers.
In contrast, the reform did not create first-order changes in firms’ incentive to termi-
nate an employment relationship (though it might have aﬀected firm incentives through
general equilibrium eﬀects). The reason is that the reform was designed to be roughly
cost-neutral (in expected value) for employers. The old system mandates substantially
higher severance-pay claims than the funds accumulated on the pension account under the
new system when comparing equal tenure levels (larger than 3 years). This compensates
for the fact that firms in the old system firms had to make the transfer only in case of a
layoﬀ and tenure above 3 years, while in the new system firms have to make payments to
all workers, irrespective of the cause of a job termination and the tenure level.
Apart from the incentive to wait for a layoﬀ, a second main part of the severance-pay
reform also removed the incentive to wait for retirement. Under the old system, workers
with more than 10 years of tenure remained eligible for the severance payment, even if they
quit voluntarily, provided that they completely withdraw from the labor force and claim
a public pension thereafter. This implies that a long-tenured worker had an incentive to
abstain from quitting even when her layoﬀ probability in the current firm was very low.
Staying with the firm until retirement ensured the severance payment.
In this paper we will mainly focus on the incentive to wait for a layoﬀ and we will show
that, empirically, this is the important margin where the severance-pay reform triggered
substantial mobility responses. However, we will also shed some light on the impact of the
reform on job mobility for longer-tenured workers who are close to retirement. While the
severance pay reform created a substantial change in incentives, this did not lead to major
mobility responses because job mobility in the concerned age groups is low anyway.3
3A further change of the 2003 reform was the switch from a severance-pay schedule firm that changed
discontinuously with tenure on the current job to an occupational pension scheme where any tenure
discontinuity disappears (because firms pay pensions contributions month by month into the worker’s
pension account). Other papers have shown that the tenure discontinuities of the old system aﬀected
unemployment durations (Card et al. (2007)) and the timing of retirement (Manoli and Weber (2016)).
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4.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data sources. Our analysis is based on the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD),
which covers the universe of Austrian private sector workers and provides longitudinal
information on the workers’ earnings- and employment history from 1972 onward. The
data has been collected in order to verify old-age pension claims and hence covers all
information relevant to calculate a worker’s pension benefit. In addition to individuals’
earnings- and employment history, the ASSD reports other labor market states, such as
registered unemployment, sickness or maternal leave.
We also make selective use of the Austrian Earnings-Tax Database (ATD), which
covers the universe of private sector earnings-tax records and can be matched to ASSD
via an individual identifier for the years 1994 to 2012. It is based on reports the employer
has to complete for the tax oﬃce every year. The report contains the base salary and
several other categories. In general, employees are not obliged to file individual tax
returns, since the reports by the employer are detailed enough. Among other things, tax
reports also report income subject to the fixed tax rate of 6%, among which is also a
category for severance payments. This category comprises three types of payment: (i)
mandatory severance-pay, (ii) voluntary severance-pay, and (iii) refunds for vacation days
not taken.
Baseline sample. To test whether workers respond to the severance-pay reform we
focus on workers who are likely to be displaced in the future. In this group of workers,
the old system generates an incentive to wait, while no such incentive exists in the new
system.
More precisely, we look at workers who entered a firm that subsequently experienced
a mass layoﬀ. The idea is that these workers can reasonably expect to be laid oﬀ in the
near future. In the old system, these workers had an incentive to wait for the layoﬀ in
order to collect the severance payment. In the new system, this incentive is gone. Job
separation outcomes in this group of workers should thus be informative about the eﬀect
of the severance pay reform on job mobility.4
Column 1 of Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for all job starters observed in
the ASSD who satisfy the following criteria: (i) aged 25-55 at job start, (ii) started a
new job during the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2008, (iii) stayed at least
4If a worker is employed in a secure job (with a layoﬀ probability equal to zero), the severance
pay reform does not generate any diﬀerential incentives in terms job mobility. In the old system, the
worker gets the severance payment as a lump-sum at retirement, while in the new system the firm pays
continuously into the worker’s pension account that the worker can take with her to the new employer. As
the expected transfers under both systems are equally large, incentives to switch job remain unchanged
after the reform for workers with a zero layoﬀ probability.
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12 months in the new firm. Column 3 restricts attention to the subsample of workers
who entered a firm that subsequently experienced a mass layoﬀ. To be selected into our
baseline sample, the worker must have (iv) entered a firm, which experienced a mass
layoﬀ 3 to 4 years later. A “mass-layoﬀ” firm has to satisfy the following characteristics:
(a) an employment reduction of more than 33 percent of the firm’s work force; (b) the
employment reduction has to occur within one month; and (c) the firm had at least 30
employees in the last month before the mass layoﬀ. Workers who satisfy criteria (i) - (iv)
constitute our “baseline sample”.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics, all job starters and baseline sample
All Job Starts Reweighted Baseline
Female 0.55 0.53 0.51
Age (years) 37.79 37.59 36.73
Experience (years) 13.13 13.14 11.79
Austrian 0.79 0.79 0.78
Previous Jobs 4.99 4.97 5.37
Manufacturing 0.22 0.25 0.24
Vienna 0.32 0.33 0.36
Starting wage in e 1,779 1,876 1,992
Number of Firms 173,528 173,528 4,198
Median firm size at entry 98 210 212
Median firm size before shock . . 222
Median size reduction . . 175
Observations 1,300,062 1,300,062 28,099
Note: Column 1 of the table reports descriptive statistics for the universe of newly hired workers observed
in the ASSD who satisfy the following criteria: (i) aged 25-55 at job start; (ii) started a new job between
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2008; (iii) stayed at least 12 months in the new firm. Column 3
restricts attention to the subsample of workers who (iv) entered a firm that experienced a mass layoﬀ
within 3 to 4 years after the worker’s job start date. Workers who satisfy criteria (i)-(iv) constitute our
"baseline sample". Column 2 is based on workers satisfying criteria (i)-(iii), but reweights observations
according to the firm size distribution observed in the baseline sample at the time of the job start, which
diﬀers by construction as we restrict to firms with at least 30 employees before the mass layoﬀ. We
group observation in 50 size quantiles, hence the median firm size does not necessarily correspond to
the baseline sample exactly. The table shows that the baseline sample of mass layoﬀ workers shows
by and large similar characteristics, though starting wages are somewhat higher in the baseline sample.
Reweighting shows that part of this discrepancy is explained by diﬀerences in firm size.
Table 4.1 compares the characteristics of workers in our baseline sample to all prime-
age job starters (irrespective of whether the firm subsequently experienced a mass layoﬀ),
showing that workers in the baseline sample are slightly less likely to be female, younger,
and more experienced. Due to criteria (iv) and (v) baseline workers are (mechanically) se-
lected from larger firms and have higher wages. Overall, the baseline sample of mass layoﬀ
workers shows by and large similar characteristics, though starting wages are somewhat
higher in the baseline sample. (In column 2, we reweight observations in the universe to
match the average firm size of the baseline sample which reduces the diﬀerence in average
wages.) The median employment reduction during the subsequent mass in the baseline
sample is 175. The median size of a firm is 212 in the month of entry and 222 one month
before the mass layoﬀ. Hence, on average, employment levels even slightly increased up
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until the month immediately before the mass layoﬀ.
Empirical strategy: RD design. To identify the eﬀect of the severance-pay reform
on job mobility, we exploit the fact that the policy changed discontinuously on January
1, 2003. In our baseline specifications we will estimate local linear regressions of the form
Y =  0 +  1D +  2x+  3D ⇥ x+ ", (4.1)
where Y denotes the outcome variable, which is in our case an indicator for job mobility—
a separation from the current job (in the mass-layoﬀ firm) which can either be a transition
to a new job, a transition to unemployment, or a transition to non-employment—D is a
dummy variable that indicates whether the job started on January 1, 2003 or later (so
that the employment contract is subject to the new occupational pension system) worker,
x denotes the start date of the job (normalized to take the value 0 at the time of the
reform) and " captures unobservables.
The main identification assumption is that heterogeneity in the absence of the treat-
ment evolves smoothly around the threshold, so that workers arbitrarily close to the cutoﬀ
are “as good as” randomly assigned. In this case  1, the parameter of interest, measures
the reform impact.
We restrict all analyses to an RD sample of at most 24 quarters around the cutoﬀ but
explore the robustness to smaller bandwidths. We put more weight on observations close
to the cutoﬀ by using a triangular kernel following the suggestions by Porter (2003) and
Hahn et al. (2001). Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap (1000 replications)
clustered at the firm level to account for potential correlation in unobservables at the firm
level.
4.5 Job Mobility and the Severance-Pay Reform
In what follows we present empirical estimates on the 2003 severance pay reform’s causal
eﬀect on job mobility. Our empirical strategy relies on a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) which treats the start date of a new job as the running variable and the date of
implementation of the severance-pay reform, January 1, 2003, as the critical threshold.
We first provide our main results which document an upward jump in job mobility
immediately after the reform was implemented. We then provide a detailed check of the
validity of our RDD and perform a number of robustness checks that document that our
main results are quite robust. Finally, we look at further outcomes, such as wage increases
for job changes and job mobility for long-tenured workers (whose job mobility might have
increased because the reform removed the incentive to wait for retirement).
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Main results. Figure 4.1 documents a discontinuous increase in the fraction of job
separations in response to the reform. On the vertical axis we measure the percentage
job separations that took place before the mass layoﬀ. Recall that the baseline sample
includes workers who stayed for at least 12 months and who were hired by a firm that
experienced a mass layoﬀ 36 to 47 months after the worker’s job start. The vertical axis
measures the percentage of job separations, which we define as the fraction of workers
having left the firm before reaching 36 months of tenure.5 The horizontal axis refers to
the quarter during which workers in the sample were hired by a firm that subsequently
experienced a mass layoﬀ. The vertical line in the middle of the graph indicates the reform
date: jobs that started before this date are still subject to the old severance-pay system;
jobs that started after this date are subject to the new occupational-pension system.
Figure 4.1: Job separations by date of job start
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Note: The figure plots the fraction of workers in our baseline sample (N = 28, 099)—among those who
have entered a firm at the date specified on the horizontal axis, “Start of job”—who stayed in this firm
less than 36 months, conditioning on a tenure of at least 12 months. The red vertical line displays the
date of the severance-pay reform (2003q1). Jobs that started after (before) the reform date were subject
to the new (old) system. The fitted lines and confidence intervals are from a local linear regression with
triangular weights. Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. The
figure displays a stark discontinuity at the reform date: jobs which started immediately after the reform
are significantly more likely to be terminated than jobs which started immediately before the reform
date. This is in line with the incentive to wait for a layoﬀ in the old system, which disappeared after the
reform. (See text for details.)
The graph indicates a clear discontinuity at the reform date: among workers who
started their job immediately before the reform date, below 25 percent have left the firm
5In the robustness checks below we look at alternative definitions of the job separation measure. Our
main results are based on a fixed time window for job separations (percentage leavers within 36 months
after job start). Alternatively, we define a separation indicator based on a variable time window for
job separations (percentage leavers by 1 month before the mass layoﬀ). The former indicator keeps the
separation time window fixed but is subject to a variable time to the mass layoﬀ. The latter indicator
keeps the time to the mass layoﬀ fixed but is subject to a variable time since job start. Our RDD estimates
are robust to this change of definition in the job separation indicator.
118 Job Mobility and Creative Destruction
before reaching 36 months of tenure. The corresponding number jumps up to above 35
percent for workers who started their job immediately after the reform date. This indicates
that the 2003 reform had a large and statistically significant impact. Job separations
increased by 12.5 percentage points or by 40 percent relative to the pre-reform mean.
Figure 4.2 distinguishes job separations by transitions to a new job (panel (a)) and
transition to unemployment (panel (b)), coding a transition as job-to-job (JTJ) if in-
termittent nonemployment is below 28 days, while calling all other transitions job-to-
unemployment (JTU). Panel (a) shows a significant and quantitatively large discontinu-
ity in JTJ transitions, while panel (b) indicates that also transitions to unemployment
(JTU) are aﬀected, though the discontinuity is smaller and only weakly significant. JTJ
transitions increase from less than 9 percent immediately before to above 15 percent im-
mediately after the reform, suggesting that JTJ transitions increased by more than 60
percent in response to the reform. In contrast, JTU transitions increase from 13 to 17
percent, corresponding to roughly 30 percent.
As a first-order approximation, it is reasonable to assume that transitions to new
jobs predominantly reflect voluntary quits, while transitions to unemployment are more
likely driven by involuntary job terminations. To the extent that this approximation
is correct, our results indicate that the increase in job separations caused by the 2003
reform is mainly due to workers’ higher willingness to move to new jobs. This is in line
with reform incentives. Notice that assuming that only JTJ moves are responses to the
reform in line with incentives may underestimate the true response. We might erroneously
classify a transition to unemployment as “involuntary” when the worker already found a
new job but decides to stay on UI benefits for an intermediate period. (An error in the
opposite direction is less likely because a transition to a new job after an involuntary
layoﬀ can only happen when a fired workers finds a new job immediately.) We conclude
that worker-induced transitions to a new job is likely to underestimate the reform’s eﬀect
on job mobility.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results in a series of RDD regressions. The table reports
the RD-coeﬃcient from various linear probability models based on specification (4.1).
Columns 1 to 3 use the entire sample, while columns 4 and 5 use the optimal bandwidth
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Columns 3 and 5 include covariates,
while column 3 uses a quadratic specification to capture potential nonlinear eﬀects of the
running variable (calendar time).
Regression results are robust and confirm the graphical evidence of Figures 4.1 and
4.2 above. Panel A uses all job separations as the outcome variable and estimates that
the severance-pay reform increases job separations by 11 to 14 percentage points in our
baseline sample. As a fraction of the pre-reform mean, this amounts to a 40 percent
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Figure 4.2: Transitions to a new job (JTJ) vs unemployment (JTU), by date of job start
(a) Transitions to a new job (JTJ)
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(b) Transitions to unemployment (JTU)
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Note: Panel (a) plots the fraction of workers in our baseline sample (N = 28, 099) by job start date, who
transitioned to another job (JTJ) between month 12 and month 36 after their job start date, conditioning
on a tenure of at least 12 months. Panel (b) plots the corresponding fraction of workers who entered
unemployment (JTU) between month 12 and month 36. The fitted lines and confidence intervals are from
a local linear regression with triangular weights. The vertical line indicates the reform date. Inference is
based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. In line with reform incentives, the
fraction of JTJ movers shows a discontinuous and sizable upward jump for jobs that started immediately
after the reform. The fraction of JTU movers also displays an upward jump, but the eﬀect is considerably
smaller and barely statistically significant. (See text for details.)
increase in job separations. Panels B and C run the same RD models using, respectively,
transitions to a new job and to unemployment as outcome variables. JTJ transitions
increase by 7 to 10 percentage points, or by 54 to 85 percent in terms of the pre-reform
mean. The reform eﬀect on JTU transitions is also positive, but substantially smaller in
absolute (and relative) value and less precisely estimated.
The results of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and Table 4.2 define as outcome an indicator for
a job transition, which took place 12 to 36 months after the workers was hired. To see
how the eﬀect builds up, we look more specifically into the timing of these additional job
transitions. Denote by y12,x an indicator that takes value 1 if a transition occurs between
month 12 and month x > 12 (among workers with tenure   12 months). Instead of only
using x = 36, we ran 12 regressions using y12,x as outcome with x = 14, 16, . . . , 36. Figure
4.3 reports the 12 RD coeﬃcients when the outcome variable is based on all job-separations
(panel a), JTJ transitions (panel b), and JTU transitions (panel c), respectively.
The graphs clearly show that the eﬀect builds up smoothly. The increase in job
separations is paralleled by an increase in JTJ transitions, while JTU transitions do not
increase that much with tenure after month 20. The figures indicate that the increase in
job separations at dates closer to the mass layoﬀ is almost entirely driven by increases in
JTJ transitions. This is further support for the claim that the reform has mainly aﬀected
workers’ willingness to quit and move to new jobs.
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Table 4.2: Dependent variable: probability of separation by 36 months after entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All exits
Estimated coeﬃcient 0.125⇤⇤⇤ 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.111⇤⇤⇤ 0.128⇤⇤⇤ 0.130⇤⇤⇤
(0.0371) (0.0468) (0.0294) (0.0454) (0.0387)
Pre-reform mean 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.280 0.280
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.396 0.431 0.350 0.457 0.466
Panel B: Job-to-Job
Estimated coeﬃcient 0.0803⇤⇤⇤ 0.0870⇤⇤⇤ 0.0729⇤⇤⇤ 0.0992⇤⇤⇤ 0.0996⇤⇤⇤
(0.0200) (0.0247) (0.0186) (0.0270) (0.0242)
Pre-reform mean 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.112 0.112
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.593 0.642 0.539 0.882 0.886
Panel C: Job-to-Unemployment
Estimated coeﬃcient 0.0414⇤ 0.0603⇤⇤ 0.0372⇤⇤ 0.0418 0.0479⇤
(0.0220) (0.0275) (0.0187) (0.0260) (0.0254)
Pre-reform mean 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.143 0.143
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.264 0.386 0.238 0.291 0.334
Specification
Linear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic No Yes No No No
Controls No No Yes No Yes
Bandwidth(quarters) 24 24 24 10 10
Observations 28099 28099 28099 13543 13543
Note: The table reports the coeﬃcient  1 from a linear probability model based on equation (4.1).
Results indicate a discontinuous increase in total job separations after the reform (panel A), which is
mainly driven by JTJ transitions (panel B) and to a lesser extent by JTU transitions (panel C). The
estimated eﬀects are robust to the inclusion of control variables, the specification of the running variable
and the bandwidth choice. 10 quarters is the optimal bandwidth according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 replications) and clustered at firm level. Controls are
gender, age, age squared, experience, experience squared, Austrian nationality, log firm size 24 months
before the mass layoﬀ, and indicators for manufacturing sector, Vienna, and quarter of job entry; *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
RDD validity. A potentially important caveat for interpreting the above RD coeﬃcient
as causal may be manipulation of the start date of the job. Note first that it is not
entirely obvious whether firms (workers) have an incentive shift the start date of a planned
hire forward or backward. Since the reform was cost-neutral on average, there is no
clear ex-ante gain from self-selection into the old or the new system. Moreover, revealed
behaviors suggest that postponing a new job to the new system was not a dominant
option. Otherwise, the possibility of switching to the new system (that became possible
with the reform for all ongoing employment relationships) would have been taken up much
more frequently.
Figure 4.4 looks at the empirical evidence. The horizontal axis shows calendar year-
month of job start, while the vertical axis plots the absolute number of newly hired
workers by calendar year-months. Panel (a) restricts attention to our baseline sample
(N = 28, 099), Panel (b) looks at the universe of job starters (N = 1, 300, 062) observed in
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Figure 4.3: How does the eﬀect build up over time?
(a) All job separations
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(b) Transitions to a new job (JTJ)
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(c) Transitions to unemployment (JTU)
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Note: The figures plot the RD coeﬃcients  1 estimated from equation (4.1) using our baseline sample
when we vary the time window during which a job separations occurs between month 12 and month
x > 12 after the start of a job. (This means we look at workers who stayed at least 12 months and
at most x > 12 months in a firm that subsequently experienced a mass layoﬀ, while in Table 4.2 we
restrict attention to x = 36.) Panel A uses as the dependent variable an indicator for a job separation
between month 12 and month x after job start; Panels B and C use an indicator for a JTJ and a JTU
transition, respectively, as the dependent variable. Estimates are from a linear probability model, using
the specification of column 1 in Table 4.2. Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered
at the firm level. Panel A shows that the fraction of separated workers increases continuously with tenure,
x, panel B shows that this increase is mainly due to JTJ transitions, while panel C shows that also JTU
transitions increase, but estimates are smaller and barely statistically significant. (See text for details.)
the ASSD (who satisfy the selection criteria). Figure 4.4 shows that the number of monthly
hires is a quite noisy indicator. However, there is no statistically or visually significant
discontinuity in the absolute number of job starts at the reform date (2003q1), neither
among workers in the baseline sample, nor among all job starters. This indicates that
manipulation of new hires around the reform date does not appear empirically relevant.
Figure 4.5 looks for discontinuities around the reform date in the work-force com-
position of firms that hired the workers in our baseline sample at diﬀerent dates before
the date of the mass layoﬀ. A date point on the vertical axis takes firms that hired a
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Figure 4.4: Absolute number of new hires, by date of job start
(a) Baseline sample
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(b) Universe
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Note: The figures plot the absolute number of newly hired workers by calendar year-months. Panel A
restricts attention to our baseline sample (N = 28, 099), Panel B looks at the universe of job starters
(N = 1, 300, 062) observed in the ASSD (who satisfy selection criteria). The fitted lines and confidence
intervals are from a local linear regression with triangular weights. Inference is based on a bootstrap
(1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. While the number of monthly hires is quite noisy, there is
no statistically significant discontinuity in the number of job starts at the reform date (2003q1), neither
among workers in the baseline sample, nor among all job starters. This indicates that manipulation of
new hires around the reform date does not appear empirically relevant. (See text for details.)
worker of our baseline sample in the respective month and plots the mean “percentage
of new-system workers”. To calculate this indicator we weight by the number of baseline
workers. I.e. we first assign, to each worker in our baseline sample, a (worker-specific)
variable “firm’s fraction of new-system workers x months before the mass layoﬀ”, where
x = 24 months (panel (a)), x = 12 months (panel (b)), and x = 1 month (panel (c)).
We then take the mean of this variable among all workers in the baseline sample who
started their new job in the respective month. None of the three panels indicates a sig-
nificant discontinuity around the reform date (2003m1). This suggests that a contrast of
job starters immediately before and after the reform is unlikely contaminated by diﬀer-
ences in the work-force composition of the firms that hired these new workers. Moreover,
this analysis also addresses the concern that the firms’ mass layoﬀ decisions, and hence
the way we select observations, might be driven by the reform. Arguably, firms having
similar workforce compositions in terms of eligibility—such as the typical firms employ-
ing workers having started either in December 2002 or January 2003—should not, ceteris
paribus, display systematic diﬀerences in their behavior due to the reform. Thus, we can
be confident that the discontinuity is driven by worker behavior.
In Table 4.3 we check whether observed covariates are smooth around the threshold
to detect potential signs of selection and to rule out the possibility that events or in-
terventions other than the severance-pay reform drive the discontinuous increase in job
mobility observed when the new policy was implemented. The table compares descriptive
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Figure 4.5: Percentage new-system workers in total work force of the firm
(a) 24 months before the mass layoﬀ
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(b) 12 months before the mass layoﬀ
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(c) 1 month before the mass layoﬀ
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Note: The figures look for discontinuities around the reform date in the workforce composition among
the firms that hired new workers. To calculate the variable “percentage new-system workers” we first
assign, to each worker in our baseline sample (N = 28, 099), a (worker-specific) variable "firm’s fraction
of new-system workers x months before the mass layoﬀ", where x = 24 months (panel a), x = 12 months
(panel b), and x = 1 month (panel c). We then take the mean of this variable among workers who started
their new job in the respective month. None of the three panels indicates a significant discontinuity
around the reform date (2003m1). This suggests that a contrast of job starters immediately before and
after the reform is not contaminated by diﬀerences in the work-force composition of the firms that hired
these new workers. (See text for details.)
statistics of the baseline sample, before and after the reform (columns 1-3), as well as the
corresponding RD estimates (columns 4-5). Panel A focuses on worker characteristics,
Panel B focuses on the characteristics of the firms that hired these workers. Compar-
ing sample means does not indicate any diﬀerences before and after the policy change.
Moreover, the corresponding RD estimates do not show significant discontinuities at the
reform date (2003q1), neither in worker- nor in firm characteristics (the only exception
being a somewhat lower percentage of females after the reform6).
As a next step we replicate the RD analysis, but instead of assigning the true reform
6Later, we will demonstrate that this small discontinuity does not aﬀect our conclusions by showing
that the eﬀect is present even when restricting to females or males, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Are covariates smooth around the cutoﬀ?
Mean before Mean after Diﬀerence RDD estimate p-value
Panel A: Worker characteristics
Age (years) 36.65 36.83 0.175 -0.231 0.757
Female 0.544 0.467 -0.0776 -0.110 0.0883⇤
Experience (years) 11.98 11.56 -0.421 -0.452 0.715
Austrian 0.800 0.761 -0.0389 -0.0402 0.118
Log previous wage 4.024 4.159 0.135 -0.0212 0.815
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Manufacturing 0.162 0.216 0.0545 0.145 0.157
Located in Vienna 0.314 0.426 0.112 0.129 0.260
Log firm size 2 y. bef. shock 5.668 5.445 -0.224 -0.0157 0.973
Log firm size 1 y. bef. shock 5.694 5.450 -0.243 -0.0971 0.831
Log firm size 1 m. bef. shock 5.689 5.453 -0.236 -0.116 0.794
Note: The table compares descriptive statistics of the baseline sample, before and after the reform
(columns 1-3), as well as the corresponding RD estimates (columns 4-5). Panel A focuses on worker
characteristics, Panel B focuses on the characteristics of the firms that hired these workers. Comparing
sample means does not indicate any diﬀerences before and after the policy change. Moreover, the cor-
responding RD estimate do not show significant discontinuities at the reform date (2003q1), neither in
worker- nor in firm characteristics (the only exception being a somewhat lower percentage of females after
the reform). Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. Overall,
the evidence supports the validity of the RD design. (See text for details.)
date we estimate the RD coeﬃcients from a series of “placebo reforms”. The placebo
reform shifts the reform cutoﬀ date x quarters away from the true reform date 2003q1
(the true reform date is normalized to zero), and we let x vary from 8 quarter before and
7 quarters after the true reform date. Panel (a) of Figure 4.6 uses an indicator for a job
separation (12-36 months after the start of the new job) as the dependent variable; panels
(b) and (c) look at, respectively, JTJ and JTU transitions during the same time interval
as the outcome variable. The evidence in all three panels consistently shows that RD
estimates are larger for placebo reforms closer to—and are highest at—the true reform
date. This supports the idea that the discontinuous change in job separations is indeed
caused by the severance-pay reform rather than by some other event or intervention.
In Appendix A we conduct a number of further checks that support our RD strategy.
Notice that our baseline sample is selected as if the mass layoﬀ was an exogenous event.
This is clearly not the case and it is important to be aware that the mass layoﬀ is the
firms’ endogenous response to an exogenous shock we cannot observe. Ideally, we would
like to know the exact date when the worker learns that the firm was hit by a shock
and that her layoﬀ probability has increased. We would also like to know the date when
the worker is eventually informed that (and, if at all, when) she will be fired. Because
these dates are unobserved, it is important to be transparent about the dynamics of
mass layoﬀ firms’ employment levels before the mass layoﬀ. In Appendix A, we provide
RD contrasts of the firms which hired the workers in the baseline sample immediately
before the severance-pay policy change, to those firms that hired baseline-sample workers
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Figure 4.6: Placebo reforms
(a) All job separations
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(b) Transitions to a new job (JTJ)













3
R
LQ
W
H
VW
LP
D
WH




&
,V
               
&XWRIIVKLIWHGE\TXDUWHUV
(c) Transitions to unemployment (JTU)
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Note: The figures provide the RD coeﬃcients from a series of “placebo reforms”. The placebo reform
shifts the reform cutoﬀ date x quarters away from the true reform date 2003q1 (the true reform date
is normalized to zero), and we let x vary from  8 to +7 quarters. Panel a) uses an indicator for a job
separation (12-36 months after the start of the new job) as the dependent variable; panels b) and c) look
at, respectively, JTJ and JTU transitions as the outcome variable. Inference is based on a bootstrap
(1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. The evidence in all three panels consistently shows that
RD estimates are larger for placebo reforms closer to – and are highest at – the true reform date. This
supports the idea that the discontinuous change in job separations is indeed caused by the severance-pay
reform rather than by some other event or intervention. (See text for details.)
immediately after the policy change. We document the absence of a discontinuous change
at the policy threshold in the following characteristics: employment levels (at various
dates before the mass layoﬀ); absolute and relative sizes of the subsequent mass layoﬀs;
absolute and relative employment reductions in the last two years before the mass layoﬀ
(not counting employment reduction associated with the mass layoﬀ).
Overall, we argue that the empirical evidence supports our identification strategy. We
conclude that the contrast of mobility outcomes at the policy threshold provides a valid
empirical design to identify the causal eﬀect of the severance-pay policy change on job
mobility.
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Robustness. The above main results on the eﬀect of the severance-pay reform on job
mobility are obtained from a specific sample of workers: Workers who were hired by firms
which subsequently experienced a mass layoﬀ. The definition of a mass layoﬀ was an
employment reduction of 33 percent (between months t and t + 1), which is clearly an
arbitrary number. In Figure 4.7 we check whether our main results are robust to the
definition of a “mass layoﬀ”. The figures provides estimates for the RD coeﬃcients when
a mass layoﬀ is defined as an employment reduction of x percent or more, where we let
x vary from an employment reduction (between months t and t+ 1) of 10 percent to 100
percent (i.e. a plant closure). Panel (a) shows that the estimated reform eﬀect on all
separations increases in x, at least over the range x = 10 to x = 60 percent. This is in line
with incentives: A higher x means a higher layoﬀ probability for the average worker in the
sample. Hence, under the old system, a higher x is associated with a stronger incentive
to wait for a layoﬀ with severance pay. In contrast, in the new system workers with an
increased layoﬀ probability will move to new jobs quickly. Panels (b) and (c) show that,
indeed, the reform eﬀect is mainly driven by higher job-to-job moves and to a smaller
extent by increased transitions to unemployment. For mass layoﬀ definitions with x > 60
percent, the reform eﬀect levels oﬀ, mainly due to fewer transitions to unemployment,
while the reform eﬀect on job-to-job moves remains large.
One potentially important reason that could invalidate the RD design is that the
responses of firms and workers in our baseline sample are the results of changing macroe-
conomic conditions or of seasonality. To explore this hypothesis we replicate our main
results of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for a sample of “matched control workers”. Matched controls
are hired by a firm that did not subsequently experience a mass layoﬀ. The matching
procedure was implemented as follows. For each worker in the baseline sample, we look
for exact matches in terms of the following characteristics: hired in the same quarter and
stayed on the job for at least 12 months; same gender; same region (9 “Bundeslaender”);
same industry (21 categories); same age decile. If we obtain multiple controls, we take
the one with the closest propensity score based on experience, experience squared, em-
ployment status in the four quarters preceding the current job, and decile of the starting
wage. 4.5 percent (out of 28,099) workers in the baseline sample could not be matched
and were dropped. We end up with 26,841 matched pairs.
The graphs show no significant upward jump at the reform threshold. If at all, we see
a slight reduction in job mobility at the date of the policy change. However, the jumps are
very small and not statistically significant. We conclude that these results are in line with
the incentives created by the policy change. By construction, matched control workers
have a low probability of being fired and hence to do not have a strong incentive to wait
for a layoﬀ with severance pay. Hence we expect them not to be strongly aﬀected by the
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Figure 4.7: Results by alternative definitions of a mass layoﬀ
(a) All job separations
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(b) Transitions to a new job (JTJ)
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(c) Transitions to unemployment (JTU)
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Note: The figures provides estimates for the RD coeﬃcients when a mass layoﬀ is defined as an em-
ployment reduction of x percent or more between months t and t + 1. (In the baseline sample, the
required employment reduction is x = 33 percent). Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications),
clustered at the firm level. Results show that the reform eﬀect on all separations increases in x (over
the range x = 10 to x = 60 percent). This is in line with incentives: A higher x means a higher layoﬀ
probability of the average worker in the sample. Hence, under the old system, a higher x is associated
with a stronger incentive to wait for a layoﬀ (with severance pay). In contrast, in the new system workers
with an increased layoﬀ probability move to new jobs quickly. Panel (b) shows that, indeed, the reform
eﬀect is mainly driven by higher job-to-job moves and to a smaller extent by increased transitions to
unemployment (panel (c)). Beyond x = 60 percent, the reform eﬀect levels oﬀ, mainly due to fewer
transitions to unemployment, while the reform eﬀect on job-to-job moves remains large. (See text for
details.)
severance-pay reform.
In Table 4.4 we compare RD estimates of the reform eﬀect on job mobility in the
baseline sample (column 1) to “matched control” workers (column 2) and then conduct a
diﬀ-in-diﬀ RD analysis (column 3). The RD diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimates are in line with previous
results and confirm the hypothesis that the new system generates a stronger incentive to
move to a new job for workers with a high firing probability (baseline sample)—but not
for other workers (matched controls).
We report further robustness checks in Table 4.5, which are based on alternative
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Figure 4.8: Reform eﬀect on workers not in a mass-layoﬀ firm (“matched controls”)
(a) All job separations
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(b) Transitions to a new job (JTJ)
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(c) Transitions to unemployment (JTU)
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Note: The figures replicate Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for a sample of “matched control workers” hired by a firm
that did not subsequently experience a mass layoﬀ. For each worker in the baseline sample, we look for
exact matches in terms of the following characteristics: hired in the same quarter and stayed on the job
for at least 12 months; same gender; same region (9 “Bundeslaender”); same industry (21 categories);
same age decile. If we obtain multiple controls, we take the one with the closest propensity score based
on experience, experience squared, employment status in the four quarters preceding the current job,
and decile of the starting wage. 4.5 percent (out of 28,099 workers) in the baseline sample could not be
matched and were dropped. We end up with 26,841 matched pairs. Inference is based on a bootstrap
(1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. The graphs confirm the hypothesis that matched control
workers (who, by construction, have a low probability of being fired and hence to do not have a strong
incentive to wait for a layoﬀ with severance pay) were not aﬀected by the severance pay reform.
samples of workers hired by mass-layoﬀ firms. Panel A repeats the results of the our
baseline sample for comparison, Panel B splits the baseline sample by gender. In Table
3 above, we have seen that the percentage female was the only variable which showed
a marginally significant discontinuous change at the policy threshold—under the new
regime, fewer women were hired by firms with a subsequent mass layoﬀ. However, the
results in Panel B show that reform eﬀects are almost equally large for females as for
males. In particular, transitions to new jobs are aﬀected almost equally, while for women
but not for men, there is an increase transitions to unemployment.
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Table 4.4: RD diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimates: baseline workers vs matched controls
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Control Treatment - Control
Panel A: All exits
Post-reform 0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.0175 0.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.0384) (0.0245) (0.0437)
Pre-reform mean 0.316 0.419 0.367
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.393 -0.0417 0.385
Panel B: Job-to-Job
Post-reform 0.0785⇤⇤⇤ -0.0144 0.0929⇤⇤⇤
(0.0215) (0.0227) (0.0302)
Pre-reform mean 0.136 0.193 0.165
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.575 -0.0744 0.564
Panel C: Job-to-Unemployment
Post-reform 0.0421⇤⇤ -0.0100 0.0522⇤
(0.0214) (0.0147) (0.0267)
Pre-reform mean 0.156 0.199 0.177
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean 0.271 -0.0504 0.294
Specification
Bandwidth(quarters) 24 24 24
Linear Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26841 26841 53682
Note: The table compares RD estimates for workers in the baseline sample (column 1) to “matched
control” workers (column 2) and conducts a diﬀ-in-diﬀ RD analysis (column 3). Matched controls are
workers hired by a firm that did not subsequently experience a mass layoﬀ. For each worker in the
baseline sample, we look for exact matches in terms of the following characteristics: hired in the same
quarter and stayed on the job for at least 12 months; same gender; same region (9 “Bundeslaender”);
same industry (21 categories); same age decile. If we obtain multiple controls, we take the one with
the closest propensity score based on experience, experience squared, employment status in the four
quarters preceding the current job, and decile of the starting wage. 4.5 percent (out of 28,099 workers)
in the baseline sample could not be matched and were dropped. We end up with 26,841 matched pairs.
Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. The RD diﬀ-in-diﬀ
estimates are in line with previous results and confirm the hypothesis that the new system generates a
stronger incentive to move to a new job for workers with a high firing probability (baseline sample)—but
not for other workers (matched controls).
Panel C varies the selection of workers entering firms before a mass layoﬀ. In our
baseline specification, we look at workers entering 3 to 4 years before a mass layoﬀ. If
we either look at workers entering 3 to 3.5 years before (6 months) or 3 to 5 years before
(24 months), we find a significant increase in all separations, the larger part of which is
again due to higher transitions to a new job. However, we find a somewhat larger eﬀect
on transitions to unemployment.
In Panel D we present RD estimates when we increase the employment reduction
criterion for a mass layoﬀ to 66 percent and 100 percent, largely mirroring the previous
graphical analysis in Figure 4.7. We continue to find a large reform eﬀects on job separa-
tions, which are entirely driven by a higher incidence of job-to-job moves. Transitions to
unemployment are small and insignificant.
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Table 4.5: RD estimates: further robustness checks
All exits JTJ JTU Observations
Panel A: Baseline Results
Baseline coeﬃcient 0.125⇤⇤⇤ 0.0803⇤⇤⇤ 0.0414⇤ 28099
(0.0371) (0.0200) (0.0220)
Panel B: According to gender
Only male 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 0.0726⇤⇤⇤ 0.0363 13775
(0.0426) (0.0251) (0.0272)
Only female 0.127⇤⇤⇤ 0.0788⇤⇤⇤ 0.0571⇤⇤ 14324
(0.0428) (0.0235) (0.0257)
Panel C: According to width of mass layoﬀ window
24 months 0.0967⇤⇤⇤ 0.0569⇤⇤⇤ 0.0336⇤⇤ 53550
(0.0263) (0.0149) (0.0156)
6 months 0.156⇤⇤⇤ 0.0991⇤⇤⇤ 0.0564⇤ 14677
(0.0456) (0.0233) (0.0303)
Panel D: According to size of mass layoﬀ
At least 66% reduction 0.0921⇤⇤ 0.0873⇤⇤⇤ -0.00176 20576
(0.0409) (0.0275) (0.0210)
Firm closure 0.0962⇤⇤⇤ 0.0720⇤⇤⇤ 0.0222 13011
(0.0292) (0.0187) (0.0193)
Panel E: According to distance to mass layoﬀ, exit by one month before mass layoﬀ window
Entry 24 – 35 months before mass layoﬀ 0.00677 0.00219 -0.00347 26244
(0.0191) (0.0137) (0.0116)
Entry 48 – 59 months before mass layoﬀ 0.0880⇤⇤ 0.0519⇤⇤⇤ 0.0275 26668
(0.0371) (0.0201) (0.0210)
Panel F: According to minimum firm size 1 month before mass layoﬀ
At least 15 employees 0.108⇤⇤⇤ 0.0696⇤⇤⇤ 0.0337⇤ 34182
(0.0344) (0.0183) (0.0201)
At least 60 employees 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.0856⇤⇤⇤ 0.0479⇤ 22860
(0.0427) (0.0235) (0.0257)
Note: The robustness checks are based on alternative samples of workers hired by mass-layoﬀ firms. Panel
A repeats the results based on our baseline sample for comparison, Panel B splits the baseline sample
by gender, Panel C varies the selection of workers entering firms before a mass layoﬀ. In our baseline
specification, we look at workers entering 3 to 4 years before a mass layoﬀ, while we now consider either
workers entering 3 to 3.5 years before (6 months) or 3 to 5 years before (24 months). Panel D increases
the required employment reduction to 66 percent and 100 percent (sticking to the baseline time window
of 1 month). Panel E varies the sample selection criterion for workers. In the baseline, we select workers
that entered the firm 36-47 months before the subsequent mass layoﬀ, in Panel E this time interval is
changed to 24-35 and 48-57 months, respectively. Finally, Panel F varies the sample selection criterion
for mass layoﬀ firms. In the baseline, we include only firms that had at least 30 employees one month
prior to the mass layoﬀ; in Panel F we change minimum firm size to 15 and 60 employees, respectively.
Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. The robustness checks
confirm the baseline result. The severance pay reform leads to higher job separations—mainly because
of higher job-to-job transitions under the new system.
Panel E varies the sample selection criterion for workers. In the baseline, we select
workers that entered the firm 36-47 months before the subsequent mass layoﬀ, in Panel
E this time interval is changed to 24-35 and 48-57 months, respectively. We change the
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treatment variable to, respectively, “left the firm before tenure 24 months” or “48 months”.
Interestingly, we do not find any significant eﬀect of the reform on job mobility of workers
who entered the firm 24-35 months before the mass layoﬀ. Recall that workers became
eligible for the severance payment only after at least 36 months of tenure. Since the mass
layoﬀ already took place before these workers became eligible for the severance pay, we
should actually not expect any reform eﬀect for this group. In contrast, workers who
entered 48-57 months before the mass layoﬀ had this incentive—and for them, we see a
similar response as in the baseline sample.
Finally, Panel F of Table 5 varies the sample selection criterion for mass layoﬀ firms.
In the baseline, we include only firms that had at least 30 employees one month prior
to the mass layoﬀ; in Panel F we change minimum firm size to 15 and 60 employees,
respectively. The robustness checks confirm the baseline result. The severance pay reform
leads to higher job separations—mainly because of higher job-to-job transitions under the
new system.
Further results. Figure 9 and Table 6 suggest that the wage increases among job
changes (JTJ transitions) are smaller under the new regime. This is in line with incentives,
as workers waiting for a future severance payment require higher outside oﬀers to be
induced to switch jobs. However, while the point estimates are consistently negative and
of a similar order of magnitude, they are not very precisely estimates and statistically
insignificant in most cases. One potential reason for this might be that we have to restrict
our sample to a small subset (N = 4280) as we have to concentrate on workers having
left before the mass layoﬀ by a JTJ transition.
Figure 4.10 and Table 4.7 look at the incentive to wait for retirement. As explained
above, workers subject to the old system were eligible for a severance pay of at least 4
monthly wages if they quit into retirement with at least ten years of tenure. Thus, old-
system workers close to retirement, unlike new-system workers, should have an incentive
to stay with the current employer until retirement. In order to explore this question, we
consider workers aged 40 to 51 when entering a job (early retirement age is 55 (60) for
women (men), while women (men) become eligible for old age pensions at 60 (65)), and
look at the fraction employed for at least 10 years. Since under the old system also quits
were eligible, we do not condition on a subsequent mass layoﬀ and instead use the entire
sample. We do not find any statistically or economically significant results.
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Figure 4.9: Wage growth of job changers (JTJ), by date of job start
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Note: The figure reports the diﬀerence in log earnings in the new job and the previous job (in the mass-
layoﬀ firm). Only workers classified as job-to-job changers leaving the firm before the mass layoﬀ occurs
are considered. Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. Under
the old system, the incentive to change jobs is lower because voluntary quitters give up their severance
pay option. Under the new system, voluntary quitters do not suﬀer such a loss. Hence, lower wage
increases are required to induce new-system workers to accept outside job oﬀers. The figure shows that
there is indeed at negative jump in average wage growth of job changes at the reform date (2003q1),
although the eﬀect is not statistically significant.
Table 4.6: Wage growth of job changers (JTJ), RD estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-reform -0.0457⇤ -0.0433 -0.0274 -0.0564 -0.0383
(0.099) (0.251) (0.261) (0.172) (0.349)
Linear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic No Yes No No No
Controls No No Yes No Yes
Bandwidth (quarters) 24 24 24 8 8
Observations 4280 4280 4280 1435 1435
Note: The table reports the RD estimate of the eﬀect of the severance pay reform on the diﬀerence in
log earnings between the new job and the previous job (in the mass-layoﬀ firm). Only workers classified
as job-to-job changers leaving the firm before the mass layoﬀ occurs are included in the regression. The
hypothesis is that, under the new system, lower wages increases are required to induce workers to accept
an outside oﬀer. The estimated reform eﬀect is indeed negative (though not statistically significant) in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level, are reported in
parentheses. Controls are gender, age, age squared, experience, experience squared, Austrian nationality,
log firm size 24 months before mass layoﬀ, manufacturing sector, Vienna, and quarter of job entry.
⇤(p < 0.10), ⇤ ⇤ (p < 0.05), ⇤ ⇤ ⇤(p < 0.01)
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Figure 4.10: Probability of tenure larger than 10 years, by date of job start
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Note: The figure explores whether the severance-pay reform aﬀected the incentive to wait for retirement.
Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000 replications), clustered at the firm level. Under the old system,
workers were eligible for severance pay if they quit the job for retirement, thus there was an incentive
to wait for retirement at the firm. The graph looks at workers between 40 and 51 years old who started
a new job in the respective quarter. Outcome variable is an indicator whether the job lasted for more
than 10 years. The underlying sample includes all job starters (and does not condition on a subsequent
mass layoﬀ). The figure does not indicate any major discontinuity at the reform date. If at all, there is
an upward jump in the probability to stay with the firm for more than 10 years. This suggests that the
abolished incentive to wait for retirement of the reform did not result in lower tenure for workers close
to retirement that are subject to the new system.
Table 4.7: Dependent variable: Probability of tenure < 10 years (age at entry between 40
and 51 years)
All exits JTJ JTU
Estimated coeﬃcient -0.00613 0.00296 -0.00909
(0.0113) (0.00613) (0.00950)
Linear Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform mean 0.807 0.247 0.560
Eﬀect relative to pre-reform mean -0.008 0.012 -0.016
Bandwidth (quarters) 24 24 24
Observations 299975 299975 299975
Note: The table reports the coeﬃcient  1 from a linear probability model based on equation (4.1). The
dependent variable is an indicator taking the value 1 if a worker stays with the firm for at least 10 years.
We consider workers aged 40 to 51 at the time of the job start, bu do not restrict to firm experiencing
mass layoﬀs. The results indicate no statistically or economically significant response. Standard errors
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) and clustered at firm level. Controls are gender, age, age squared,
experience, experience squared, Austrian nationality, log firm size 24 months before the mass layoﬀ, and
indicators for manufacturing sector, Vienna, and quarter of job entry; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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4.6 A Model of the Severance Payment Reform
In this section we will try to rationalize our previous empirical findings using a simple
model of the severance payment reform.
Environment. Time is discrete. There is a continuum of risk-neutral workers of mass
1 who are either employed or unemployed. Production features constant returns to scale.
If employed, a worker produces with productivity p 2 ⇥p, p⇤.7 Productivity at the firm-
level evolves according to a Markov process and is i.i.d. across firms. At the beginning
of a period, firms can dissolve matches. In this case, a payment  has to be made to
the worker, if he is eligible. Workers in a match start out as non-eligible and become
eligible with probability ↵ every period. At the end of a period, workers receive outside
oﬀers with endogenous probability  f , where   denotes employees’ search eﬀort relative
to the unemployed, and decide whether to accept them (in which case they do not receive
a payment  ). In addition, matches are dissolved exogenously with probability  . The
unemployed receive benefits b every period, meet vacant firms with probability f and
decide whether to accept their oﬀer.
Everyone can set up a firm, meaning that vacancies have value zero ex-ante. Vacant
firms draw initial productivity from the unconditional productivity distribution and either
meet unemployed or employed workers with some (endogenous) probability. These workers
will then decide whether to accept the firms oﬀer or turn it down. Wages are set by Nash
bargaining.
Firm and worker decisions. The model makes predictions regarding the firms’ de-
cision to close down and the workers’ decision to accept outside oﬀers. We denote by
 i(p) 2 {0, 1} the endogenous firm closure decision given productivity p and eligibity
status i of the worker, where i takes the value 1 if a worker is eligible for severance pay.
Moreover, let µji (p, po) indicate the endogenous decision of a worker with current eligi-
bility status i employed by a firm facing productivity p to accept an outside oﬀer by a
firm facing productivity po where she will have eligibility status j. Given our assumption
that a worker turns eligible with probability ↵ every period, the overall probability that
a worker accepts an outside oﬀer given productivity p and eligibility status i is given by
µ¯i(p) =
Z p
p
↵µ1i (p, p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0i (p, po) dG(po),
7In the following, we will refer to the state variable p as “productivity”. A diﬀerent interpretation
would be that firms are subject to demand shocks, which could be captured by assuming that a worker
produces one unit per period which is sold at price p. This would not change the model in any way.
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where G(po) denotes the distribution of outside oﬀers, i.e. the unconditional produc-
tivity distribution. Similarly, denote by µju(po) the endogenous decision by an unemployed
worker to accept an oﬀer by a firm facing productivity po where she will have eligibility
status j and define the overall probability as
µ¯u =
Z p
p
↵µ1u(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0u(po) dG(po).
Bellman equations. Denote by J0(p) and J1(p) the value of a firm employing a non-
eligible or eligible worker, respectively, and facing productivity p. Likewise, denote by
W0(p) and W1(p) the value of a non-eligible or eligible worker, respectively, employed by
a firm with productivity p. We assume that firms have to pay  to an eligible worker if
bargaining breaks down. As the value of a vacancy is 0, firms’ outside value is 0  =   .
Workers’ outside value is U +  .8 The common surplus, S1(p) is then given by
S1(p) = (W1(p)  (U +  )) + (J1(p)  (  )) = W1(p)  U + J1(p).
Nash bargaining implies
W1(p)  (U +  ) =  S1(p) and J1(p) +  = (1   )S1(p),
where   denotes workers’ bargaining power. Similarly, the surplus if the worker is not
eligible, S0(p), is given by
S0(p) = W0(p)  U + J0(p)
and
W0(p)  U =  S0(p) and J0(p) = (1   )S0(p).
All equilibrium objects can be characterized as functions of the surplus functions. In
Appendix B we specify the workers’ and firms’ Bellman equations. Denote by   the dis-
count rate, and by F (p0|p) the conditional distribution of a future productivity realization
p0 given that current productivity is p. Using the bargaining assumption, we show that
the surplus functions satisfy (throughout, primes denote next period values)
S1(p) = p  b+  fO1(p) +  (1      fµ¯1(p))
Z p
p
(1   1(p0))S1(p0)dF (p0|p) (4.2)
8 One potential alternative assumption adopted by Saint-Paul (1995) is to assume U and   for
the workers’ and firms’ outside values, respectively, based on the rationale that each party receives the
payment she would receive if having initiated the separation. This coordination failure can lead to
multiple equilibria and proved to be less stable in the structural estimation to follow. We thus opted
for the more parsimonious approach. However, the basic mechanism still goes through, as we discuss in
footnote 10.
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and
S0(p) = p  b+  fO0(p)
+  (1      fµ¯0(p))
Z p
p
↵(1   1(p0))S1(p0) + (1  ↵)(1   0(p0))S0(p0)dF (p0|p). (4.3)
Both surplus functions consist of a flow payoﬀ p   b, the workers’ object value due
to potential job-to-job transitions  fOi(p), as well as the continuation value, taking into
account exogenous and endogenous separations. The object values satisfy
Oi(p) =
Z p
p
↵( µ1i (p, p
o) µ1u(po))( S1(po)+ )+(1 ↵)( µ0i (p, po) µ0u(po)) S0(po) dG(po),
where i 2 {0, 1}.
A firm with a non-eligible or eligible worker shuts down if J0(p) < 0 or J1(p) <   ,
respectively. Using the bargaining assumption, the decision rules to shut down the firm,
 0 and  1, are hence given by
 0 = 1 {S0 < 0} and  1 = 1 {S1 < 0} .
That is, due to the bargaining assumption, it does not matter whether we think of a
lay-oﬀ as firm- or worker-induced, since both parties choose to shut down the firm as soon
as the joint surplus falls below zero.
Moreover, a worker receiving an outside oﬀer trades oﬀ the outside value, given by
either W0(po) or W1(po), against the value of staying, given byZ p
p
 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0) dF (p0|p)
if eligible orZ p
p
↵ [ 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0)]+(1 ↵) [ 0(p0)U + (1   0(p0))W0(p0)] dF (p0|p)
if non-eligible. Using the bargaining assumption, we can easily show that the decision
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rules of the worker satisfy
µ00(p, p
o) =1
(
 S0(p
o) > ↵ +
Z p
p
↵(1   1(p0)) S1(p0) + (1  ↵)(1   0(p0)) S0(p0) dF (p0|p)
)
µ10(p, p
o) =1
(
 S1(p
o) +  > ↵ +
Z p
p
↵(1   1(p0)) S1(p0) + (1  ↵)(1   0(p0)) S0(p0) dF (p0|p)
)
µ01(p, p
o) =1
(
 S0(p
o) >  +
Z p
p
(1   1(p0)) S1(p0) dF (p0|p)
)
µ11(p, p
o) =1
(
 S1(p
o) +  >  +
Z p
p
(1   1(p0)) S1(p0) dF (p0|p)
)
.
 enters the decision rules in a very transparent way. Clearly, a higher  makes
workers more reluctant to switch jobs when eligible. Figure 4.11 gives a summary of the
model’s predictions regarding worker behavior before and after the reform:9 Before the
reform, a worker had to be compensated for forgoing a severance payment and hence a
firm making an outside oﬀer had to have a much higher productivity. After the reform,
workers are also willing to move to firms that are weakly more productive.
Figure 4.11: Oﬀer acceptance rule before and after the reform (eligible workers)
(a) Pre-reform
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(b) Post-reform
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Note: The plots show the acceptance rule of outside oﬀers for eligible workers given productivity of the
current employer and productivity of the outside firm. The plots are outcomes of the estimated model
to be described later in the text.
The decision rules for the unemployed are given by
µ0u =1 { S0(po) > 0}
µ1u =1 { S1(po) +  > 0} .
9Figures 4.11 and 4.12 have been generated using the parameterization based on the baseline estimates
described later on.
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How can a severance payment have an eﬀect in our setting? First, note that absent
endogenous job-to-job transitions by workers, the surplus equations would not be aﬀected
by severance payments. Due to Nash bargaining, the wages would completely oﬀset the
eﬀect, which is reminiscent of the Lazear (1990) result. Even if we allowed for job-to-
job mobility, severance pay would be inconsequential if eligibility for severance pay was
universal—the special case ↵ = 1 in our model—as is usually assumed when modeling
lay-oﬀ taxes. In this case, severance pay would again just correspond to a deferred pay-
ment and be oﬀset by wages. However, mirroring a prominent feature of most severance
payment rules around the world, we assume that eligibility relates to tenure. This breaks
the neutrality result, as severance pay is allowed to aﬀect worker mobility: Currently
eligible workers know that they will lose their eligibility status with probability 1  ↵ in
any outside oﬀer, in which case their outside value drops from U +  to U , while firms
outside value increases from   to 0, leading to a lower bargained value ceteris paribus.
Hence, workers facing a high  are more reluctant to accept outside oﬀers.10
How does this feed back into the firm closure decisions, the second important behav-
ioral margin of the model? The eﬀect of higher worker mobility on the surplus is generally
ambiguous: To get some intuition, consider the eﬀect of an increase in µ01 and µ11 on S1(p),
assuming they will move back to their old values in the subsequent period:
 S1(p) =   f
Z p
p
↵ µ11(p, p
o)
"
 S1(p
o) +   
Z p
p
(1   1(p0))S1(p0)dF (p0|p)
#
+ (1  ↵) µ01(p, po)
"
 S0(p
o) 
Z p
p
(1   1(p0))S1(p0)dF (p0|p)
#
dG(po)
As is apparent, the sign of the eﬀect depends on how  S1(po) + or  S0(po) compare
to the continuation surplus in the current firm. On the one hand, a moving worker only
takes into account her part of the surplus in the decision, while ignoring the part accruing
to the firm. On the other hand, the worker’s part of an outside oﬀer might still be more
than the entire expected surplus in the current firm if the current surplus is very low.
10 This is the crucial link in the model which would be preserved even if we used Saint-Paul (1995)’s
assumption discussed in footnote 8. While in our case the surplus of workers relative to the surplus of
firms is given by
W   U =  
1    J +
 
1    ,
the respective expression following Saint-Paul (1995) reads
W   U =  
1    J +
 
1    .
Hence, even if their outside value is not aﬀected, workers still manage to improve their bargaining position
with a high  as the firms’ outside value is lower.
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Given a high worker mobility, workers in bad matches realize they have a high option
value. They will rebate part of this option value to their employer by accepting lower
wages. This implies that firms facing low prices can survive by paying lower wages. While
the former would tend to lead to a lower surplus, the latter would increase the surplus. In
Figure 4.12, we plot the policy function for a firm with an eligible worker implied by our
baseline estimates.11 As is apparent, given the 101-state grid we apply, the two eﬀects
cancel each other out and the firm’s policy function is unaﬀected.
Figure 4.12: Probability of mass layoﬀ before and after the reform
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Note: This figure shows the optimal decision to close down as function of productivity for a firm with an
eligible worker,  1(p). As explained later in the text,  1(p) has to be smoothed for the estimation. The
graph is obtained by re-dichotomizing the smoothed policy function using the rule 1 [ 1(p) > 0.5].
Stationary employment distribution. In order to derive the zero-profit condition,
which involves the probability of meeting a worker currently employed at a firm with
productivity p, we need to solve for the stationary productivity distribution. In particular,
denote by n0(p) and n1(p) the stationary number of non-eligible and eligible workers
employed at a firm with current productivity p. Since there is a unit measure of workers,
the unemployment rate satisfies u = 1  R pp n0(p) + n1(p) dp.
n0(p) and n1(p) satisfy the following properties: For all p0 2
⇥
p, p
⇤
,
n0(p
0) = (1   0(p0))(1  ↵)
Z p
p
(1   fµ¯0(p)   )n0(p)f(p0|p) dp
+ (1  ↵)fuµ0u(p0)g(p0) + (1  ↵) f
Z p
p
(n0(p)µ
0
0(p, p
0) + n1(p)µ01(p, p
0))g(p0) dp (4.4)
11As we will explain later on, we smooth the policy functions following standard practices to make
estimation feasible. To produce Figure 4.12, we re-dichotomized the continuous  1(p) using the rule
1 [ 1(p) > 0.5]. The smoothed  1(p) before and after the reform are not entirely equal, but the diﬀerence
is minimal, leading to unchanged dichotomized policy functions.
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and
n1(p
0) = (1   1(p0))
Z p
p
(1   fµ¯1(p)   )n1(p)f(p0|p) dp
+ ↵fuµ1u(p
0)g(p0) + ↵ f
Z p
p
(n0(p)µ
1
0(p, p
0) + n1(p)µ11(p, p
0))g(p0) dp
+ (1   1(p0))↵
Z p
p
(1   fµ¯0(p)   )n0(p)f(p0|p) dp, (4.5)
where g(p) is the p.d.f. of initial productivity draws. A non-eligible worker currently
employed at a firm with productivity p0 was either employed at the firm before and not
laid oﬀ, or entered it from unemployment or a diﬀerent job. An eligible worker was either
employed before or promoted to be eligible.
Zero profit condition. The number of meetings between a vacant firm and a potential
employee is determined by the meeting function
m = m(u+  (1  u), v),
where v denotes the number of vacancies. Define labor market tightness ✓ ⌘ vu+ (1 u) .
Assuming that m(u+  (1  u), v) satisfies constant returns to scale, we can write for the
probability that a vacant firm meets a worker, q,
q =
m
v
= m(✓ 1, 1) ⌘ q(✓) with q0(✓) < 0.
The probability of meeting an unemployed person is given by qu/(u+  (1  u)), whereas
the probability of meeting an employed person is given by q (1  u)/(u+ (1  u)). The
probability that an unemployed person meets a firm, f , can be written
f =
m
u+  (1  u) = m(1, ✓) ⌘ f(✓) with f
0(✓) > 0,
while the probability that an employed person meets a firm is given by  f .
Denote by ai(po) the probability that, upon meeting an unemployed or employed
worker, an oﬀer by a firm with initial productivity po and status i 2 {0, 1} is accepted. It
is given by
ai(p
o) =
u
u+  (1  u) · µ
i
u(p
o) +
 (1  u)
u+  (1  u) ·
R p
p n0(p)µ
i
0(p, p
o) + n1(p)µi1(p, p
o)dp
1  u ,
where the first term is the conditional probability of meeting an unemployed worker
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times the probability that the worker accepts, while the second term is the conditional
probability of meeting a currently employed worker times the probability that she will
accept the outside oﬀer.
The expected value of a vacancy, V , satisfies
V =  c+  q(✓)
Z p
p
(1  ↵)a0(po)J0(po) + ↵a1(po)J1(po) dG(po).
A vacant firm pays hiring costs c every period. With probability q the firm meets a
potential worker and draws initial productivity po from the distribution G(po), while the
worker becomes eligible with probability ↵. If the oﬀer is accepted, the firm can start
producing in the subsequent period, yielding value Ji(po).
Due to free entry, a vacancy has to yield zero expected profits, i.e. V = 0. In terms
of the surplus functions, this implies
c
 q(✓)
=
Z p
p
(1  ↵)a0(po)(1   )S0(po) + ↵a1(po)((1   )S1(po)   ) dG(po) (4.6)
pinning down ✓, q, and f . We have to point out one subtlety here: If ↵ or  are
very large, the right-hand side of (4.6) is not guaranteed to be positive. Indeed, given
extremely high firing restrictions, firms may not find it worthwhile to post vacancies. In
this case, an equilibrium is not defined.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, firms and workers have rational expectations and choose
their strategies optimally, meaning that the surplus functions S0(p) and S1(p) solve the
recursive equations (4.2) and (4.3). Moreover, vacancies yield zero profit, taking as given
optimal behavior by firms and workers and the stationary employment distribution. Def-
inition 4.1 summarizes the equilibrium conditions.
Definition 4.1. An equilibrium is given by functions {n0(p), n1(p)}, values {S0(p), S1(p)}
and labor market tightness ✓ such that
1. {S0(p), S1(p)} solve the recursive equations (4.2) and (4.3);
2. {n0(p), n1(p)} solve the recursive equations (4.4) and (4.5);
3. labor market tightness ✓ solves the zero-profit condition (4.6).
Note that the bargaining assumption is not as restrictive as it might appear. In
particular, the model’s structure does not require bargaining every period. In fact, the
equilibrium is only aﬀected by   due to the formation of new matches: On the one hand,
the surplus functions depend on   as it determines the share of the new match surplus
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which is captured by workers when they move to a new job. On the other hand, firms’
vacancy creation depends on their share of the surplus. It does not matter, however,
whether this share of the match is preserved in ongoing matches every period, since the
definition of the equilibrium will not be aﬀected. Instead, we can interpret   as the
share of the match surplus that a worker expects to receive on average over all future
periods when entering a new match. The only additional assumption we need then is that
renegotiation takes place if either margin of the bargaining range is hit (see Malcomson
(1997)).
Transition. Definition 4.1 allows us to derive steady states for the pre- and post-reform
period given a set of parameters. However, given that we compare workers close to the
reform cutoﬀ in our RDD setting, a comparison of steady states might not give us useful
predictions. Indeed, two workers, one of them having entered in December 2002 and the
other in January 2003, arguably face very similar outside opportunities when the firm is
close to a mass layoﬀ about three years later. Moreover, while the pre-reform steady state
presumes that workers expect to stay in the old system forever, a worker in an old-system
match having surpassed the reform threshold knows that any future match will be subject
to the new system.
To account for these issues, we will have to allow for the transition between the old and
the new steady state. To see how this can be done, first note that labor market tightness is
the only state variable on the macro level. As the economy moves from the old to the new
steady state, labor market tightness moves from its old to its new equilibrium value. If we
fix ✓ and hence f , all policy functions characterizing firms’ and workers’ optimal behavior
follow in partial equilibrium, as can be seen from equations (4.2) and (4.3). New-system
workers know that any future match will also be subject to the new system and hence
their Bellman equations do not change. Old-system workers, on the other hand, take into
account that they switch to the new system in any new match. For instance, denoting by
tilde values in transition and calling S˜new(po) the surplus of a match with a new-system
worker, the surplus of an eligible old-system worker in transition satisfies
S˜old1 (p) = p  b+  f
Z p
p
( µ˜old1 (p, p
o)  µ˜u(po)) S˜new(po) dG(po)
+  (1      f ¯˜µold1 (p))
Z p
p
(1   ˜old1 (p0))S˜old1 (p0)dF (p0|p).
In Appendix B, we show in detail how the recursive equations are aﬀected.12
12Note that we still have to make a simplification here: We fix ✓ at one intermediate value, while
in reality workers should take into account the actual future transition to the new steady state. Apart
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4.7 Structural Estimation
Model specification. We estimate the model by Simulated Method of Moments. That
is, after choosing functional forms and fixing part of the parameters of the model, we use
the model to simulate artificial data sets. We then require the parameters of the model
to minimize the distance between specific moments of the actual and the simulated data.
Periodicity is set to one month. We assume that productivity evolves according to
log pt = ⇢ log pt 1 + "t,
where "t ⇠ N (0,  2"). We approximate this process by a 101-state Markov chain using the
algorithm due to Tauchen (1986). The meeting function is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas
form, i.e.
m(u+  (1  u), v) = m0(u+  (1  u)) v1  .
We have to choose part of the parameters exogenously, for several reasons: The level
of the severance payment and the probability of becoming eligible,  and ↵, are dictated
by the institutional setting. In reality, severance payments are indexed to the monthly
wage before the layoﬀ. In order to approximate this rule, we index the severance payment
to w1(p˜), where p˜ is the lowest level of productivity for which  1(p) = 0. We then have
 =  ww1(p˜), where we set  w = 2 to match two monthly wages for the time before the
reform, while setting  w = 0 after the reform. Moreover, we set ↵ = 1/36 to match an
average waiting time until eligibility of three years.
Other parameters are not identified separately from other parameters of the model or
typically hard to estimate. However, we find them reasonably constrained by previous
choices in the literature. We set   = 0.997, which yields an annual interest rate of
approximately 4%. We follow Hall and Milgrom (2008) in choosing b = 0.71. The meeting
function elasticity   is fixed at 0.6, which is the middle of the range of values reported
by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000). The condition due to Hosios (1990) then provides a
natural choice for workers’ bargaining power and hence we set   = 0.6. Lastly, we need
to fix the autocorrelation of idiosyncratic firm shocks, ⇢, for computational reasons.13 We
choose ⇢ = 0.972, so that the half-life of a shock is two years. Diﬀerent choices for ⇢ yield
from the obvious comment that it should be very hard for workers to correctly predict the equilibrium
response of the labor market, it also turned out in our estimation that the quantitative consequences
when moving from a comparison of steady states to the version allowing for transition are small. Thus,
the results when accounting for the actual transition of ✓ should not be very diﬀerent, either.
13In particular, estimation is computationally feasible as we can keep the same set of stochastic shocks
in every iteration. If we vary the standard deviation of "t, we just have to scale the shocks. If we varied
⇢, by contrast, we would have re-generate the trajectories in every iteration.
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Table 4.8: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Definition Value Source/Target
  Discount rate 0.997 4% annual interest rate
  Workers’ bargaining power 0.600 Hosios (1990) condition
  Elasticity of q w.r.t. ✓ 0.600 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000)
↵ Probability of becoming eligible 0.028 3 years average waiting time
 w Severance payment per previous wage 2.000 2 monthly wages
⇢ Autocorrelation of prices 0.972 Half-life of shock 8 quarters
b Opportunity cost of employment 0.710 Hall and Milgrom (2008)
Note: The table contains the parameter values which are fixed exogenously either based on the institu-
tional setting or based on the literature.
similar results, while we need suﬃcient persistence for the workers to be able to predict
future mass layoﬀs. We summarize the parameter choices in Table 4.8.
Empirical moments. The remaining parameters of the model, that is, the exogenous
separation rate  , the standard deviation of innovations "t,  ", relative search eﬀort of
the employed  , the eﬃciency parameter of the meeting function m0, and hiring costs c
are chosen to match empirical moments.
Figure 4.13: Moments estimated from RDD
(a) Cumulative exit rates (JTJ)
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(b) Cumulative exit rates (JTU)
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Note: The figures plot pre- and post-reform cumulative exit rates (either conditioning on a JTJ or a
JTU transition) calculated from an RDD (see main text for the exact specification). The point estimates
are part of the moments to be fitted. Confidence intervals are based on a bootstrap (1000 replications)
clustered at the firm level.
On the one hand, we require the model to match the observed cumulative exit shares
into unemployment (JTU) and to a new job (JTJ) in the months 23 to 1 before a mass
layoﬀ. As in the empirical section, we classify a transition as JTJ if the intervening period
of unemployment does not exceed 28 days. Of course, this will lead us to misclassify part
of the JTU transitions as JTJ. However, this is not a problem if we apply the same
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definition to the simulated data. In order to identify the exit rates in the data, we include
workers still employed at the firm two years before the mass layoﬀ14 and estimate RDD
regressions of the form
di(t) =  0(t) +  1(t)1 [xi   0] +  2(t)xi +  3(t)xi1 [xi   0] + "i(t),
where di(t) takes the value 1 if worker i has exited the firm t periods before the mass
layoﬀ by a JTU or JTJ transition and xi denotes the normalized start date of the job.
We include 24 quarters to the left and the right of the cutoﬀ and give more weight to
observations close to the cutoﬀ by choosing a triangular kernel. The exit rates before
and after the reform are then identified as  0(t) and  0(t) +  1(t), t 2 {24, . . . , 2}. We
show the resulting patterns in Figure 4.13. We estimate the same RDD specification on
the artificial data generated by the model. Since there is no time dimension, we allocate
xi randomly to individual observations using probability weights according the observed
distribution of start dates in the data.
In addition, we require the model to match certain macro moments: Using the uni-
verse of workers observed in ASSD, we measure a monthly probability of a reduction
in employment by at least 33% of 1.37%15, a monthly job-finding rate of 15%, and an
average unemployment rate (years 1994-2013) of 6.8%. Using survey data on vacancies,
we calculate an average vacancy-unemployment ratio of 0.35 for the years 2009-2015 (we
lack representative data on the years before). Moreover, drawing on evidence in Silva
and Toledo (2009), Elsby and Michaels (2013) require expected hiring costs to equal 14%
of quarterly worker compensation. Here, expected hiring costs are given by c/(q(✓) · a),
where a denotes the unconditional probability that an oﬀer is accepted, and we target the
same number. Since we cannot measure the macro moments separately before and after
the reform due to business cycle eﬀects, we will take an average of the simulated values
before and after the reform.
The exit rates in Figure 4.13 are based on N = 250719 observations (N0 = 140288
before the reform and N1 = 110413 after the reform) of workers in firms in the last two
years before firm closure. For every given set of parameters, we solve for the equilibrium
defined in Definition 4.1 by iterating on the equilibrium conditions pre- and post-reform.
This allows us to simulate aggregate variables as well as policy functions contingent on
being in a firm about to close down. Using these policy functions, we then simulate H
14As we assume constant returns and model one-person firms, our model can only generate firm
closures. For our baseline results, we define the corresponding event in the data to be a mass lay-oﬀ as
defined in the empirical section ( 33 % reduction within one month), but we also estimated the model
only including actual firm closures and the results were broadly in line (results available on request).
15In order to keep the model from choosing a zero probability, we target the log of this probability.
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datasets of size N0 and N1 for the period before and after the reform, respectively, and
estimate the RDD regressions and macro moments based on them.
In total, we target 97 moments (23 monthly exit rates for JTU and JTJ pre- and
post-reform plus five macro moments). Call   ⌘ ( ,  ", ⇠,m0, c) the parameters to be
estimated and m˜( , e) the simulated moments given parameters   and a set of shocks e.
Call m the corresponding vector of empirical moments. We choose   by solving
min
 
(m˜( , e) m)0W (m˜( , e) m) ,
where W is a weighting matrix. Eﬃcient GMM requires setting W equal to the inverse
of variance-covariance matrix of m. Instead, we choose W equal to the identity matrix.16
The reason is that we view the model rather as a description of firms about to experience a
mass layoﬀ than as a representation of the entire economy. We include macro moments to
ensure that the parameters are identified and not unrealistic but do not expect the model
to reproduce macro moments perfectly in line with aggregate data solely using data from
firms experiencing negative shocks. In other words, we do not expect the parameters
describing the behavior of these firms to be perfectly in line with the entire economy.
Since the macro moments are measured with much less variance, eﬃcient GMM will put
much more weight on the macro moments, while our primary interest lies in explaining
worker mobility in declining firms.
A well known problem with Method of Simulated Moments is that the simulated
moments are a discontinuous function of the underlying parameters for a given set of
random shocks, as we have a finite number of observations and discrete outcomes. This
can pose problems to optimization algorithms, leading to non-convergence or convergence
to local optima. Keane and Smith (2003) propose a remedy for this problem in the context
of a random utility model: Suppose that a binary variable yi is 1 if a simulated latent
utility given parameters  , ui( ), is positive and zero otherwise. Instead of using yi to
calculate the simulated moments, they propose using a continuous function of the latent
utility, g(ui; ⇣), where g(ui; ⇣)! yi as ⇣ ! 0. Our choice for g(u; ⇣) is
g(u; ⇣) =  (u/⇣),
where  (·) denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Paralleling this strategy,
we apply this smoothing procedure to all discrete outcomes of the model, i.e. to the policy
functions  0(p),  1(p), µ0(p, po), and µ1(p, po).
There is no clear rule as to which value should be chosen for the smoothing parameter
16We only give weight 0.1 to expected hiring costs, as this is the only moment not based on Austrian
data.
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⇣ and the number of simulated datasets H. Larger values of ⇣ and H lead to a smoother
surface of the objective function, decreasing the risk of local optima where the optimization
algorithm could get stuck. At the same time, increasing ⇣ increases the bias, while a higher
H is more computationally expensive. For the results reported here, we choose H = 5,
which still leads to manageable computation time. We then chose ⇣ so that the objective
function is reasonably smooth.17
Informal discussion of identification. In this section we briefly comment on the
structural features of the model and the variation in the data that helps pin down the
parameters to be estimated.
• Exogenous separation rate: The exogenous separation rate is primarily identified by
the exit rates into unemployment as well as equilibrium unemployment conditional
on the average job-finding rate.
• Standard deviation of innovations: The volatility of firm shocks is primarily pinned
down by the probability of a mass lay-oﬀ, i.e. the probability that the stochastic
process hits a lower threshold.
• Relative search eﬀort of the employed: Conditional on the job-finding rate, the
relative search eﬀort is pinned down by the exits into new jobs.
• Meeting eﬃciency: Meeting eﬃciency is pinned down by labor market tightness and
the job-finding rate.
• Hiring costs: Conditional on the vacancy filling rate, hiring costs are identified by
expected hiring costs per quarter.
While this intuition helps in understanding where the identification comes from, this is of
course no formal criterion. As another check, we conducted extensive Monte-Carlo tests
showing that the estimation mostly succeeds in recovering the true structural parameters.
4.8 Results
The estimated parameter values are presented in column 1 of Table 4.9. We estimate a
monthly exogenous separation rate of 0.98%, which implies an average job duration in
the absence of job-to-job transitions of approximately 8.5 years. Moreover, we estimate
a standard deviation of innovations in idiosyncratic firm heterogeneity of 1.05%, which
together with ⇢ corresponds to an unconditional standard deviation of productivity of
17We choose ⇣ as low as possible. It turned out that ⇣ = 0.2 resulted in a reasonably smooth surface.
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around 19%. Our estimates also imply that the employed have a twenty times lower
probability of getting a job oﬀer. While this might seem very low, we have to point out
that this parameter not only captures diﬀerences in search eﬀort, but also other factors
which lower the probability of job-to-job transitions, such as moving costs, specific human
capital, and so on.18
Table 4.9: Estimates
Specification
Temporary
Parameter Definition Baseline employment
  Exogenous separation rate 0.0098 (0.0001) 0.0098 (0.0001)
 " Standard deviation of innovations 0.0105 (0.0006) 0.0120 (0.0005)
  Relative search eﬀort of the employed 0.0466 (0.0115) 0.0495 (0.0112)
m0 Meeting eﬃciency 0.2527 (0.0076) 0.2140 (0.0068)
c Hiring costs 0.3528 (0.0072) 0.3628 (0.0073)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: This table shows the estimated parameter values obtained by estimating the baseline model (column
1) or a variant of the model allowing for temporary employment to be explained later in the text.
In Figure 4.14 we plot the simulated exit rates into unemployment and to a new
job, as well as all exits, against their observed counterparts. In column 1 of Table 4.10,
we additionally compare the simulated macro moments to their empirical counterparts.
Overall, the fit is quite good. The estimated model captures well the qualitative finding
that the diﬀerence in exit rates is mostly driven by JTJ transitions. In the data we also
observe a small positive eﬀect on JTU transitions which the model cannot replicate.19
The fit of the macro moments is decent, given that we have to extrapolate to the entire
economy from the set of declining industries. The main discrepancy is in the expected
hiring cost, which we overestimate considerably. However, we have to keep in mind that
this moment might not give a good description of the Austrian case as it is based on US
survey data.
While we target the average of the pre- and post-reform equilibrium unemployment
rates, the model predicts a modest decrease of unemployment from 6.54% to 5.94%,
which is driven by higher job creation. Along with 0.6 percentage points increase in
18In fact, we have estimated a diﬀerent version of the model where we fix   to a common value in
the literature and assume workers face moving costs, which are estimated. While the two models are not
separately identified given the data, we obtain reasonable moving costs of around two monthly wages.
19One explanation for the positive eﬀect could be that post-reform workers are more likely to quit a
job in order to become self-employed. Since self-employed workers are not observed in our dataset, these
workers would show up as JTU transitions. Indeed, Hacamo and Kleiner (2016) document a positive
relationship between bankruptcy and subsequent entrepreneurship by former employees.
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Figure 4.14: Cumulative share of workers leaving into unemployment and to another job,
simulated values vs. data
(a) Cumulative exit rates (all exits)
Distance to shock (months)
-20 -15 -10 -5
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
ha
vin
g 
lef
t f
irm
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
All exits
Data: Old system
Data: New system
Model: Old system
Model: New system
(b) Cumulative exit rates (JTJ)
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(c) Cumulative exit rates (JTU)
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Note: The figures compare cumulative exit rates implied by an RDD (see main text for details) on
our baseline sample to an RDD based on artificial data generated by the model using calibrated (Table
4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model parameters. Figure (a) shows all exits, while figures (b) and (c)
distinguish between JTJ and JTU transitions. Note that we only fit figures (b) and (c) as figure (a)
corresponds to the sum of figures (b) and (c).
Table 4.10: Model fit: macro variables
Simulated:
Temporary
Moment Data Baseline employment
Probability of Mass Layoﬀ 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137
Unemployment Rate 0.0680 0.0624 0.0709
Labor Market Tightness 0.3500 0.3489 0.3501
Job-Finding Rate 0.1500 0.1654 0.1865
Hiring Cost Share 0.1400 0.3505 0.3187
Share Temporary Employment 0.0400 – 0.0756
Note: The table compares observed macro moments to moments generated by the model using calibrated
(Table 4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model parameters.
employment goes an increase in output of almost one percentage point. Thus, we also
predict a productivity increase (output per worker increases by 0.33 percentage points)
which is due to faster reallocation of workers from less to more productive firms. In Figure
4.15, we plot the stationary productivity distributions before and after the reform and the
change in the number of matches in every productivity bin. Clearly, we observe a rightward
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shift as less productive firms exit the market more quickly, while more productive firms
benefit from the higher arrival rate of workers. In reality, this eﬀect might even be stronger
as we have reason to believe that our model underestimates this eﬀect.20
Figure 4.15: Stationary productivity distribution before and after the reform
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Note: The top plot shows the stationary number of workers of either eligibility status (i.e. n0(p)+n1(p))
per productivity state implied by the model using calibrated (Table 4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model
parameters, distinguishing between the pre- and post-reform steady state. The bottom plot shows the
diﬀerence in the number of workers per productivity state between the post- and the pre-reform steady
state.
4.9 A Role Model for Southern Europe?
Inflexible labor markets are among the main culprits of the persistently high unemploy-
ment rate in Southern Europe: Given the high dismissal costs in bad times and the low
arrival rate of currently employed workers, firms are reluctant to create jobs, leading
to high unemployment. As mentioned above, our model predicts a moderate eﬀect on
unemployment for Austria. However, Austria’s pre-reform system was more moderate
than the status quo of most Southern European countries. In Figure 4.16, we plot the
mandatory severance payment schemes for diﬀerent Southern European countries against
the Austrian case. While the level appears to be comparable, it is striking that the time
to eligibility is generally lower than in Austria. However, these numbers just give an
20To keep the model manageable for our structural estimation, we assume that entrepreneurs that
exit the market get to draw from the stationary distribution again. Thus, a very bad entrepreneur
might re-enter as a very good one. In reality, bad entrepreneurs remain bad even if inactive and creative
destruction should have a more persistent eﬀect.
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incomplete account of the actual dismissal costs employers face, as they do not account
for potential litigation in case of unfair dismissal, which is common in these countries: In
Portugal, for instance, the court fixes an amount of indemnification between 15 and 45
days per year of tenure, but at least three months of wages. Overall, the risk of litigation
increases the expected size of the payment, but also entails considerable uncertainty.
Figure 4.16: Mandatory severance pay in selected countries
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Note: The figure shows mandatory severance payment schemes in selected countries. The num-
bers are based on OECD Indicators of Employment Protection (http://www.oecd.org/employment/
emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm, and ILO Employment Protection Legislation
Database ?- EPLex, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home, both accessed 12/21/2016).
Baseline model. While our model cannot account for all qualitative features of the
systems in diﬀerent Southern European economies, we can explore the consequences of a
more generous severance payment scheme by either increasing  , i.e. assuming a higher
payment in case of an (unfair) dismissal of an eligible worker, or lowering ↵ and thus
mimicking a lower time to eligibility. All other parameters are held constant at either the
calibrated values (Table 4.8) or the estimated values in Table 4.9.
The results are shown in Table 4.11. In column 1, we summarize the baseline Austrian
case, where mandatory severance pay is two monthly wages and time to eligibility is 36
months. There is a moderate drop in unemployment by around 0.6 percentage points.
It turns out that job destruction increases slightly, but this is more than compensated
by the much higher eﬀect on job creation. Moreover, there is an eﬀect on output which
exceeds the eﬀect on employment, implying a productivity increase as discussed above.
In column 2, we start by increasing the size of the mandatory severance payment from
two to three monthly wages. As is apparent, there is a modest increase in the eﬀect on
unemployment, output and output per worker, but the broad conclusions stay unchanged.
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This changes once we reduce the time to eligibility to one quarter in columns 3 and 4:
There is now a marked eﬀect on unemployment of either 3 or almost 5 percentage points.
Output changes by up to 6 percentage points, accompanied by a productivity increase of
up to 0.66 percentage points.
Table 4.11: Simulation results (baseline)
Scenario:
Time to eligibility (months): 36 36 3 3
Severance pay (monthly wages): 2 3 2 3
Panel A: Unemployment
– pre-reform in % 6.54 6.71 8.95 10.80
– post-reform in % 5.94 5.94 5.94 5.94
– change in pp. 0.59 0.76 3.01 4.86
– of which job creation 0.67 0.82 3.36 5.35
– of which job destruction -0.08 -0.06 -0.36 -0.50
Panel B: Output
– change in pp. 0.97 1.17 3.84 6.13
Panel C: Output/Worker
– change in pp. 0.33 0.35 0.52 0.66
Note: This table shows results from a policy simulation exercise conducted based on the baseline model
using calibrated (Table 4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model parameters. Column 1 compares the pre-
and post-reform steady state in the Austrian case, while columns 2 to 4 vary expected time to eligibility
(1/↵) or the size of the mandatory severance payment ( ) in the pre-reform state.
These results suggest an important role for time to eligibility. In Figure 4.17 we
look at the relationship between  and ↵ and the predicted reduction in equilibrium
unemployment in more detail. Figure 4.17a demonstrates that, as long as ↵ is fixed at
1/36, the eﬀect on unemployment never exceeds one percentage point even if severance
pay is as high as four monthly wages. This changes markedly if we lower the time to
eligibility to three months, where we predict drops in unemployment between 3 and 7
percentage points and an approximately linear relationship. The relationship to time to
eligibility, by contrast, is highly nonlinear, as can be seen from Figure 4.17b.21
Allowing for temporary employment. While the previous section suggested sizable
reform eﬀects on unemployment, our model might not give a completely realistic account
of Southern European economies. The reason is that we abstract from temporary employ-
ment, which is a prevalent phenomenon in these countries. If firms can decide whether
to create regular or temporary jobs there are two margins of adjustment. The concern
might be that firms react to a reform simply by substituting temporary with regular jobs,
while unemployment is unaﬀected.
21As time to eligibility approaches zero, especially if combined with a high  , we also encounter the
case where firms do not create any vacancies and an equilibrium is not defined.
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Figure 4.17: The eﬀect of varying severance pay or time to eligibility on unemployment
(a) Severance pay
Severance Pay (Monthly Wages)
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in 
Un
em
plo
ym
en
t (
pp
.)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Time to eligibility: 36 months
Time to eligibility: 3 months
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Note: Figure (a) shows the diﬀerence between post- and pre-reform equilibrium unemployment for dif-
ferent values of the mandatory severance payment amount,  , keeping expected time to eligibility, 1/↵,
at 36 or 3. Figure (b) shows the same outcome for diﬀerent values of expected time to eligibility, keeping
the mandatory severance payment amount at 2 or 3.
Figure 4.18: Cumulative share of workers leaving into unemployment and to another job,
simulated values vs. data (allowing for temporary employment)
(a) Cumulative exit rates (all exits)
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(b) Cumulative exit rates (JTJ)
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(c) Cumulative exit rates (JTU)
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Note: The figures compare cumulative exit rates implied by an RDD (see main text for details) on our
baseline sample to an RDD based on artificial data generated by the model allowing for temporary jobs
using calibrated (Table 4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model parameters. Figure (a) shows all exits,
while figures (b) and (c) distinguish between JTJ and JTU transitions. Note that we only fit figures (b)
and (c) as figure (a) corresponds to the sum of figures (b) and (c).
We address this concern by allowing for temporary employment in our model. We
do so by assuming that firms can create vacancies either for regular or temporary jobs.
While workers in regular jobs become eligible for severance pay with probability ↵ as
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Table 4.12: Simulation results (temporary employment)
Scenario:
Time to eligibility (months): 36 36 3 3
Severance pay (monthly wages): 2 3 2 3
Panel A: Share temporary employment
– pre-reform in % 7.75 7.95 10.04 10.55
– post-reform in % 7.37 7.37 7.37 7.37
– change in pp. 0.38 0.58 2.67 3.18
Panel B: Unemployment
– pre-reform in % 7.32 7.47 9.17 10.27
– post-reform in % 6.87 6.87 6.87 6.87
– change in pp. 0.45 0.60 2.30 3.40
– of which job creation 0.42 0.47 1.74 2.33
– of which job destruction 0.03 0.13 0.56 1.07
Panel C: Output
– change in pp. 0.77 0.93 2.78 3.85
Panel D: Output/Worker
– change in pp. 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.06
Note: This table shows results from a policy simulation exercise conducted based on the model allowing
for temporary employment using calibrated (Table 4.8) and estimated (Table 4.9) model parameters.
Column 1 compares the pre- and post-reform steady state in the Austrian case, while columns 2 to 4 vary
expected time to eligibility (1/↵) or the size of the mandatory severance payment ( ) in the pre-reform
state.
before, temporary jobs never turn eligible and are dissolved at rate ↵t, where ↵t is an
exogenous probability.22 Temporary jobs yield lower value, as they are inherently less
stable, and workers are less likely to accept oﬀers for temporary jobs. Equilibrium, where
firms are indiﬀerent between posting vacancies in either submarket, is attained by fewer
firms posting vacancies in the temporary submarket which leads to a higher vacancy filling
rate. We describe the full model in Appendix C.
We stick with the calibration of the baseline model summarized in Table 4.8. We
set ↵t = 1/36, consistent with the idea that workers become eligible for severance pay
automatically after three years and firms create temporary jobs so as to avoid firing costs.
In addition to the moments targeted in the baseline estimation, we also target the fraction
of jobs subject to a temporary contract. According to the Micro Census, this is about
4%.
We summarize the estimation results in columns 2 of Table 4.9. The fit of the macro
moments is summarized in columns 2 of Table 4.10, while Figure 4.18 demonstrates the
fit of the micro moments. Overall, the fit is similar. The model does a decent job in
generating temporary employment, while all other moments are in a similar ballpark as
22We also estimated an alternative version, where a firm gets the possibility of transforming the job
into a permanent (eligible) one once the ↵t shock hits. All qualitative results are unaﬀected.
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in the baseline model.
In Table 4.12, we show the results of conducting the same policy simulation exercise
as in the baseline case. The broad conclusions regarding unemployment, output, and
output per worker are unchanged, even though the eﬀect becomes somewhat weaker.
Interestingly, firms seem to react along both margins, reducing temporary employment but
overcompensating this by the creation of new jobs so as to reduce unemployment. Thus,
it appears that a similar reform can achieve two goals—the reduction of unemployment
and the increase in the share of permanent jobs—at the same time.
4.10 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at a major change in Austrian labor market regulations:
the introduction of an occupational pension scheme based on separation payments for
private sector workers and the simultaneous abolition of a previous system of severance
payment. The new policy brought about two major changes. While only laid-oﬀ workers
were eligible for severance pay under the old system, both quitters and laid-oﬀ workers can
keep their accumulated savings on the pension account (and transfer it to a new employer
once they have a new job) in the new system. The policy change abolished a discontinuous
schedule of severance pay (with jumps at tenure thresholds) in favor of a continuous one
(with the balance of the pension account increasing smoothly with employer’s monthly
contributions). The new policy increases the incentive to quit an employment relation
with a distressed firm. By contrast, workers employed under the old system had no
such incentive but rather benefited from waiting for their layoﬀ (to receive the severance
payment).
This paper uses data from the Austrian social security register (ASSD) to study how
the policy change from severance payment to occupational pensions aﬀected job mobility.
Using an RD approach, we indeed find that job mobility in distressed firms is substantially
higher under the new system compared to the old one. The probability that a worker
is still employed at a distressed firm (that is about to experience a mass layoﬀ within
the next two years) at the date of the mass layoﬀ is 12.5 percentage points (or around
40 percent) lower then the corresponding probability for workers employed under the old
system. Moreover, the diﬀerence is almost entirely driven by transitions to new jobs
as opposed to transitions into unemployment. Thus, the new system encourages moves
from “bad” to “good” firms with potentially important consequences for the allocation of
workers and total factor productivity. By comparing workers entering firms shortly before
and after the reform, we are able to address potential concerns such as the firms’ reaction
to their workforce composition and business cycle eﬀects.
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To explore the reform’s aggregate implications, we propose an equilibrium search
model featuring endogenous layoﬀs and job-to-job mobility. In the model, workers start
out as non-eligible and turn eligible with some probability, while firms face productiv-
ity (or demand) shocks, changing the likelihood that a worker in a distressed firm will
experience a layoﬀ. When the layoﬀ probability is high, a worker who might lose her
severance payment optimally waits for the layoﬀ to occur under the old system (rather
than search hard for a new job and accept reasonable job oﬀers). Under the new system,
a worker—with a separation payment transferred to the new employer—is much more
likely to move on to a new and more productive employment relationship.
We estimate the model by Simulated Method of Moments and show that, under real-
istic parameter values, it generates diﬀerences in mobility behavior of similar magnitude
as those found in the empirical analysis. The model predicts a moderate decrease in equi-
librium unemployment (around 0.6 percentage points) as well as an increase in output
per worker, which is driven by quicker reallocation of workers along the job ladder.
Many Southern European economies have systems in place which are more extreme (in
terms of time to eligibility and expected size of payment) than the Austrian pre-reform
system. Using the parameterized model, we predict in counterfactual simulations that
a comparable reform can have sizable eﬀects on unemployment and productivity. This
conclusion even holds when allowing for temporary employment, which is widespread in
these economies. In this case, the reform is predicted to aﬀect both margins, reducing
both unemployment and temporary employment. Thus, we conclude that the Austrian
reform might be a potential role model for Southern Europe.
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4.11 Appendix
A Further Robustness Checks
Our empirical strategy is set up as if the date of a mass layoﬀ was as an “exogenous”
event. This is obviously not the case as the firm’s employment reduction is an endogenous
response of the firm to the exogenous event that triggered this response (i.e. unexpectedly
lower demand and/or reduced prices for its products or shocks that increase costs). Ideally
we would like to know the exact date when a worker learns that her firm was hit by a
shock that increases her layoﬀ probability; and the exact date when the worker is informed
that she will eventually be fired.
The purpose of this appendix is to document in more detail the size distribution and
employment dynamics of mass layoﬀ firms. We also provide related RD evidence that
supports the validity of the RD design adopted in our empirical analysis.
One concern might be that the systematically higher outflow due to new-system work-
ers changes the dynamics of the firm size over time in a way that also changes the nature
of the employment reduction and thus also the selection of firms in the pre- and the
post-reform sample. If this were the case, we should arguably see signs in the firm size
distribution in the month preceding the mass layoﬀ. In Table 4.11.1, we inspect the dis-
tribution of firm sizes (in the month preceding the mass layoﬀ), comparing the pre- and
the post-reform observations. We do not find any systematic diﬀerences. Even if there
were diﬀerences, this would not pose a problem to our strategy if the change in the firm
size distribution trends smoothly around the reform threshold. To check this, we measure
average firm size in the baseline sample 24, 12 and 1 month before the mass layoﬀ and
demonstrate that there is no discontinuity at the time of the reform in Figure 4.11.1.
We might also expect to the see the size of the actual mass layoﬀ aﬀected if more
workers exit the firm during the time preceding it. Figures 4.11.2 and 4.11.3 indicate large
variation in the size of the mass layoﬀ (while most events seem to be actual plant closures)
and even more variation in the change in employment during the two years preceding the
event. Still, Figure 4.11.4 suggests that most of the actual change in employment during
the last two years is driven by the mass layoﬀ itself (especially in absolute terms), while
in relative terms we see that some substitution takes for place for smaller layoﬀs, meaning
that smaller reductions over the last two years are accompanied by larger mass layoﬀs.
Again the crucial thing to verify is that the outcomes trend smoothly around the cutoﬀ:
In Figures 4.11.5 and 4.11.6 we confirm that this is the case, with neither the size of the
mass layoﬀ (in absolute or relative terms)23 nor the change in employment in the two
23We do observe some spikes in the absolute size of the layoﬀ especially around the year 2000. This is
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preceding years (in absolute or relative terms) showing any discontinuity at the time of
the reform.
While it might seem surprising that the change in incentives brought about by the
reform does not show up in any of the outcomes considered here, the crucial thing to
realize is that we are never comparing firms employing solely old- or new-system workers.
In fact, as we have seen in Figure 4.5, the diﬀerence in work force composition at the
firm level actually vanishes at the discontinuity. Thus, we are able to estimate the causal
response of the severance pay reform on workers’ mobility choices.
Table 4.11.1: Size distribution of mass layoﬀ firms
% Firms in Category % Workers in Category
Panel A: Pre- and post-observations
Less than 50 Employees 37.52 13.87
50 – 99 Employees 32.73 18.76
100 – 499 Employees 25.92 32.67
500 – 999 Employees 2.67 15.13
At least 1000 Employees 1.17 19.57
Observations 4198 28099
Panel B: Pre-observations only
Less than 50 Employees 37.22 13.17
50 – 99 Employees 32.48 18.29
100 – 499 Employees 25.87 31.53
500 – 999 Employees 2.90 16.99
At least 1000 Employees 1.52 20.02
Observations 2238 15600
Panel C: Post-observations only
Less than 50 Employees 37.03 14.75
50 – 99 Employees 32.80 19.35
100 – 499 Employees 26.72 34.10
500 – 999 Employees 2.63 12.80
At least 1000 Employees 0.83 19.01
Observations 2055 12499
Note: This table shows the distribution of firm sizes in the month preceding the mass layoﬀ in our baseline
sample. The first column displays the share of firms in a specific size category, while the second column
shows the share of workers in a specific size category. Panel A pools pre- and post-reform observations,
while Panel B and C restrict to pre- and post-reform observations, respectively. Even though our baseline
results indicate systematically higher outflow by post-reform workers, the firm size distribution at the
time of the actual shock does not seem to be aﬀected.
due to single large firm closures.
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Figure 4.11.1: Log Firm Size
(a) Two years before shock
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(b) One year before shock
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(c) One month before shock
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Note: The figures show results of RD regressions (based on equation (4.1)). The dependent variable is
the log of the firm size 24, 12, and 1 month before the mass layoﬀ measured at the worker level. We
give more weight to observations close the cutoﬀ by using a triangular kernel. Inference is based on a
bootstrap (1000 replications) clustered at the firm level. The results demonstrate that there are no signs
of diﬀerential firm size dynamics at the time of the reform.
Figure 4.11.2: Distribution of mass layoﬀs
(a) Relative change in employment
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(b) Absolute change in employment
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Note: The figures show histograms of the monthly employment reduction occurring at the time of the
mass layoﬀ in the baseline sample. In panel (a) we display the employment reduction relative to the firm
size one month before, while panel (b) shows the absolute reduction.
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Figure 4.11.3: Relative change in employment 24 months until 1 month before mass layoﬀ
(a) Relative change in employment
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(b) Absolute change in employment
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Note: The figures show histograms of the change in employment occurring two years until one month
before the mass layoﬀ in the baseline sample. In panel (a) we display the change in employment relative
to the firm size one month before, while panel (b) shows the absolute change.
Figure 4.11.4: Change in last two years against change in last month
(a) Month -24 until Month 0 vs. Month
-1 until Month 0 (relative)













(
P
S
OR
\P
H
Q
W
5
H
G
X
FW
LR
Q
OD
VW


0
R
Q
WK
V
     
0RQWKO\(PSOR\PHQW5HGXFWLRQDW0DVV/D\RII
(b) Month -24 until Month 0 vs. Month
-1 until Month 0 (absolute)
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Note: The figures show the relationship between the change in employment occurring during the last two
years and the last month preceding the mass layoﬀ, either in relative terms (panel (a)) or in absolute
terms (panel (b)). The dots indicate averages within 100 quantiles of the variable on the horizontal axis,
respectively. The dashed line denotes the 45  line. The results indicate that most of the reduction during
the last two years before the mass layoﬀ are driven by the change due to the actual mass layoﬀ. In relative
terms, some substitution appears to occur, as firms with smaller reductions during the time preceding
the mass layoﬀ experience somewhat larger mass layoﬀs.
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Figure 4.11.5: Average layoﬀ size by start date
(a) Relative
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(b) Absolute
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Note: The figures show results of RD regressions (based on equation (4.1)). The dependent variable is
the monthly employment reduction at the time of the mass layoﬀ relative to the firm size one month
before (panel (a)) and in absolute terms (panel (b)) measured at the worker level. We give more weight
to observations close the cutoﬀ by using a triangular kernel. Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000
replications) clustered at the firm level. The results demonstrate that there are no signs of diﬀerences in
shock size at the time of the reform.
Figure 4.11.6: Change in employment 24 months before mass layoﬀ until 1 month before
mass layoﬀ
(a) Relative change
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(b) Absolute change
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Note: The figures show results of RD regressions (based on equation (4.1)). The dependent variable is the
employment reduction between two years and one month before the mass layoﬀ, relative to employment
two years before (panel (a)) and in absolute terms (panel (b)) measured at the worker level. We give more
weight to observations close the cutoﬀ by using a triangular kernel. Inference is based on a bootstrap (1000
replications) clustered at the firm level. The results demonstrate that there are no signs of diﬀerences in
shock size at the time of the reform.
B Baseline Model
Steady State
The value of a firm employing an eligible worker, J1(p), is given by (throughout, primes
denote next-period values)
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J1(p) = p w1(p)+  (  )+ (1  fµ¯1(p)  )
Z p
p
 1(p
0)(  )+(1  1(p0))J1(p0) dF (p0|p),
where w1(p) is the bargained wage of an eligible worker given productivity p. Firms
currently earn p   w1(p). With probability (1    fµ1(p)    ), the match persists and a
new productivity realization p0 is drawn. Upon observing this draw, firms can either shut
down and pay  or continue to produce, earning J1(p0).
The value of a firm employing a non-eligible worker, J0(p), satisfies
J0(p) = p  w0(p) +  (1   fµ¯0(p)   )
Z p
p
↵ ( 1(p
0)(  ) + (1   1(p0))J1(p0))
+ (1  ↵)(1   0(p0))J0(p0) dF (p0|p).
Given that the match persists, workers become eligible with probability ↵. In this case,
the firm has to pay  if shutting down and has continuation value J1(p0) else. If the
worker does not become eligible, the firm does not have to make a transfer in case of a
layoﬀ, while it continues with J0(p0) if not.
The value of an eligible worker, W1(p), is given by
W1(p) = w1(p) +   (U +  )
+   f
Z p
p
↵µ11(p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ01(p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+  (1   fµ¯1(p)   )
Z p
p
 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0)dF (p0|p),
where U is the value when unemployed. A worker currently earns w1(p), with probability  
an exogenous separation occurs, and with probability  f an outside oﬀer with productivity
po is obtained. If the workers does not receive an outside oﬀer or turns it down, the worker
becomes unemployed and receives  if the firm is shut down, while receiving continuation
value W1(p0) otherwise.
The value of a non-eligible worker, W0(p), is given by
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W0(p) = w0(p) +   U
+   f
Z p
p
↵µ10(p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ00(p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+  (1   fµ¯0(p)   )
Z p
p
↵ [ 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0)]
+ (1  ↵) [ 0(p0)U + (1   0(p0))W0(p0)] dF (p0|p).
Note that neither an eligible nor a non-eligible worker will accept an oﬀer that results in
an immediate layoﬀ  i(po) = 1 due to the bargaining assumption. Hence, we do not have
to account for this possibility.
The value when unemployed reads:
U = b+  f
Z p
p
↵µ1u(p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0u(po)W0(po) dG(po) +  (1  fµ¯u)U
We assume that firms have to pay  to an eligible worker if bargaining breaks down.
As the value of a vacancy is 0, firms’ outside value is 0  =   . Workers’ outside value
is U +  . The common surplus, S1(p) is then given by
S1(p) = (W1(p)  (U +  )) + (J1(p)  (  )) = W1(p)  U + J1(p).
Nash bargaining implies
W1(p)  (U +  ) =  S1(p) and J1(p) +  = (1   )S1(p),
where   denotes workers’ bargaining power. Similarly, the surplus if the worker is not
eligible, S0(p), is given by
S0(p) = W0(p)  U + J0(p)
and
W0(p)  U =  S0(p) and J0(p) = (1   )S0(p).
There is no need to solve explicitly for the values of workers and firms, since all
equilibrium objects can be characterized as functions of the surplus functions. Combining
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the firm’s and worker’s value functions and using the bargaining assumption, we find
S1(p) = p  b+  f
Z p
p
↵( µ11(p, p
o)  µ1u(po))( S1(po) +  )
+ (1  ↵)( µ01(p, po)  µ0u(po)) S0(po) dG(po)
+  (1      fµ¯1(p))
Z p
p
(1   1(p0))S1(p0)dF (p0|p) (4.7)
and
S0(p) = p  b+  f
Z p
p
↵( µ10(p, p
o)  µ1u(po))( S1(po) +  )
+ (1  ↵)( µ00(p, po)  µ0u(po)) S0(po) dG(po)
+  (1      fµ¯0(p))
Z p
p
↵(1   1(p0))S1(p0) + (1  ↵)(1   0(p0))S0(p0)dF (p0|p). (4.8)
Surplus Functions in Transition
To account for transition from the old to the new steady state, fix a value of ✓ and hence
of f . The surplus function of the new-system workers is not aﬀected and still satisfies
equations (4.3) and (4.2) for a given f (note that both equations coincide for  = 0). Call
it S˜new, where tilde denotes values in transition in what follows. The old-system workers
take into account that any new match will be subject to the new system. Hence, their
surplus functions satisfy
S˜old1 (p) = p  b+  f
Z p
p
( µ˜old1 (p, p
o)  µ˜u(po)) S˜new(po) dG(po)
+  (1      f ¯˜µold1 (p))
Z p
p
(1   ˜old1 (p0))S˜old1 (p0)dF (p0|p) (4.9)
and
S˜old0 (p) = p  b+  f
Z p
p
( µ˜old0 (p, p
o)  µ˜u(po)) S˜new(po) dG(po)
+  (1      f ¯˜µold0 (p))
Z p
p
↵(1   ˜old1 (p0))S˜old1 (p0)
+ (1  ↵)(1   ˜old0 (p0))S˜old0 (p0)dF (p0|p). (4.10)
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Optimal firm closures follow as
 ˜old0 (p) = 1
n
S˜old0 (p) < 0
o
 ˜old1 (p) = 1
n
S˜old1 (p) < 0
o
 ˜new(p) = 1
n
S˜new(p) < 0
o
,
while workers’ acceptance rules are given by
µ˜old0 (p, p
o) =1
(
 S˜new(po) > ↵ +
Z p
p
↵(1   ˜old1 (p0)) S˜old1 (p0)
+ (1  ↵)(1   ˜old0 (p0)) S˜old0 (p0) dF (p0|p)
)
µ˜old1 (p, p
o) =1
(
 S˜new(po) >  +
Z p
p
(1   ˜old1 (p0)) S˜old1 (p0) dF (p0|p)
)
µ˜new(p, po) =1
(
 S˜new(po) >
Z p
p
(1   ˜new(p0)) S˜new(p0) dF (p0|p)
)
.
C Allowing for Temporary Jobs
Environment
The environment in the baseline model is adapted by adding the possibility to create
temporary jobs. We assume that temporary jobs are fixed-term. That is, with exogenous
rate ↵t, temporary matches are dissolved at the beginning of the period.
Endogenous Firm and Worker Decisions
We denote by  i(p) 2 {0, 1, t} the endogenous firm closure decision given productivity p
and eligibity status i of the worker, where t now indicates a temporary job. Moreover,
let µji (p, po) indicate the endogenous decision of a worker with current eligibility status
i 2 {0, 1, t} employed by a firm facing productivity p to accept an outside oﬀer by a
firm facing productivity po where she will have eligibility status j 2 {0, 1, t}. The overall
probability that a worker accepts an outside oﬀer for a regular job given productivity p
and eligibility status i is given by
µ¯i(p) =
Z p
p
↵µ1i (p, p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0i (p, po) dG(po).
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Similarly, denote by µju(po) the endogenous decision by an unemployed worker to accept
an oﬀer by a firm facing productivity po where she will have eligibility status j 2 {0, 1, t}
and define the overall probability of accepting a regular job as
µ¯u(p) =
Z p
p
↵µ1u(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0u(po) dG(po).
Bellman Equations
The value of a firm with an eligible worker, J1(p), is given by
J1(p) = p  w1(p) +   (  )+
 (1   frµ¯1(p)   ftµt1(p)   )
Z p
p
 1(p
0)(  ) + (1   1(p0))J1(p0)dF (p0|p),
where fr and ft denote the probability that a worker meets a firm oﬀering a regular or
temporary job, respectively.
The value of a firm with a non-eligible worker, J0(p), satisfies
J0(p) = p  w0(p)+
 (1   frµ¯0(p)   ftµt0(p)   )
Z p
p
↵ [ 1(p
0)(  ) + (1   1(p0))J1(p0)]
+ (1  ↵)(1   0(p0))J0(p0)dF (p0|p),
while the value of a temporary job to a firm, Jt(p), is given by
Jt(p) = p  wt(p) +  (1   frµ¯t(p)   ftµtt(p)   )
Z p
p
(1  ↵t)(1   t(p0))Jt(p0)dF (p0|p).
In addition to exogenous separations with rate   and job-to-job transitions, a temporary
job is destroyed at the beginning of a period at rate ↵t.
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The value of an eligible worker, W1(p), is given by
W1(p) = w1(p) +   (U +  )
+   fr
Z p
p
↵µ11(p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ01(p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+   ft
Z p
p
µt1(p, p
o)Wt(p
o) dG(po)
+  (1   frµ¯1(p)   ftµ1t (p)   )
Z p
p
 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0)dF (p0|p),
where U is the value when unemployed, G(po) is the distribution of outside oﬀers po (i.e.
the unconditional distribution of p), and  1(p) takes the value 1 if a firm with an eligible
worker is shut down given p and zero otherwise. A worker currently earns w1(p), with
probability   an exogenous separation occurs, and with probability  f an outside oﬀer
with productivity po is obtained. If the workers does not receive an outside oﬀer or turns
it down, the worker becomes unemployed and receives  if the firm is shut down, while
receiving continuation value W1(p0) otherwise.
The value of a non-eligible worker, W0(p), is given by
W0(p) = w0(p) +   U
+   fr
Z p
p
↵µ10(p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ00(p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+   ft
Z p
p
µt0(p, p
o)Wt(p
o) dG(po)
+  (1   frµ¯0(p)   ftµ0t (p)   )
Z p
p
↵ [ 1(p
0)(U +  ) + (1   1(p0))W1(p0)]
+ (1  ↵) [ 0(p0)U + (1   0(p0))W0(p0)] dF (p0|p).
The value of a temporary worker, Wt(p), is given by
Wt(p) = wt(p) +   U
+   fr
Z p
p
↵µ1t (p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0t (p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+   ft
Z p
p
µtt(p, p
o)Wt(p
o) dG(po)
+ (1    frµ¯t(p)  ftµtt(p))
Z p
p
↵tU+(1 ↵t) [ t(p0)U + (1   t(p0))Wt(p0)] dF (p0|p).
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The value when unemployed reads:
U = b+  fr
Z p
p
↵µ1u(p, p
o)W1(p
o) + (1  ↵)µ0u(p, po)W0(po) dG(po)
+  ft
Z p
p
µtu(p
o)Wt(p
o) dG(po) +  (1  frµ¯u   ftµtu)U
The surplus functions satisfy:
S1(p) = (W1(p)  (U +  )) + (J1(p)  (  )) = W1(p)  U + J1(p).
W1(p)  (U +  ) =  S1(p) and J1(p) +  = (1   )S1(p),
S0(p) = W0(p)  U + J0(p)
W0(p)  U =  S0(p) and J0(p) = (1   )S0(p).
St(p) = Wt(p)  U + Jt(p)
Wt(p)  U =  St(p) and Jt(p) = (1   )St(p).
Combining the firm’s and worker’s value functions and using the bargaining assump-
tion, we find
S1(p) = p  b+  frO1(p) +  ftOt1(p)
+  (1   frµ¯1(p)   ftµ1t (p)   )
Z p
p
(1   1(p0))S1(p0)dF (p0|p), (4.11)
S0(p) = p  b+  frO0(p) +  ftOt0(p)
+  (1   frµ¯0(p)   ftµt0(p)   )
Z p
p
↵(1   1(p0))S1(p0)
+ (1  ↵)(1   0(p0))S0(p0)dF (p0|p), (4.12)
and
St(p) = p  b+  frOt(p) +  ftOtt(p)
+  (1   frµ¯t(p)   ftµtt(p)   )
Z p
p
(1  ↵t)(1   t(p0))St(p0)dF (p0|p). (4.13)
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where
Oi(p) =
Z p
p
↵( µ1i (p, p
o) µ1u(po))( S1(po)+ )+(1 ↵)( µ0i (p, po) µ0u(po)) S0(po) dG(po),
for i 2 {0, 1, t}, denotes the option value due to a potential transition to a regular job
and
Oti(p) =
Z p
p
( µti(p, p
o)  µtu(po)) St(po) dG(po)
for i 2 {0, 1, t}, denotes the option value due to a potential transition to a temporary job.
µu(po) takes the value 1 if an unemployed accepts an oﬀer with initial productivity po
and the decision rules to shut down the firm,  0, 1, and  t, are given by
 i = 1 {Si < 0} for i 2 {0, 1, t} .
That is, due to the bargaining assumption, it does not matter whether we think of a
lay-oﬀ as firm- or worker-induced, since both parties choose to shut down the firm as soon
as the joint surplus falls below zero.
The decision rules of the workers are given by
µji (p, p
o) = 1[V oj (p
o) > V si (p)] for i 2 {0, 1, t, u} and j 2 {0, 1, t} ,
where V oi and V sj denote, respectively, the workers’ value of staying with i and the oﬀer
j. The value of the oﬀer satisfies
V o0 (p
o) =  S0(p
o)
V ot (p
o) =  St(p
o)
V o1 (p
o) =  S1(p
o) +  ,
while the value of staying can be written
V s0 (p) = ↵ +
Z p
p
↵ [(1   1(p0)) S1(p0)] + (1  ↵)(1   0(p0)) S0(p0) dF (p0|p)
V st (p) =
Z p
p
(1  ↵t)(1   t(p0)) St(p0) dF (p0|p)
V s1 (p) =  +
Z p
p
(1   1(p0)) S1(p0) dF (p0|p)
V su (p) = 0.
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Stationary Employment Distribution
Since there is a unit measure of workers, the unemployment rate satisfies u =
R p
p n0(p) +
n1(p) + nt(p) dp.
n0(p), n1(p), and nt(p) satisfy the following properties: For all p0 2
⇥
p, p
⇤
,
n0(p
0) = (1   0(p0))(1  ↵)
Z p
p
(1   frµ¯0(p)   ftµt0(p)   )n0(p)f(p0|p) dp
+ (1  ↵)fruµ0u(p0)g(p0)
+ (1  ↵) fr
Z p
p
(n0(p)µ
0
0(p, p
0) + n1(p)µ01(p, p
0) + nt(p)µ0t (p, p
0))g(p0)dp, (4.14)
n1(p
0) = (1   1(p0))
Z p
p
(1   frµ¯1(p)   ftµ1t (p)   )n1(p)f(p0|p) dp
+ ↵fruµ
1
u(p
0)g(p0) + ↵ fr
Z p
p
(n0(p)µ
1
0(p, p
0) + n1(p)µ11(p, p
0) + nt(p)µ1t (p, p
0))g(p0)dp
+ ↵(1   1(p0))
Z p
p
(1   frµ¯0(p)   ftµt0(p)   )n0(p)f(p0|p) dp, (4.15)
and
nt(p
0) = (1  ↵t)(1   t(p0))
Z p
p
(1   frµ¯t(p)   ftµtt(p)   )nt(p)f(p0|p) dp
+ ftuµ
t
u(p
0)g(p0) +  ft
Z p
p
(n0(p)µ
t
u(p, p
0) + n1(p)µt1(p, p
0) + nt(p)µtt(p, p
0))g(p0)dp. (4.16)
Zero Profit Condition
We assume that there are two submarkets, one for permanent and one for temporary
jobs. Denote by vr and vt the number of vacancies for permanent and temporary jobs,
respectively. To keep things simple, we assume that the eﬀective number of job seekers,
u+  (1  u), always searches in both markets.
The number of meetings between a vacant firm and a potential employee in submarket
i 2 {r, t} is then given by the meeting function
mi = m(u+  (1  u), vi).
Define labor market tightness ✓i ⌘ viu+ (1 u) . Assuming that m(u +  (1   u), v) satisfies
constant returns to scale, we can write for the probability that a vacant firm meets a
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worker in submarket i, qi,
qi =
mi
vi
= m(✓ 1i , 1) ⌘ q(✓i) with q0(✓i) < 0.
The probability of meeting an unemployed person is given by qiu/(u +  (1   u)), while
the probability of meeting an employed person is given by qi (1 u)/(u+ (1 u)). The
probability that an unemployed person meets a firm in submarket i, fi, can be written
fi =
mi
u+  (1  u) = m(1, ✓i) ⌘ f(✓i) with f
0(✓i) > 0,
while the probability that an employed person meets a firm is given by  fi.
Denote by ai(po) the probability that an oﬀer by a firm with initial productivity po
and status i 2 {0, 1, t} is accepted. It is given by
ai(p
o) =
u
u+  (1  u) ·µ
i
u(p
o)+
 (1  u)
u+  (1  u) ·
R p
p n0(p)µ
i
0(p, p
o) + n1(p)µi1(p, p
o) + nt(p)µit(p, p
o)dp
1  u .
The expected value of a vacancy in submarket t, Vt, then satisfies
Vt =  c+  q(✓t)
Z p
p
at(p
o)(1   )St(po) dG(po),
while the value of a vacancy in submarket r, Vr, satisfies
V0 =  c+  q(✓r)
Z p
p
↵a1(p
o)((1   )S1(po)   ) + (1  ↵)a0(po)(1   )S0(po) dG(po).
A vacant firm pays hiring costs c every period. With probability qi the firm meets a
potential worker and draws initial productivity po from the distribution G(po). If the
oﬀer is accepted, the firm can start producing in the subsequent period, yielding value Ji.
Due to free entry, a vacancy has to yield zero expected profits, i.e.
Vi = 0 for i 2 {r, t} , (4.17)
also implying that firms are indiﬀerent between creating temporary and permanent jobs
in equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Definition 4.2. An equilibrium is given by functions {n0(p), n1(p), nt(p)}, values {S0(p), S1(p), St(p)}
and labor market tightness {✓r, ✓t} such that
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1. {S0(p), S1(p), St(p)} solve the recursive equations (4.11), (4.12), and (4.13);
2. {n0(p), n1(p), nt(p)} solve the recursive equations (4.14), (4.15), and (4.16);
3. {✓r, ✓t} solve the zero-profit condition (4.17).
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